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Glossary of the Terms 
Bakshish (tips) Bakshish comes from a Persian word ‘bakhshesh’ which is synonymous to 
"tip" in the conventional western sense (Wiki). In this study, it indicates a 
kind of “tip” which is given to the lower level officials to maintain a good 
rapport for the continuation of the favor/support in future. 
Dalal (broker) The persons who are involved with the processes of persuasion for a 
service, generally in exchange of money. They act like a middleman. In 
Bangladesh, there is no legal/formal existence for these Dalal as they are 
not registered for doing so. 
Kalobazar (black 
market) 
Kalobazar is an informal market for the trade of illegal goods and illegal 
transactions. The people who are involved with this market are known as 
Kalobazari (blackmarketeers/scalpers) and the system is also known as 
Kalobazari (black marketing/scalping). 
Tadbir (lobbying) Tadbir is a kind of lobbying to manage a decision taken or to be taken by 
an authority overruling, breaking, or bending existing norms and practices. 
It is a tradition of highly personal lobbying designed to secure individual 
benefits (Jamil and Haque, 2005:175-178).  
Upodhoukon 
(Gift) 
Upodhoukon is synonymous to gift which are given to someone for the 
future anticipated gain from the respective person.  
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Abstract...... 
Corruption has been considered as one of the most prevalent and persistent challenges in enhancing 
economic growth and improving the quality of life of the citizens across the globe. Amidst the negative 
consequences of corruption and the limited successes in controlling corruption in many countries, the 
potentials to combat corruption by using E-governance is gaining popularity in the public policy discourse. 
This increased enthusiasm demands further inquiry to understand the degree of effectiveness. The present 
study is an attempt to explore this potential of E-governance through the use of global level data as well as 
micro level cases. The global data are collected from the two databases: Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) by Transparency International and Online Service Index (OSI) by United Nation; while the micro 
level cases are taken from a country (Bangladesh) where the intensity of corruption is comparatively higher 
and the system of E-governance is emerging. The findings of the current research reaffirm the potential of 
E-governance as a means to curb corruption with some observations and conditions. The findings based 
on the state level data indicate that E-governance can explain most of the variations of the level of 
corruption in the different countries i.e. support the main argument of the study that E-governance may 
have positive impacts in reducing corruption. The findings seem to be robust and more consistent in the 
developing countries though some of the developed countries, particularly the OECD countries show 
inconsistent trends. These findings are also consistent with other studies, e.g. the study of Andrew (2009) 
who conducted the research by WB’s ‘Control of Corruption Index’. The patterns of corruption may provide 
an explanation of the variations of the effectiveness of E-governance in the different countries. It may be 
more effective on certain types of corruption (like petty corruption done by street level bureaucrats) by 
changing the service delivery channels and by eliminating the provisions for the direct human interaction 
as it can increase the bargaining power of the respective officials. In contrast, E-governance may not be 
effective for the policy level or the strategic corruption as E-governance itself is dependent on those policy 
inputs; like the tailor-made specifications to favor someone in the bidding. E-governance is just a tool to 
select the best bidder based on those policy decisions and if the policies are flawed or biased then it may 
play a limited role to curb corruption. 
From the micro level cases, it appears that the mere introduction of E-governance is not sufficient to control 
corruption, its nature and maturity levels are also important. As part of the natural experimental design, 
the study includes different levels of E-governance to understand the dynamics between E-governance and 
corruption. The dynamics that emerged from the different levels of E-governance provide some 
understandings about the nature of E-governance which can have greater impacts on corruption and some 
insights on explaining the limited successes of the different E-governance initiatives/projects. From the 
sample cases, it appears that E-governance may have larger impacts when it can affect power relations in 
an organization. This power can be affected when E-governance can provide an alternative service delivery 
channel through the electronic platform. In such a case, officials lose their power to influence, as the 
respective process may entirely be decided automatically through the electronic platform. The discretionary 
power of the officials can also be affected if the accountability system can be improved. In the sample cases, 
though there are indications for the improvement of the monitoring and the investigation capacities due to 
higher traceability by E-governance; but such development fails to achieve the desired success due to lack 
of ‘enforcement of the law’ and some other implementation related challenges. E-governance as a tool can 
detect corrupt activities and can expose the corrupt persons, but after that, the key to control corruption is 
to take necessary actions based on the detections. If these conditions are fulfilled, then an E-governance 
initiative may demonstrate more effectiveness in curbing corruption. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.0 Background 
Corruption, in its many guises, is a global phenomenon which is deeply embedded in the very 
fabric of a society (Carr and Outhwaite, 2013:3). It undermines good governance and rule of law, 
negatively impacts service quality and efficiency, and poses threats to the principles of democracy, 
justice and the economy (Graycar and Sidebottom, 2012: 384). Corruption has been considered as 
one of the most prevalent and persistent challenges in enhancing economic growth and improving 
the quality of life of the citizens across the globe (Mistry and Jalal, 2012: 147). Most of the 
empirical studies find that corruption is detrimental to the economic growth and the development 
of a country. Studies that supports this view include Akaiet al. (2005), Blackburn et al.(2006), 
Lambsdorff (2003), Li et al. (2000), Mauro (1997), Shaw et al. (2006), Svendsen (2003), Temple 
(2000) and Welsch (2004) (cited in Paul, 2010: 247). Though some researchers supported that 
corruption might be desirable (like Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998; 
cited in Mo, 2001:66). They argue that corruption works like piece-rate pay for bureaucrats, which 
induces a more efficient provision of government services, and provides a leeway for entrepreneurs 
to bypass the rigid rules and regulations (Ibid, 66). In contrasts, the studies like Mauro (1995), 
Ades and De Tella (1997) and Kaufmann and Wei (1999) rejected the ‘efficiency effects’ of 
corruption (Me´on and Weill, 2010: 244); Kaufmann and Wei (1999:15) found that the 
multinationals that pay more bribes also tend to spend more time in negotiating with the foreign 
countries’ officials. Corruption also undermines growth and development of a country especially 
in the developing countries by diverting resources away from the development programs and thus 
increasing poverty, inequality and underdevelopment1 (Moleketi, 2009: 334). It can become threat 
to the very security of many states when, in alliance with trans-state criminal organizations 
(Collier, 2002:2). Amidst the negative consequences and the limited successes to control 
                                                 
1For example, twelve hundred new primary schools can be established in Bangladesh by the financial loss of 
corruption in a year (Iqbal, 2010:84). 
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corruption in many countries, the potentials to increase transparency and to combat corruption by 
using E-governance is gaining popularity in the communities of E-government practitioners and 
researchers (Wescott, 2003; APDIP, 2006; cited in Kim et.al. 2009: 42). This increased enthusiasm 
demands further inquiry to understand the degree of effectiveness to control corruption by E-
governance. Present study is an attempt to explore this potential of E-governance based on the 
empirical evidences.   
1.1 Problem Statement and Rationales of the Study 
Different case studies like Iqbal & Seo (2008), Bhatnagaret al. (2007), NeGP Report, (2007), 
Pathak and Prasad (2006), Csáki & Gelléri (2005) and Cho & Choi (2004) (cited in Ojha et.al, 
2008:163) showed that E-government can play a significant role in reducing corruption in the 
different countries. However, these studies are mostly project related studies and each project is 
distinct and unique and may have some contextual factors for the successes. That is why those 
studies suffer in terms of the ‘external validity’. Their findings cannot be generalized fully and one 
cannot expect to produce the same results in other contexts (Kim, 2013: 2). Though, these studies 
have narrow and limited scopes but at the same time, generated the enthusiasm for curbing 
corruption by adopting E-governance. In addition, through the logics of the ‘general equilibrium 
effects’; these findings can also be challenged (Rodrik, 2008, cited in Andersen, 2009: 202). It 
indicates that due to anti-corruption drive ‘corruption’ may transfer from one domain to other 
domains of an economic system. The introduction of E-governance may be successful to eliminate 
or to reduce corruption in one area (partial equilibrium) but at the aggregated level (general 
equilibrium level), it may not be proved successful as corruption may shift to other domains and 
starts to grow. To capture this probable shifting of arena or displacement of corruption, a macro 
level analysis may produce more comprehensive understanding. Because, then it will be possible 
to measure the overall impacts of E-governance on corruption in a country. Anderson (2009) 
conducted such type of macro level studies by using World Bank’s database of corruption (Control 
of Corruption Index). However, there is another important and comprehensive database on 
corruption (Corruption Perception Index) by Transparency International. Based on this index, 
another study can be conducted to confirm the extent of the validity of the earlier studies. However, 
this macro level study can only produce the statistical trends between E-governance and 
corruption; not the processes. For better understanding of the processes, the analysis of micro level 
cases can be an effective approach as it can generate details of the effect of the different factors 
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and their causal relations. It also can help to enhance further effectiveness of E-governance 
initiatives/projects by identifying the limitations of the existing approaches. Therefore, the 
rationale that stems from these discussions is for the need of a combined study at both ‘Macro’ 
and ‘Micro’ level.  
1.2 Research Question 
Based on the problem statement and the rationales of the study, the research question can be put 
as: 
 
RQ: What E-governance does and how it reduces corruption? 
This research question can be divided into two parts: first part is about the probable effects of E-
governance on corruption while the second part is related with the processes of effecting corruption 
by E-governance.  
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
1.3.1 Overall Objective  
The major objective of the research is to analyze the effectiveness of E-governance in reducing 
corruption. 
1.3.2 Specific Objectives  
The specific objectives of the research are: 
 To explore the probable effects of E-governance on corruption in the different countries 
based on the longitudinal data analyses. 
 To identify the probable variations of the effectiveness of E-governance on corruption based 
on the nature of the countries (like developing/developed countries). 
 To explore the probable causal relations between E-governance and corruption based on the 
‘Micro level’ case studies. 
 To understand the processes through which E-governance may reduce corruption.  
1.4 Delimitation 
In the ‘Macro level’, the study needs to be confined between the year 2010 and 2012 due to the 
change of the calculation method of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) after the year 2010. 
Because, any comparison of the data after 2010 with the earlier data may generate wrong readings 
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of the data. As CPI is the combination of both the private and the public sector corruption, the 
study covers both types of corruption in the macro level analyses. However, in the ‘micro level’ 
cases; the study mainly concentrate on the public sector corruption, though it covers the nexus 
between the public and the private sector where the interests of the respective actors intersect but 
individually the private sector is not considered for the study. The public sector analysis is based 
on two public organizations which are selected on certain rationales, like intensity of corruption, 
existence of E-governance and their maturity level, accessibility to data of the researcher etc. At 
the Macro level, the study only considers the economic nature of the countries (e.g. low income, 
middle income, high income etc.) to understand the probable variations of the effectiveness of E-
governance on corruption; but it does not explore the impacts of other important determinants of 
corruption like culture, governance system, regional variations, religion, education etc. due to 
limited time and resources. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The first chapter is a brief outline of the entire manuscript along with the rationales, research 
questions, objectives and the scope of the study. Chapter two depicts briefly the earlier literature 
with the relevant theoretical underpinnings. The chapter continued in detailing the hypotheses and 
the variables of the study and their operationalizations. Third chapter is an illustration of the 
methodology and the estimation processes for the study. Fourth chapter provides a brief 
description of the background information of the two sample cases. Fifth chapter presents the 
findings based on the macro level statistics and then goes for testing the hypothesis of the study. 
Sixth chapter shares the findings and the test results of the hypotheses based on the micro level 
cases. The seventh chapter draws all the trends that emerged from both the macro and the micro 
level findings together not in a conclusion but in some closing statements along with their probable 
implications for the policy interventions as well as their theoretical relevance. It is evident that the 
research probably left many questions unexplored like the implications of the cultural or the 
regional varieties (the variation in Africa, Asia or in Europe). All those unexplored questions are 
left as the scopes of further research for the future researchers. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FOUNDATION 
 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 “A social science theory is a reasoned and precise speculation about the answer to a research 
question, including a statement about why the proposed answer is correct” (King et al. 1995:19). 
These speculations can generate both the descriptive and the causal hypotheses, which need to be 
tested through empirical evidences. This chapter of the research paper focuses on the theoretical 
answers of the research question and tries to understand the dynamics that exists between E-
governance and corruption. Before analyzing the theoretical arguments, the chapter starts with the 
conceptual discussions and the operational definitions to clarify the key terms. Then it proceeds 
with a brief literature review on the previous studies depicting the probable effects of E-governance 
on corruption. In the next section, the study concentrates on the discussions of the logics, which 
can set the rules of the game for corruption and their associated theoretical underpinnings. From 
these theoretical arguments, the study derives the hypotheses to test the validity of the assumed 
nature of relations between E-governance and corruption. The chapter concludes with the 
descriptions and the operationalization of the variables of the study.  
2.1 Corruption and E-governance: Conceptual Foundations 
2.1.1 Corruption 
The search for a definition of corruption has long been a feature of conceptual and political 
analysis. Traditional conceptions of corruption that focused on the ‘moral vitality’ of whole 
societies have given way to the definitions based on ‘behavior classification’, in which specific 
actions of a nation are measured against a variety of standards (Pillay and Dorasamy, 2010: 363). 
Me´on and Weill (2010: 254) identified two perspectives of corruption: ‘Moralistic’ and 
‘Functionalistic’. From the ‘Moralistic’ perspective, Moleketi (2009: 332) defines corruption as 
the process that “undermines the value system, the norms and the very cohesion of society”. The 
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‘Functionalistic’ perspective reflects the relationships between the individuals and the institutions, 
which is rooted in the operation of market forces, the pursuit of individual prosperity as opposed 
to the common good (Moleketi, 2009: 332). In between these two perspectives of the society and 
the market; there is another perspective which can be labeled as the ‘legalistic perspective’ 
(Heidenheimer et al. 1999: 166). It is based on ‘Public-office-centered’ definitions which can be 
illustrated by the work of Nye who defined corruption as “behavior which deviates from the normal 
duties of a public role because of private-regarding (close family, personal, private clique), 
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence” (cited in Heidenheimer and et al. 1999: 165).These definitions can be argued as the 
explanations of corruption rather than the definitions which explain how it happens rather than 
what constitutes corruption. In social perspective (moral approach), the institutions set certain 
standards of norms and values which need to be complied by its members. In the functionalistic 
perspective (market approach), institution can generate individualism that can lead to the rise of 
the rampant pursuit of individual gain. Under such situation, everyone is profit maximizing selfish 
agent who tries to attain individual gain by undermining the goals and the objectives of the national 
and the community level development (Moleketi, 2009: 332). The last perspective, legalistic 
approach is about the deviation from the existing rules and regulations. This perspective is 
different from the social perspective as it is mainly based on the established formal rules which 
can be different from the social norms and values. Though, the social norms and values can have 
significant impacts in the formulation of the formal rules and regulations and from that point of 
view both of the perspectives may have many common grounds. In addition, both of the 
approaches can have strong influence to determine the degree of the ‘functionalistic’ nature of an 
individual as both are designed to regulate the selfish profit maximizing nature of a person.  
Now, to understand what constitute corruption; the definition by Waldman (1974) can be useful; 
he defined corruption as “(1) a public official, (2) who misuses his authority, position, or power, 
and as a result, (3) violates some existing, legal norm in his or her particular country. The corrupt 
act is (4) usually done in secret and (5) is for personal gain in wealth or status or in preferment of 
family, friends, ethnic or religious groups. In collusive forms of corruption, (6) an outside party is 
involved (e.g. foreign businessmen)” (cited in Doin, 2010:45). In the current discourse of 
corruption, the definition by World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as “the abuse of 
public office for private gains”, has received much attention from both the policymakers and the 
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researchers (Elbahnasawy and Revier, 2012: 311). Though, this definition indicates that corruption 
is something related with the public offices but it is self-evident that the main arena and the agents 
of corruption is not always a public official. Similar nature of definition is also given by 
Transparency International’s (TI) in slightly different way which may be more comprehensive. It 
defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Website: TI). This definition 
has two key components: entrusted power and the private gain. Here ‘entrusted power’ can be 
understood as the assigned responsibilities for the specific task/s. The exercise of this power can 
be treated as corruption when someone capitalizes the power for the personal benefits/interests. 
Thus, the combination of both the components can lead to the corrupt activities. This definition is 
more comprehensive in a sense that it can cover the corruption from both the private and the public 
sectors and their nexus (Website: U4). Here, misuse of power from any sector for the private gain 
is treated as corruption. This study considers the TI’s definition of corruption as the operational 
definition because of this comprehensiveness and the consistency with the purposes of the study. 
2.1.2 E-governance 
With the advancement of ICT (Information and Communication Technology), the words like E-
government and E-governance have come into prominence (Godse and Garg, 2006:13). In fact, in 
many cases, both of these terms are used synonymously although they are quite different and have 
different audiences to cater to and different objectives to achieve (Ibid, 13). The definitions of E-
governance range from “the use of information technology to free movement of information to 
overcome the physical bounds of traditional paper and physical based systems” to “the use of 
technology to enhance the access to and delivery of government services to benefit citizens, 
business partners and employees” (Pathak and et al., 2007: 197). The basic premise for introducing 
E-governance is that the citizens can communicate with the public officials and avail the public 
services via online and/or other information technologies. Such introduction entails streamlining 
operational processes, transcribing information held by government agencies into electronic form, 
linking disparate databases, and improving ease of access to the services for the public (Singh et.al. 
2010:256). The desired goal is streamlined sharing of information between government agencies 
to conduct government-to-government (G2G) transactions in order to simplify the navigation of 
government-to-citizen (G2C) and government-to-business (G2B) transactions (Ibid, 256). Thus, 
E-governance operates through its three components: G2G, G2B and G2C. Generally, G2G is 
considered as E-government and is limited within the boundary of the public organizations only. 
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However when it goes beyond that i.e. covers G2B and G2C then it becomes E-governance, but 
in many cases they are used synonymously to have more comprehensive coverage (Godse and 
Garg, 2006:13). As the study is trying to understand the overall impacts of the electronic system, 
it does not differentiate between the two terms and both the words are used interchangeably. For 
the purpose of this study, E-governance is “an information-age model of governance that seeks to 
realize processes and structures for harnessing the potentialities of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) at various levels of government and the public sector and beyond, for the 
purpose of enhancing good governance” (Bedi et al, 2001; Holmes, 2001; Okot-Uma, 2000; cited 
in Saxena, 2005: 500). 
The United Nations (UN) and the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) introduced 
a model of E-governance in 2002. The UN model has five-stages which described the various 
stages of E-governance: emerging, enhanced, interactive, transactional and seamless stage. Later 
on, the stages are reduced to four: emerging, enhanced, transactional and connected stage (UN, 
2010: 95). The first stage is ‘emerging’ stage where the basic presence is ensured through 
electronic platform. Second stage is ‘enhanced’ in which the system can deliver enhanced one-
way or simple two-way e-communication between government and citizen, such as downloadable 
forms for government services and applications. The next stage is ‘transactional’ stage when the 
users have the ability to make online payments for transactions like filing taxes online or applying 
for certificates, licenses, permits etc. The final stage is known as ‘connected’ stage where 
electronic services are integrated across agencies. Governments have moved from a government-
centric to a citizen-centric approach, where e-services are targeted to citizens through life cycle 
events and are provided 24/7 i.e. the services are available throughout the day - not limited within 
the office hour only. This is the most sophisticated level of E-government initiatives and is 
characterized by: a) Horizontal connections (among government agencies), b) Vertical connections 
(central and local government agencies), c) Infrastructure connections (interoperability issues), d) 
Connections between governments and citizens and e) Connections among stakeholders 
(government, private sector, academic institutions, NGOs and civil society) (UN, 2008:16). 
2.3 Corruption and E-governance: A Search for Interrelations in Retrospect 
Empirical research shows that the presence of high corruption negatively affects economic 
development (Mauro, 1998), significantly hinders the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
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(Zhao et al., 2003), reduces the level of human capital, and destroys confidence in both public and 
private institutions (Husted, 2002) (cited in Selim and Bontis, 2009: 165). Though, there are 
opposite views and research findings as well (like Leff, 1964; Leys, 1965; and Huntington, 1968; 
cited in Me´on and Weill, 2010: 244). They describe about the beneficial effects of corruption and 
put it as “Corruption grease the wheels”. Thus, we can get two contrasting opinions on corruption. 
Though; maximum study findings go against “the grease the wheels” hypothesis and mentioned 
about the ‘‘sand the wheels” effects of corruption (Me´on and Weill, 2010: 245).  
Tapscott and Caston (1993) argue that ICT causes a “paradigm shift” by introducing “the age of 
network intelligence”, reinventing businesses, governments and individuals (cited in Ndou, 
2004:3). The traditional bureaucratic paradigm, characterized by internal productive efficiency, 
functional rationality, departmentalization, hierarchical control and rule-based management 
(Kaufman, 1977), is being replaced by E-government paradigm which emphasizes on competitive, 
knowledge based economy requirements, such as: flexibility, network organization, 
vertical/horizontal integration, innovative entrepreneurship, organization learning, speed up in 
service delivery, and a customer driven strategy (Ho, 2002; cited in Ndou, 2004: 2). In the 
traditional model of public service delivery, the procedures are long, time consuming and lack 
transparency which often helps to create an environment leading to corrupt practices (Kabir and 
Baniamin, 2011:37). Now, E-governance is considered as an effective tool to radically change the 
face of government. Because, a mature and effective e-government has the capacity to create new 
methods and avenues for participation in government, acting as an endless wire, electronically 
threading together citizens, businesses, and all levels of government in a nation (Jaeger, 2003:328). 
Table 1 : Paradigm Shifts in Public Service Delivery 
  
Criteria Bureaucratic Paradigm E-Government Paradigm 
Orientation  Production cost-efficiency User satisfaction and control, flexibility 
Process Organization Functional rationality, departmentalization, 
vertical hierarchy of control 
Horizontal hierarchy, network organization, 
information sharing 
Management 
Principle 
Management by rule and mandate Flexible management, interdepartmental 
team work with central coordination 
Leadership Style Command and control Facilitation and coordination, innovative 
entrepreneurship 
Internal 
Communication  
Top down, Hierarchical Multidirectional network with central 
coordination, direct communication 
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Criteria Bureaucratic Paradigm E-Government Paradigm 
External 
Communication 
Centralized, formal, limited channels Formal and informal direct and fast feedback, 
multiple channels 
Mode of Service 
Delivery 
Documentary mode and interpersonal 
interaction  
Electronic exchange, non face to face 
interaction  
Principles of Service 
Delivery 
Standardization, impartiality, equity  User customization, personalization 
(Source: Ho, 2002: 437) 
An impressive and well-known example of controlling corruption by E-government is the case of 
the Bhoomi (meaning land) system from Karnataka, India, where the introduction of an electronic 
land record system serving about 7 million farmers has saved clients some 1.32 million work days 
in waiting time and Rs.2 806 million in bribes (World Bank, 2004:87). The main function of the 
Bhoomi system is to maintain records of rights, tenancy, and cultivation, which are crucial for 
transferring or inheriting land and obtaining loans. Under the old system an accountant, serving 
three or four villages, maintained land records. Accountants were not easily accessible and farmers 
faced long delays; two out of three paid bribes, and over two-thirds paid more than Rs. 100, 
compared to the official service fee of Rs. 23 (Andersen, 2009: 202). A snap shot of the earlier 
works on E-governance and corruption may be useful to have a quick idea on the probable effects 
of E-governance on corruption: 
Table 2: Different Study Findings on the E-government Projects’ Impacts on Corruption 
Author(s)  Study Context and Key Findings  
Iqbal, & Seo 
(2008)  
Two cases i.e. Seoul Metropolitan Government’s ‘OPEN’ (online procedures enhancement for 
civil applications) project; and S. Korea’s Government e-Procurement System (GePS) have 
been discussed as instances of E-government as an anti-corruption tool and indicated its 
successes in controlling corruption. 
Bhatnagar, Rao, 
Singh, Vaidya, & 
Mandal (2007)  
Impact assessment of five E-government projects of India was carried out. Percentage of 
transactions involving bribes was reduced in all the cases. However, in two cases, number of 
transactions involving bribe (even after reduction) remained at levels which were high.  
NeGP Report,  
(2007)  
This pertains to India’s National E-governance Plan impact assessment. In case of passport 
services computerization, bribes continued; the police take higher bribes (for verification), 
while passport office staff take lower bribes. The ministry of corporate affairs’ computerization 
reduced corruption in a significant manner. In case of income tax, individual filers reported a 
marginal reduction in bribes, while corruption data could not be collected in respect of 
businesses, due to non-disclosure.  
                                                 
2Rs is Indian currency, according to the exchange rate in 2004, 45Rs = 1 USD 
3For details of the case, please see Chawla and Bhatnagar (2004) at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/reducingpoverty/case/96/fullcase/India%20Bhoomi%20Full%20Case.pdf 
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Author(s)  Study Context and Key Findings  
Pathak, & Prasad  
(2006)  
The authors analyze nine E-government initiatives undertaken in India and conclude that E-
government can be effective in reducing corruption or eliminating it altogether.  
Csáki, & Gelléri 
(2005)  
Use of Decision Support Systems in public procurement can limit the possible damaging 
effects of corruption.  
Cho, & Choi  
(2004)  
Seoul Metropolitan Government’s ‘OPEN’ (online procedures enhancement for civil 
applications) project succeeded in controlling corruption.  
Heeks (1999)  Through five cases (the exact case context i.e. country, organization, etc. has been kept 
confidential), it is shown that even after implementation of ICT, corruption can persist.  
Source: Compiled from Ojha et.al, 2008:163 
The snap shot in Table 2 on some of the earlier works on E-governance and corruption, indicates 
that, in most of the cases E-governance helped to reduce or eliminate corruption. Nevertheless, 
these studies are mostly project based studies. Each project is distinct and unique and may have 
some contextual factors for the success. That is why those studies suffer in terms of ‘external 
validity’. Because, these findings cannot be generalized fully in other context and one cannot 
expect to produce the same results in other contexts. In addition, the logic of ‘general equilibrium 
effects’ (Rodrik, 2008) indicates that due to E-governance or for other factors, corruption may 
migrate to one domain to other domain of an economic system. So, there is a need for ‘Macro’ 
level analysis to measure the aggregate level effects of E-governance on corruption.  
Anderson (2009) conducted such type of macro level studies by using World Bank’s database of 
corruption (Control of Corruption Index) during the period of 1996-2006. There is another 
important and comprehensive database on corruption (Corruption Perception Index) by 
Transparency International. Based on this index, another study can be conducted to confirm the 
extent of the validity of the earlier studies. It can also ensure the consistencies of the findings over 
different time period. However, this macro level study can indicate the statistical trends between 
E-governance and corruption, not the processes. For this, a ‘Micro’ level analysis can be helpful 
where there is the prevalence of corruption and at the same time, E-governance is developing. 
Because, then it can be possible to capture the extent of changes of corruption and the mechanisms 
due to E-governance. The rationales that stems from these discussions are for the need for a 
comprehensive and a combined analysis at both the ‘Macro’ and ‘Micro’ level to understand the 
probable effects of E-governance on corruption.   
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2.4 Theoretical Arguments 
Corruption, in one form or another, has been found in all human societies throughout the human 
history (Mbaku, 2008: 427). This persistence of corruption throughout the ages has forced some 
researchers and policymakers to consider corruption as an unavoidable part of the human 
civilization. Though, many societies (e.g. northern European countries) have successfully designed 
their institutional arrangements and have taken public policy measures in a way that have 
minimized corruption and its deleterious effects on their economic, social, and political systems 
(Ibid, 427). Now, if we try to explore the probable factors for the successes or the failures of the 
respective countries then a proper understanding on the ‘institutions’ of the respective country may 
usher us. Because, most of the theories about the causes of corruption have focused on the 
institutions that harbor corrupt officials and give emphasis on the importance of institutional 
reforms (Shen and Williamson, 2005: 327). Such strengths of the institutions have emerged 
because of their nature as they set the rules of the game in a society, which shapes the human 
interactions (Vall and Ebben, 2011:108). “Institutions are here conceived as both patterns of 
human activity and symbolic systems, cognitive constructions and normative rules through which 
actors categorize that activity and infuse it with meaning and value” (Friedland and Alfrod, 
1991:232; cited in Hanf and Jansen,1998:4).  
The ‘Institutional Analysis framework’ which combines the use of rational choice theory and 
game theory explanations for social behavior with the ideas that agent’s choice is bounded by both 
the decision-making capacities of an individual agent and a surrounding structure of political, 
economic, and cultural rules (Collier, 2002:3). Hall and Taylor (1996: 945) illustrate that strategic 
interactions among the actors determine the outcome. An actor’s behavior is likely to be driven by 
strategic calculus, which is affected by institutional arrangement. Institution’s structures mediate 
such interactions, by affecting the range and sequence of alternatives on the choice-agenda or by 
providing information and enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the institutionalism illustrates the 
influences of institutions that can affect individual’s actions. Because of these powerful roles, 
institutions matter for the quality of governance in a country (Goel, 2012:64). The well-functioning 
institutions with the probability of the detection and the punishment are sufficiently effective to 
deter most of the decision makers from choosing to act corruptly (Saha and et al., 2014:1).  
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Now the next question is what are the main institutional factors which can be the key to determine 
the corruption level of a country. For this, the findings of Treisman (2000) can be indicative for 
us, he identified a number of factors like nature of the state, level of democracy, religion, past 
history, level of development which showed significant empirical relationships with the level of 
corruption in a country (Treisman, 2000: 399). Various other empirical studies also supported the 
importance of these factors, especially the importance of the factor ‘democratic governance’ and 
the ‘level of economic development’. The findings of Campbell and Saha (2013:290); Kolstad and 
Wiig (2011: 1-25); Rock (2008: 55) and (2007:1-18); and Shen and Williamson (2005: 327); 
supported the importance of the ‘democratic governance’  while the findings of Saha and Gounder 
(2013: 70); Bai et al. (2013:1-53); Gaeff and Mehlkop (2003:605); and  Treisman (2000:399) 
supported the importance of the ‘level of economic development’ in determining the level of 
corruption. Though, some other studies like Sung (2004:179) indicated about the ‘nonlinear 
relationship’ of democracy with corruption while some observed about the necessities of some 
conditions like ‘press freedom’ (Kalenborn and Lessmann, 2013:857) and the maturity level where 
there are probabilities of being getting caught (Saha, 2008:1) or passing a ‘threshold level’ 
(Montinola and Jackman, 2002:147). The main argument in favor of ‘democracy’ is because of its 
strength to have different kinds of institutions and mechanisms which can discover and disclose a 
corrupt incidence and also can allow the citizens and political oppositions to make an issue and 
ultimately to punish the accused persons (Sun and Johnston, 2009:1). The ‘economic development’ 
can also have a positive impact on corruption as it increases the opportunities to create more 
functioning institutes to solve the problem of corruption. Like Leys (1965) argued that civil 
servants in low income countries receive insufficient wages, the existence of bribes may constitute 
a complement that may attract able civil servants to being corrupt (cited in Saha and Gounder 
2013: 71). 
According to Robert Klitgaard (1998) (cited in Balboa and Medalla, 2006:4), “monopoly of power, 
when combined with discretion and absence of accountability, will result to corruption”. From this 
equation, it can be inferred that the power distribution in an institutional setup, degree of monopoly 
and the process of accountability determine the level of corruption. Power is necessary to manage 
and coordinate an organization (Pfeffer, 1992) but at the same time power also allows the dominant 
actors to reallocate organizational resources for their own benefits (Ja´vor, 1988) (cited in Jancsics 
and Jávor, 2012: 65). The people who are in power are able to control the critical organizational 
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resources, regulate allocation of those resources, make rules and strategic decisions, influence 
organizational controls, and manipulate the information and responsibility structure (Ibid, 65). If 
the institutional arrangement can be changed in a way so that the discretionary power can be 
curtailed then there is a possibility to reduce corruption. Theoretical logics indicate that, E-
governance also has the capacity to change the institutional arrangements in a direction which may 
also have a positive impact on the level of corruption. Because, Shim and Eom (2008:305) 
indicated that E-government can reduce the opportunities for the arbitrary actions by taking away 
employees’ discretionary power which is the key for conducting corruption. Thus, E-governance 
may lead to certain types of changes in the institutional arrangements which may reduce the level 
of corruption. As this study is about the assessment of the impacts of E-governance on corruption, 
the later sections will mainly focus on the probable relations between E-governance and corruption 
though it also considers two other important variables of corruption: quality of democracy and 
level of economic development; to assess the relative strengths in explaining the variation of 
corruption in a country. 
In the early 1960s, Gordon Tullock and James M. Buchanan, who had been analyzing the political 
dimension of wealth creation and economic growth, introduced the ‘Public Choice Model’ as a 
more effective and intellectually satisfying paradigm. In public choice theory, the individual is 
assumed as egoistic, rational and utility maximizer (Mbaku, 2008: 429). It assumes that a civil 
servant acts the same way at work as he or she would in the market place. This assumption 
indicates about the possible opportunist nature of the public officials as well as their possibilities 
to get involved with the corruption. The ‘Principal-Agent’ theory explains that if the principals 
are given sufficient opportunities to monitor the agents by setting favorable rules and situations, 
then the principals will be in a better position to make the agents accountable. In this backdrop, 
principals need effective tools to stop the unethical profit maximization tendencies of the agents. 
For this, E-governance can be an effective tool which can enable principals to monitor agents’ 
work processes (Shim and Eom, 2008: 305; Nasr, 2014: 115). Such monitoring power can help to 
make the agents accountable as it increases the chance to get caught. This detection power is a 
significant determinant of the ‘net utility of corruption’ as indicated by Jain (2001:8):    
{Net Utility of Corruption} =  f {Income from corruption, 
     Legitimate income (or fair wages), 
     Strength of political institutions, 
     Moral and political values of the society, 
     Probability of being caught and punished}(Jain, 2001:81) 
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From this equation, it is evident that the higher probability of getting caught can reduce the utility 
of corruption. As E-governance enables principals to investigate a case more efficiently and 
reliably, it can lead to the reduction of corruption. According to the Public Choice theory, every 
individual is treated as an opportunist and profit maximizer. From this perspective, a principal 
himself can become opportunist; there is no guarantee that a principal himself will not be 
corrupted. In addition, according to the principal-agent theory, there is no fixed rule for defining 
the relationships between the principals and the agents. It changes on the basis of institutional 
context. Like, within the government, the politicians are generally considered as the principals and 
the bureaucrats are considered as the agents. However, the bureaucrats can also become principals 
when they execute any contracts/agreements with the private sector. For example, when a 
bureaucrat oversights a service provided by the private companies based on certain agreements 
then the bureaucrat will become the principal and the company will be treated as an agent. Again, 
in a democratic environment, the politicians can turn into agents while the citizens can become 
principals. Through the democratic practices, the citizens can evaluate the agent’s performances. 
When the relationship of the principal-agent is considered within the government; i.e. between the 
politicians and the bureaucrats, then the level of corruption mainly depends on the ethical standards 
of the politicians who are the principals. On the other hand, when the bureaucrats become principal 
then the level of corruption depends on their ethical standards. As there are always possibilities 
that principals themselves can become corrupted at any time; just based on ethical approach, an 
anti-corruption drive may not be sustainable. However, if the citizens can become principals and 
truly able to exercise their power (in ideal democracy), then the model for curbing corruption may 
be sustainable. Because, then the citizens are in a position to evaluate their agent’s performances. 
The corruption by the politicians is generally treated as the ‘Grand’ corruption while the street 
level bureaucratic corruption is considered as the ‘Petty’ corruption. Politicians exploit their power 
to make policies to favor interest group/s and thus they get involved in large-scale corruption. 
During these policy formulation processes, the higher level bureaucrats may also get involved with 
the ‘grand’ corruption. In bureaucratic corruption, the citizens may need to bribe bureaucrats, 
particularly to the street level bureaucrats either to receive a service to which they are entitled or 
to speed up a bureaucratic procedure. In some cases, a bribe may even provide a service which is 
not supposed to be available (Jain, 2001:73-75). E-governance can have effects on each type of 
principal-agent relationships and can restructure the relationships by reducing discretion and can 
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enhance the accountability by increasing the monitoring capacity (Nasr, 2014: 115). These 
processes can be manifested in the form of the internal use of the electronic platform to detect the 
anomalies in an organization or in the form of the external uses, like social networking platforms 
(like facebook, twitter etc.) to expose corruption and building public opinions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Note: +/- signs indicate the possible nature of impacts) 
Figure 1: Possible Effects of E-governance in Principal-Agent Relationships 
Source: Researcher’s Synthesis 
In a principal-agent relation, when the corruption is triggered by the willingness of the principals 
themselves then it can be labeled as the ‘demand driven’ corruption. Generally, the principal’s 
positions are comparatively in an advantageous position to do so and this act as the ‘push factor’ 
for the agents. There is another dimension of corruption, i.e. the ‘supply side’ of corruption. The 
predictable benefits from a transaction can indicate about the agent’s degree of willingness to 
spend for a transaction. Higher the level of benefits, higher the level of willingness to spend can 
be expected from the agents. Transaction-cost theory is in better position to explain the supply 
side of corruption. It is a Neo-institutional approach to study corruption which indicates the cost 
of carrying out a transaction (Collins and Fabozzi, 1991:28). He proposed a generic model for 
Transaction-cost: 
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In this equation, ‘fixed cost’ is associated with costs like commissions, transfer fees, taxes etc. 
which are formally required for every transactions of a service. However, the ‘variable cost’ is not 
fixed. Among other costs, corrupt transaction is embedded in the ‘variable costs’. If the predictable 
benefits are higher, then an agent is most likely to spend more in the ‘variable costs’ to avail the 
opportunities. This willingness from the supply side can create the ‘pull factor’ for the principals. 
By combining the supply and the demand side of corruption, we will be in a better position to 
understand the dynamics of corruption. It shows the dynamic nature among the relationships, and 
indicates about the game like situations of corruption.  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Determination of the Level of Corruption by the Mechanisms of Demand and 
Supply of Corruption 
Source: Researcher’s Synthesis 
From the Figure 2, it can be said that except Q1, in all the other three situations, there can be 
possibilities for corruption due to the existence of high pull and/or push factors. E-governance can 
help to curb corrupt incidences in all these three situations by reducing discretionary power and 
increasing accountability. By reducing the discretionary power, E-government can control the 
bargaining power of the demand side. This discretionary power can be reduced, because E-
governance can provide a complete alternative channel for the service delivery instead of the 
traditional counter based services where the street level bureaucrats may have little influence as 
everything is decided automatically. The places where there are online service delivery systems 
along with the traditional counter system; the citizen can have a better option if they face any 
problem in the traditional counter system. According to the public choice theory, such alternative 
options are important for the better functioning of a market. Another factor of E-governance can 
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also reduce the discretionary power- the increased level of risks to get caught after the corruption 
due to the comprehensive power of E-governance to trace a work process through electronic 
platform. E-governance can increase the chances to expose corruption by maintaining detailed data 
on transactions, making possible to track and link the corrupt with their wrongful acts. By making 
a system more simpler and more transparent, E-government emboldens citizens and businesses to 
question unreasonable procedures and their arbitrary application (Bhatnagar, 2003: 30).This 
traceability also can help to increase the accountably of the respective organizations. These 
changing factors can help to control the ‘push’ factors which ultimately can also affect the ‘pull’ 
factors. The inability of the public officials to provide illegal favors may restrain the people who 
like to take the undue favors from them as well as it can increase the risk for the officials to get 
caught after the corrupt activities. Thus, E-governance can affect both the ‘pull’ and the ‘push’ 
factors of corruption. These discussions on corruption mainly indicate the ‘functionalistic’ nature 
of corruption where an individual tries to optimize his personal benefits and to control that 
opportunist nature of an individual, E-governance can demonstrate its strength by detecting the 
deviation from the established rules and regulations. This controlling approach is related with the 
‘legalistic perspective’ of corruption. Though, the impacts of E-governance can also be traced in 
the ‘moralistic’ perspective of corruption as well. By providing ethical teaching through online, 
people’s ethical standards can also be influenced. Social networking platforms (like Facebook, 
twitter) and blogs are increasingly emerging as a powerful tool to define people’s psyche. Though, 
the main strength of E-governance is in its effectiveness on ‘legalistic perspective’ to control the 
‘functionalistic’ nature of an individual as the ‘moralistic’ perspective is contingent on too many 
factors and may be time consuming.  
2.5 Hypotheses Development for the Study 
2.5.1 E-governance and Corruption 
From the foregoing theoretical discussions and the empirical research findings, it can be conferred 
that E-governance may play a significant role in reducing corruption. The ‘Public Policy’ theory 
expresses that each individual is a rational and profit maximizer, so when they get the 
opportunities, they may become corrupt. However, the ‘principal-agent’ theory indicates that the 
control of corruption depends on the principal’s ability to monitor the agents and E-governance 
can be an effective tool for the principal to monitor. By increasing the monitoring capacity through 
tracking a work process, E-governance can reduce the discretionary power significantly and can 
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increase the cost of corruption which ultimately may help to reduce corruption. Thus, the abilities 
to keep the detail records of a task process and the power to track and retrieve those information 
easily (Grönlund, 2010: 15), E-governance can make the cost of corruption higher. It can also offer 
an alternative channel for the service delivery instead of the traditional counter based system which 
may help a service seeker to avoid human interactions. This interaction in the traditional system 
can enable the service providers to have better position to negotiate for illegal benefits. E-
governance can also help to control corruption by removing the opportunities for discretion, raising 
awareness and enhancing knowledge about the rules and regulations and promoting ethical 
attitudes through online campaigns and discussions (Ibid, 15). From these theoretical analyses and 
the empirical findings, the hypothesis of the study can be put as: 
H1: E-governance may reduce the level of corruption.  
2.5.2 E-governance, Corruption and the Intervening Variables 
The test of Hypothesis 1 can provide the answer for the first part of the research question of the 
study but it cannot answer the last part i.e. the possible mechanisms to affect corruption by E-
governance. In this context, the equation of Robert Klitgaard’s (1998) can be useful where he 
indicated about the factors of corruption. He mentions that C=D+M-A, where C is corruption, D 
is discretion, M is monopoly, and A is accountability (cited in Balboa and Medalla, 2006:4).  This 
means, any attempt to change the level of corruption or the patterns of corruption, it may need to 
change these factors as the corruption of an organization is dependent on them. That is why; these 
factors demand a detailed discussion in relation with E-governance. 
Power and E-governance 
“Power is an ever-present feature of organizational life, indeed all areas of life” (Foucault, 1977; 
cited in Miller and Wilson, 2006: 471). Under the principal-agent framework, when the principal 
has the discretionary power without proper check and balance, then he can impose the power on 
the agents for his own interest which may lead to corruption. By changing the discretionary power 
level of the public officials, it is possible to develop a new power relation among the actors which 
may lead to the reduction of corruption. Here power means, “participating in decision making” 
(Lasswell and Kaplan; cited in Bacharach and Baratz, 1962:948) which is also related with the 
process of domination (Dowding, 2006:137). E-governance can reduce the discretionary power of 
the principals by eliminating the officials from a work process as it can offer a service directly 
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through electronic platform. In some cases, E-governance may not be able to eliminate the ‘human 
interface’ completely but can reduce the level of ‘human interface’. Higher level of ‘human 
interface’ increases the probabilities of corruption. Because, higher the necessity to interact with 
the public officials by the service recipients may enable more people for the arbitrary actions. By 
eliminating or reducing the ‘human interface’, E-governance may help to reduce the exercise of 
power which may contribute in reducing corruption. Following this line of reasoning, the 
hypothesis of the study can be put as: 
H2: E-governance may change power relations, which may help to reduce the level of 
corruption. 
Accountability and E-governance 
The formula of corruption by Klitgaard (1998) also indicates that the accountability level of an 
organization does have a significant level of impacts in determining the level of corruption. The 
central idea of accountability is when decision-making power is transferred from a principal to an 
agent, there must be a mechanism in place for holding the agent to account for their decisions 
(Lindberg, 2009:1). Public choice theory defines people as a rational profit maximizer whose rent 
seeking/corrupt behaviors depend on the ‘net utility’ achieved from the corrupt practices. 
However, the ‘principal-agent model’ indicates that E-governance can reduce this utility by 
enhancing the accountability system through empowering the principals to oversight the agents. It 
can increase the principals’ ability by enhancing the traceability of a task process. Because, E-
governance has comprehensive ability to preserve records and easy and cost effective way to 
retrieve those information. Thus, E-governance makes the principals more equipped to monitor 
the agents which can help to reduce the corruption. So, from this perspective, the hypothesis can 
be considered as: 
H3: E-governance may change the patterns of accountability, which may contribute to 
reduce the level of corruption. 
Monopoly and E-governance 
State monopoly on a specific service can breed the corruption. In 1995, Ades and Di Tella 
conducted a research and concluded that the less competitive a market environment, the higher 
will be the amount of corruption by giving public servants the incentive to extract some of the 
monopoly rents through bribes (cited in Lambsdorff, 1999:4). Yang (2005: 173) demonstrates that 
the robustness of bribery is a direct result of the monopolistic powers enjoyed by the bureaucrats. 
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He showed that if there are provisions for overlapping jurisdictions, the resulting bureaucratic 
competition would completely eliminate bribery in some cases and greatly reduce bribe sizes in 
other cases (Ibid, 173). Though, there are some exceptions, like the Nordic countries show that the 
monopoly may not necessarily lead to corruption. However in general, in a monopoly system, due 
to lack of alternatives, people are forced to take the services from one single source. This enables 
the public officials to gain more bargaining power and engage in corrupt practices. In contrast, if 
such monopoly can be broken by injecting competition then people will get more access to 
alternatives to decide. By providing alternative platforms to provide services or by disintegrating 
state monopoly, E-governance can help to reduce corruption. Because, using electronic services 
means introducing competition by providing alternative delivery channels (Grönlund: 2010:12). 
For example, in a traditional system, a person has to buy tickets for a train journey from the 
designated counter or the selling points. In that case, the person responsible for selling the tickets 
may seeks extra money as ‘tips’ for selling the ticket to him (a culture which exists in some 
developing countries) but if there is any alternative provisions like online ticketing then one need 
not to go to that counter and can easily avoid those corrupt practices. This way, users can choose 
to avoid the officials who are corrupt (Bhatanagar, 2001; cited in Grönlund, 2010: 12). Thus, E-
governance can help to eliminate these types of corruption. Hence, the logics suggest the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: By reducing the monopoly in the service delivery system, E-governance may help to 
reduce corruption. 
2.6 Operationalization of the Variables of the Study 
2.6.1 Macro Level 
Independent Variable 
For the Macro level analysis, the independent variable is E-governance which is measured through 
the Online Service Index4 (OSI) by United Nations (UN). This index is calculated through four 
different indicators: degree of emerging, enhanced, transactional and connected e-government 
services in a country (UN, 2010: 110). These indicators are derived from the ‘stages of the E-
governance model’ described by UN (United States) and ASPA (American Society for Public 
Administration). First indicator is the ‘Degree of Emerging Information’ which indicates the 
                                                 
4 An index is a composite measure of variables, or a way of measuring a construct using more than one data item 
(Babbie, 2001: 162). 
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degree of available basic electronic presence (UN, 2012: 124). Second indicator is the ‘Degree of 
Enhanced Information Services’ which measures one-way or simple two-way e-communication 
(use of online platform) (Ibid, 124). The next indicator is the ‘Degree of Transactional Services’ 
which indicates about the degree of engagement of the government in two-way communication 
with their citizens through online. It measures both the financial and the non-financial transactions 
through online (Ibid, 124). The last indicator ‘Degree of Connected Service’ measures the degree 
of integration across the agencies to provide government services. Maximum of the survey 
questions related with these indicators call for a binary response of yes or no, with “yes” assigned 
one and “no” zero. Based on the responses, a country’s OSI (Online Service Index) value is 
measured. The value for a given country is equal to the total number of points scored by that 
country less the lowest score for any country divided by the range of values for all countries in the 
survey (UN, 2010: 110). Mathematically, Whitemore (2012:69) put this process as: 
Online Service Index (OSI)(Country X) =
(Σ points for each category (Country x) – MIN Σ points for each category (All Countries))
(MAX Σ points for each category (All Countries) –  MIN Σ points for each category (All Countries))
 
Dependent Variable 
At the Macro level, the dependent variable is the ‘level of corruption’ which means the magnitude 
or the volume of corruption in a country. This magnitude/volume of corruption is measured 
through the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International (TI). TI conducts 
annual surveys to capture the abuse of entrusted power for private gain on a scale of 0 to 10, with 
lower values indicating greater corruption. For most of the countries, the index is based on 14 
different annual expert and business surveys (For details: Appendix- 3). As a result, the 
measurements encompass a diverse array of issues related to corruption (Mistry and Jalal, 2012: 
156). Nonetheless, CPI only measures the volume of corruption which does not describe about the 
patterns in details or the process of corruption. It only indicates about the degree of corruption. 
That is why from the ‘Macro’ perspective; it is only possible to determine the level of corruption 
and its changes but not the patterns and the processes. 
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Table 3: Relations between Independent and Dependent Variables (Macro Perspective) 
Level 
Independent 
Variables 
Indicators for Independent 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Indicators for 
Dependent Variables 
Objective 
Macro 
Level 
Analysis 
E-governance 
Online Service Index: 
 Level of emerging services 
 Level of  enhanced services 
 Level of transaction services 
 Level of connected Services 
Corruption 
 Level of 
Corruption 
To Determine the 
trends between E-
governance and 
corruption over a 
specific period 
 
2.6.2 Micro Level 
Independent Variables 
At the ‘Micro level’, the independent variable is E-governance which is measured by four stages 
of E-governance described by UN and ASPA5. The position of the selected organizations are 
determined based on these stages and are ranked within the scale of 1- 4 (1 = emerging and 4 = 
connected). To understand the probable effects of E-governance on corruption, the study depends 
on a number of intervening variables (discretionary power, monopoly, and accountability) derived 
from the Klitggard’s (1998) equation of corruption (cited in Balboa and Medalla, 2006:4). 
According to the theoretical arguments, any attempt to change the corruption level, may need to 
change these variables as the corruption in an organization is dependent on them. 
Intervening Variables 
Power 
Power can be defined as the ability to participate in decision making process (Lasswell and Kaplan, 
1950, cited in Bacharach and Bartaz, 1962:948). However, when the power becomes discretionary 
then it may open the windows for corruption. Because, ‘discretion’ is the liberty or power of a 
person to decide or act on the basis of his or her own judgment (Schultz, 2003: 5). Under the 
‘Principal-Agent framework’, when the principal has the discretionary power without proper check 
and balance then he can impose the power on the agents for his own interest which may lead to 
corruption. Such imposition can easily be possible in an organization where ‘Power Distance’ 
(PD) exist. PD refers to the extent to which less powerful members of organizations and institutions 
accept that power will be distributed unequally (Website: The Hofstede Center). It is an important 
factor for corruption because significant PD implies fewer checks and balances against the abuse 
of power (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; cited in Pillay and Dorasamy, 2010:368). However, E-
                                                 
5 The model is explained in details in the section ‘conceptual foundation’. 
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governance can limit the ‘application of power’ by disintermediating a work process (Rumel, 
2004; cited in Grönlund, 2010: 13). Disintermediation means the removal of intermediaries or 
"cutting out the middleman" (Website: Wiki (a)). This indicates the ‘bounded nature’ of power 
which stems from the ‘organizational constraints’ (Miller and Wilson, 2006: 471). E-governance 
helps to eliminate or to reduce ‘human interactions’ which may have positive effects on corruption 
as higher levels of human interactions can create higher provisions and probabilities for corruption. 
All these changes in power game in an organization can be better understood by the ‘dimensions 
of power’ described by Bacharach and Bartaz (1962) and Luke (1974). The first dimension of 
power is ‘overt’ which is about ‘decision making’. The second dimension is ‘covert’ in nature 
which leads to influencing the decision making process (Bacharach and Bartaz, 1962:950-52). This 
indicates the ‘restrictive face’ of power. The last dimension is ‘latent’ in nature where the 
dominated willingly accepted the dominance of others. The values and norms in a society or in an 
organization help to develop the third dimension of power (Dowding, 2006:137). By indicating 
Marx’s concept, Miller and Wilson (2006:473) labeled it as ‘false consciousness’. Thus, through 
the power game, an organization turns to ‘mobilization of bias’ where some issues are organized 
and others are organized out (Bacharach and Bartaz, 1962: 949). 
Accountability 
The central idea of accountability is when the decision-making power is transferred from the 
principal to an agent; there must be a mechanism in place for holding an agent to account for their 
decisions (Lindberg, 2009:1). For this study, accountability is directed to the obligation of a person 
to another person, according to which the former must give account of, explain and justify his 
actions or decisions in an appropriate way (Weber, 2011:133) and if the former fails then the later 
can impose sanctions (Lindberg, 2009:1). The accountability mechanism of an organization can 
be divided into two dimensions: horizontal and vertical (Schillemans, 2011:390). Traditional 
accountability mechanisms are very often ‘vertical’ forms of accountability where the agencies are 
accountable to the upper echelon within its jurisdiction. In a democratic system, voters are the 
ultimate source of power to make the public organizations accountable (DFID, 2008:7), but for 
this study, vertical accountability is limited within the organizational boundary i.e. the agency 
itself and the department/Ministry under which the agency operates. ‘Horizontal’ accountability is 
the forms of accountability where the accountee is not hierarchically superior to the accountor. 
Parallel agencies (e.g. audit department), independent evaluators, boards of stakeholders or, 
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journalists, interest groups, and clients can all act as the horizontal accountees (Schillemans, 
2011:390). There are certain factors which may affect both the vertical and the horizontal 
accountability system in an organization like: rules and regulations, working procedures, oversight 
capacity (monitoring), enforcement etc. The quality of accountability is depended on the ‘working 
procedures’ of an organization, because if it is open and transparent, then can ensure higher 
accountability by increasing the probability that corruption or wrongdoing can easily be detected 
(Bac, 2001:87). To ensure the accountability in an organization, ‘rules and regulations’ are also 
important because they set the modus operandi, put the expected standard and define the boundary. 
To identify any breach of these standards, an accountability system has three elements: 
monitoring/oversight; investigation and the enforcement. Monitoring is associated with the 
overseeing activities to ensure whether everything in an organization is performed based on the 
established rules and regulations. If any deviation is observed in the monitoring stage, then it may 
lead to ‘investigation’ for more detail information. The last component is associated with the 
enforcement of the rules and regulations. ‘Enforcement’ of the rules and regulations are very 
important to curb corruption, because the exercise of accountability that expose misdeeds but do 
not impose sanctions, will appear as toothless and ‘diminished’ the effectiveness of accountability 
(Schedler et al. 1999: 15). This will be regarded as the act of ‘window dressing’ (Ibid, 16) rather 
than controlling corruption. This lack of enforcement may also encourage other people to get 
involved with the corrupt activities.  
Monopoly 
Monopoly exists when a specific person or organization is the only supplier of a particular 
commodity (Friedman, 2002: 120). It is characterized by lack of competition to produce the good 
or service and a lack of viable substitute goods (Baumol and Blinder, 2012: 220). A lack of 
competition may breed corruption. In general, monopoly limits the ‘degree of choices’ and may 
increase the ‘transaction cost’. Here, ‘degree of choice’ means the provisions for alternatives for 
a specific service or commodity. Higher level of choices may lead to reduced level of corruption. 
Because, if a person is not satisfied or faces any problem for a service of an organization; then he 
can switch to other alternatives.  
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Table 4: Relations between Independent, Intervening and Dependent Variables (Micro 
Perspective) 
Level Independent 
Variables 
Intervening  
Variables 
Indicators for Intervening 
Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Indicators for 
Dependent 
Variables 
Objectives 
Micro 
Level 
Analysis 
E-governance 
Degree of 
Accountability 
 Vertical  
Accountability 
o Working 
Procedures  
o Rules and 
Regulations 
o Oversight Capacity 
(Internal 
Mechanisms) 
o Investigation 
o Enforcement 
 Horizontal 
Accountability 
o Working 
Procedures  
o Rules and 
Regulations 
o Oversight Capacity 
(External 
Mechanisms) 
o Investigation 
o Enforcement 
Corruption 
 Level of 
Corruption 
 Patterns of 
Corruption  
To explore 
how E-
governance 
is affecting 
corruption 
Degree of 
Power 
 Dimensions of Power  
 Accessibility to 
Services 
Corruption 
 Level of 
Corruption 
 Patterns of 
Corruption 
Degree of 
Monopoly 
 Degree of Choices 
 Transaction Cost 
Corruption 
 Level of 
Corruption 
 Patterns of 
Corruption 
Dependent Variable 
At the Micro level, the dependent variable is corruption and it covers both the ‘level of corruption’ 
and the ‘patterns of corruption’. The ‘level of corruption’ means the magnitude/volume of 
corruption in an organization and the ‘patterns of corruption’ indicates about the different forms 
and types of corruption determined by the characteristics. Based on the use of power and nature of 
transactions, corruption can be divided into different types; like, bribe, embezzlement, fraud, 
extortion, favoritism etc. (Andvig et al. 2000: 15). In terms of involvement of the public officials, 
corruption can be divided into two: political corruption and bureaucratic corruption. On the basis 
of the volume, it can be divided as: grand and petty corruption. Generally, in ‘grand corruption’, 
high-level public officials and politicians are involved when they make decisions on large public 
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contracts or projects. ‘Petty corruption’ is smaller in volume which is performed by the lower level 
public officials (especially street level officials) (Langseth, 1999:5). 
Variables of the Study: Quest for Interrelations 
From the operational definitions of the intervening variables, a number of factors are emerged as 
the indicators for those variables which can be grouped into three broader umbrellas. First group 
of indicators are mainly related with the ‘organizational capacity’ i.e. fall within the boundary of 
an organization. E-governance may enhance the ‘organizational capacity’ through the increased 
level of oversight and investigation capacity, enhanced accessibility to the services, dissemination 
of the information about the various rules and regulations, and the reduced level of transaction-
cost. Due to all these changes, an organization may have an enhanced capacity to curb corruption. 
Because, such enhancement can lead to higher level of ‘vertical accountability’ for an 
organization. The effects of E-governance may not be limited within the ‘organizational 
boundary’. In an organization, the stakeholders from both inside and outside of an organization 
may try to exercise their power to manipulate a decision or a task process. This influence may 
depend on the degree of the accessibility of the respective actors, the nature and the extent of power 
which they have and their wiliness to exercise. The theoretical framework indicates that E-
governance enables a person to bypass the corrupt ‘human interactions’ and thus can help to 
overcome the problem of discretionary power and the problems of the middleman. It may also 
stifle the exercise of power from outside of an organization. For example, in India, the traditional 
tendering process suffers due to the problem of lobbying and peddling of influence through 
political interventions or due to the manipulation by the officials themselves as the system lacks 
transparency (GoAP, 2001:71). E-procurement system can make such exercise of power or 
manipulation difficult as due to automation, everything is supposed to be decided electronically 
and can easily be traced. Thus, E-governance can limit the exercise of power which may contribute 
in reducing the corruption of an organization. 
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Figure 3: Relations between Independent, Intervening and Dependent Variables 
Source: Researcher’s Synthesis 
The exercise of power from outside of an organization’s boundary indicates about the effect of the 
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choices for the citizens etc. through which E-governance may have an effect on determining both 
the level and the patterns of corruption. Thus, E-governance can reengineer the work process of 
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patterns can be reflected in the power relations as well as in the mode of providing services. For 
example, a citizen can pay utility bills or a company can apply for a license or can bid for a contract 
through online without visiting the respective offices. Such provisions for electronic payment or 
electronic bidding may reduce the scopes of the ‘street level’ bureaucrats and the stakeholders 
from outside of that organization to interfere a work process. Because, all the processes are 
recorded and decided electronically and are difficult to influence but not impossible. Thus, the 
analyses of the impacts of E-governance on corruption indicates that E-governance may bring 
changes in the organizational settings in a way which may help to reduce corruption. However, 
there are caveats as well that corruption itself can affect the processes and the development of E-
governance. Corrupt or vested group of people can create impediments to the adoption of the 
automation process or can manipulate the software/system or can hack the automated system for 
their own benefits. This manipulation or the hacking of the automated system may breed the scopes 
for further corruption as well. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This theoretical chapter briefly discusses different theories to develop a theoretical framework, 
which can explain the probable relations between E-governance and corruption. The public choice 
theory considers each individual as the profit maximizing opportunist agent, but the principal-
agent theory indicates that such opportunist nature of the individual can be controlled by the use 
of E-governance. The chapter also highlights other major studies and their findings along with the 
theoretical arguments to increase the understating on the dynamics between E-governance and 
corruption. Based on the theoretical arguments and the empirical findings, the study develops four 
hypotheses to test the validity through the empirical evidences. For testing the hypotheses, this 
chapter also clearly identifies the variables and provides their operational definitions applicable 
for this study. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS OF INQUIRY 
 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This methodology chapter is a detailed illustration of how this research is conducted. The chapter 
starts with the description of the rationales for selecting the areas for the study. Then it outlines 
the method of data collection from those sample areas. The descriptions of the data collection 
methods are divided into two different segments: macro and micro, based on the structure of the 
research. The socio-economic profiles of the respondents for the micro level study are depicted 
briefly in this chapter. It also illustrates how these collected data are estimated and analyzed to link 
with the proposed hypotheses of the study. The chapter does not confine within the illustrations of 
the methodology only but also casts light on the quality issues of the research approaches by the 
reliability and the validity tests.  
3.1 Area of the Study 
The study areas for this research are selected based on the research question that prompted the 
study. Generally, the study areas are selected to have sufficient information or data where one 
either has enough answers to the questions or has enough data to test the propositions for the 
research. The first part of the research question is about the probable effects of E-governance in 
reducing corruption. For the answer of this part of the research question, ‘quantitative approach’ 
is followed based on the macro level data of the different countries. However, such ‘quantitative 
approach’ is not able to explain the second part of the question i.e. how E-governance is affecting 
corruption (if there is any). To explore the answer of the second part, a ‘qualitative approach’ along 
with the ‘quantitative approach’ is adopted for the micro level analysis.  For this, the study selected 
a place where there is higher prevalence of corruption and at the same time, E-governance is 
introduced. Because, this can help to understand the changing dynamics of corruption due to E-
governance.  
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3.1.1 Selection of the Sample Area for the Micro Level Cases 
Bangladesh positioned at the bottom in both the corruption and the governance indexes. 
Transparency International (TI) ranked Bangladesh as the most corrupt country in the world for 
five consecutive years (2001-2005). The statistical figure of TI demonstrates that the score of 
Bangladesh is still below 3 which reflects that still there is higher level of corruption in the country 
as ‘0’ indicates the most corrupted countries and ‘10’ indicates the inverse. In terms of the degree 
of the presence of E-governance, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has taken initiatives to 
introduce E-governance. In line with this policy directive, the public service system in Bangladesh 
is gradually transforming and adopting E-governance. In the year 2004, the position of Bangladesh 
was 159 in e-readiness index among 191 countries (UN, 2004:129) and in 2012, the position 
improved to 150 among 190 countries (UN, 2012:127). Therefore, based on the existence of both 
of these attributes, Bangladesh can fulfill the inclusion criteria and can be a good place to 
understand the dynamics between E-governance and corruption.  
 
Figure 4: Corruption Trends of Bangladesh in the different Years based on the Data of 
Transparency International 
Source: The graph is calculated by the researcher based on CPI of Transparency International 
3.1.2 Selection of the Cases: Development of a ‘Natural Experimental’ Research Design 
This research work tries to follow the natural experiment approach6 to assess the impacts of E-
governance on corruption. To achieve this objective, the study tries to explore the cases where 
there are variations of E-governance level through which the probable variable impacts of E-
                                                 
6 Natural experiments are observational studies which are undertaken to assess the outcomes and the impacts of an 
intervention (Website: McKenna and Morrison). This is undertaken in the natural settings where the researchers do 
not have the ability to assign ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups for the general experiment. For this type of 
experiment, the cases are selected where one has received the intervention while the other has not. The divergences 
of the innervations can provide the opportunities of the general experiment like situations to assess the probable 
impacts on the depended variable (Ibid). 
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governance on corruption can be understood. First, the study likes to consider the district7 land 
administration of Bangladesh as land has a constitutive role in the formation of a nation-state 
(Bleiklie, 2006:9) and at the same time, it is also treated as one of the significant area for 
corruption. A household study in 2012, showed that 54.8 percent of the surveyed respondents have 
to pay bribe for receiving services from the land administration (TIB, 2012:13). Recently, the 
government has taken decision to digitalize (introduction of E-governance) the land 
administration. The government has introduced ‘District e-Service Center’ (DESC) which is an E-
governance facilitated one-stop service point at the Districts. The DESC was first piloted at Jessore 
district and later on replicated in all other 63 districts from August, 2011 (Daily Star, 2011). On 
March, 2013; the government launched more upgraded version and renamed as National e-Service 
System (NESS). So, the district land administration can be a good area to study on the effect of E-
governance on corruption as there is higher level of corruption and at the same time E-governance 
is introduced. The study selected two districts: one from the urban and another one is from the 
rural area. For this study, the districts outside the main metropolitan areas are treated as the rural 
districts.  
However, the automation of the ‘land administration’ does not have any variation of the level of 
E-governance as all the district headquarters have the same level of E-governance. For this, the 
ticketing system of Bangladesh Railway (BR) can be a better alternative where there has been 
automation for quite a long period of time (the automating process started from 1994) and have 
various levels of E-governance. Due to the huge demand of the tickets, especially in the weekend 
and in the holidays; and the limited supply (mainly due to lack of capacity), there are windows for 
corruption which are exploited by the different sections of people. There are consistent allegations 
for the corrupt practices with the tickets of Bangladesh Railway. Though, there are lacks of any 
systematic study regarding these corrupt practices, but the persistent news of such bad practices in 
the local newspapers can be indicative regarding the intensity of the problem. Earlier, BR has paper 
based ticketing system which is sold manually from the counter. Now, it has the provisions for 
Electronic-ticketing (E-ticketing) and Mobile-ticketing (M-ticketing). For E-ticketing, tickets are 
                                                 
7District is an administrative unit in Bangladesh which is considered as one of the significant hub for providing 
different government services.  Around 37 types of services are provided by the District administration like providing 
license and certificates, land acquisitions, census, education and public examinations etc. At present, Bangladesh is 
divided into 64 districts which are clustered under 7 divisions. There are two tiers bellow the district administration: 
Upazila (Sub-district) and Union. The hierarchical structure of these administrative units can be put as: Central 
Government→ Division→ District→ Upazila (Sub-district) →Union. 
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sold through internet and the payments are taken through the online banking while for M-ticketing; 
tickets are sold through mobile phone platform and the payments are taken through its usual billing 
system. Based on this direct transactional nature, both of the ticketing system can be considered 
as higher level of E-governance. There is another kind of ticketing system in Bangladesh Railway 
which can be labeled as Computerized ticketing or C-ticketing. Under this system, tickets are sold 
from the counter by using the computer system, but this is not ‘direct transactional’ like E/M-
ticketing. Here, all the activities like seat allocation, accounts, production of selling report etc. are 
maintained through the computer. This C-ticketing can again be divided based on the connectivity 
with the central servers. In the sample urban station, C-ticketing system is connected with the 
central servers which enable the official to monitor the activities from the other places through 
internet. In contrast, the sample rural area does not have such option as the computers are not 
connected to the central servers, and hence the E-governance system is working there 
independently. This variation can also lead to the variation of the level of E-governance.   
Table 5: Levels of E-governance in the Sample Areas (within the scale of 1-4) 
Study Areas Offices 
E-governance 
Level 
Rationales 
Bangladesh 
Railway 
Urban Station which has E/M-ticketing 3.5 
 Have provisions for online transactions 
and is connected with the other 
organizations. 
 Connected with the central server and 
can be monitored from any places 
through internet. 
Urban Station which has computerized 
ticketing (C-ticketing) and connected  
with the central server 
2 
 Connected with the central server and 
can be monitored from any places 
through internet. 
Rural Station which has computerized 
ticketing (C-ticketing)  but not 
connected with the central server 
1 
 Not connected with the central server 
and cannot be monitored from other 
places. 
District Land 
Administration 
District Land Administration (Urban) 
(DESC/NESS) 
2.5 
 Connected with the central server and 
can be monitored from other places. 
 Citizen has limited provision to apply for 
the service, still they need to visit the 
office to complete the application. 
 No provision for online payment; still 
traditional mode of payment is followed. 
District Land Administration (Rural) 
(DESC/NESS) 
2.5 
 Same as the Urban area 
 
Source: Researcher’s Estimation based on the model of E-governance by United Nations (UN) and American Society 
for Public Administration (ASPA) 
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Based on the model of United Nations (UN) and ASPA (American Society for Public 
Administration), all these sample areas’ E-governance level can be mapped within the ranges 
between 1- 4. These variations of the levels of E-governance within and across the cases enable 
this research to have ‘natural experiment’ like situation to understand the probable variable effects 
of E-governance on corruption. Thus, the study dovetailed the research areas to generate robust 
understanding about the relations between E-governance and corruption. Table 5 briefly illustrates 
of the sample areas’ E-governance level along with the rationales. The analyses of the variations 
of the level of E-governance in BR and its probable impacts on corruption may generate important 
insights to explore the answer of the research question of this study in the real life settings. As 
most of the contextual factors for these sample areas are more or less same; drawing the causality 
between E-governance and corruption can be comparatively easier, especially within the same 
service. Though, there can be variations of some of the factors; like in Bangladesh Railway, the 
demand of the tickets may vary based on the destinations and the quality of the services (variations 
between train services) and these can have effects on the extent of corruption of the respective 
places. These problems may create some challenges for drawing causalities. The comparative 
analysis of two types of services (railway and district land administration) also helped to 
understand the effectiveness of E-governance on corruption across two different types of services 
in two different settings (urban and rural). Thus, through the ‘cross-case synthesis’, the study is 
likely to produce more robust picture on the propositions of the study.  
3.2 Research Approaches and Estimations  
3.2.1 Macro Level 
The ‘Macro level’ study is an attempt to examine the impacts of E-governance on corruption using 
national level data. This longitudinal data analysis can help to comprehend the global trends and 
scenarios. The study relays on two well-known indexes: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by TI 
(Transparency International) and E-government Development Index (EGDI) by UN (United 
Nations) which help to understand the effects of E-governance on Corruption from the ‘Macro’ 
perspective. The data of CPI is obtained from the database of TI. The index is an average of various 
indices which ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) (Me´on and Well, 2009: 248). 
The dependent variable for this study, ‘corruption’ is measured by the changes of CPI values 
between the year 2010 and 2012. The validity of the CPI has been tested by the several researchers; 
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like: Husted (1999) and Wilhelm (2002) (cited in Shim and Eom, 2008:306). Husted’s (1999) 
study demonstrates that CPI has higher level of construct validity and reliability (Ibid, 306). 
EGDI is a scoring of the willingness and the capacity of national administrations to use online and 
mobile technology in the execution of government functions (UN, 2010: 109). The index faces 
some criticisms especially for the ‘construct validity’ from some of the researchers (like Points 
and Pardo, 2011; Whitmore, 2012). Points and Pardo (2011:358) raised the question about the 
relevance of the ‘Human Capital Index’ built on the literacy rate and the gross enrolment ration 
which not necessarily reflect the citizen’s capacity to operate E-governance. In spite of these 
criticisms, it is widely used for the assessment of the level of E-governance in the different 
countries. This study only considers the Online Service Index (OSI) to calculate the impact of E-
governance; because EGDI is a composite index8; and other indexes (like human capital) may 
mislead the observations of the study. The variable E-governance is measured by the changes of 
OSI value between the year 2012 and 2010. OSI value ranges from 0 (low level of online services) 
to 1 (high level of online services). According to the Hypothesis 1 of the study, if the level of E-
governance increases then the level of corruption decreases i.e. when the value of OSI increases 
or decreases then the value of CPI will increase or decrease respectively ( here increase of CPI 
value means the reduction of corruption as 0 = highly corrupted and 10 = highly clean or less 
corrupt). These changes can be better understood by the following grid: 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Relations between E-governance and Corruption 
Source: Researcher’s Synthesis 
                                                 
8 Composed of online service index, telecommunication index and human capital index. Mathematically, EGDI = 
(0.34 × online service index) + (0.33 × telecommunication index) + (0.33 × human capital index) 
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In this grid (Figure 5), the data which can be found in Quadrant 1 and 3, support the Hypothesis 1 
of the study. Because, Quadrant 1 shows both the increase of OSI values and CPI values while 
Quadrant 3, indicates the inverse situation i.e. decrease of both OSI and CPI. This means, with the 
increase of E-governance, corruption reduces and alternatively with the reduction of E-
governance, corruption increases. The data which can be found in Quadrant 2 and 4, are not 
consistent with the proposition of the study, because, here both data go to the opposite direction 
i.e. when the OSI value increases then CPI value decreases and vice versa. This means, with the 
increase of E-governance, corruption increases and similarly with the decrease of E-governance, 
corruption decreases.  
The effects of E-governance on corruption may vary on the basis of various attributes like culture, 
governance system, geography, level of development etc. Like in an autocratic system, a country 
may have a high level of E-governance but may not use this as a tool to detect the corruption of 
the ruling party or the powerful people who are connected with the ruling party. Even if someone 
is detected then there can be possibilities that the respective authority may not take any action 
against him. Similarly, other factors can have an effect on the effectiveness of E-governance on 
corruption. This study only considers the distinctions of the countries based on the level of 
economic development due to the time constraint and the limited scope of the research. For this, 
the study relies on the classifications of the countries based on their economic capacities 
determined by World Bank. For measuring the level of economic development, it uses GNI per 
capita and categories the countries as: low income, lower middle income, upper middle income 
and high income countries. In this study, high-income countries i.e. which have per capita income 
equivalent to $ 12,476 or more are treated as developed countries and the rest is treated as 
developing countries. Based on these categories of the countries, the study analyzes the variation 
of the effectiveness of E-governance on corruption. 
Table 6: Classifications of the Countries based on GNI per capita (year 2011) 
World Bank’s Category of the Countries GNI per capita (year 2011) 
Low Income $1,025 or less 
Lower Middle Income $1,026 to $4,035 
Upper Middle Income $4,036 to $12,475 
High Income (OECD/Non OECD) $12,476 or more 
Source: Website of Global Finance, accessed on April 20, 2013 
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From the literature review in the theoretical chapter, it appears that with the improvement of the 
economic condition and the democratic values of a country, the level of corruption can 
significantly be influenced and improved. To understand the relative strengths of all these 
explanatory variables of corruption, the ‘multiple regression analysis’ can be an effective statistical 
tool. Because, it is a statistical tool which can help to understand the effects of the different 
explanatory variables on the dependent variables together. Through this tool, it is possible to know 
the magnitude of the impacts of the variables along with the explanatory power of the tested model. 
This study measures the economic development through the change of GDP in a country. The data 
for the change of GDP within the time frame of 2012 to 2010, are obtained from World Bank’s 
database. The degree of democratic governance is measured through the Democratic Index (DI) 
by the Economic Intelligence Unit (2012 and 2010). Based on the aforementioned three 
explanatory variables (OSI, GDP and DI), a model can be developed to measure the magnitude of 
the impacts of these variables on the level of corruption. Based on the principle of the liner 
regression model, the equation for corruption can be put as: 
Corruption i = αi + β1iOSIi + β2i DIi + β3iGDPi+ β4i Xi + β5i Zi + Ɛi…….. (1) 
(here, i = initial, , α =  period-specific intercept, β = Coefficients and Ɛ = estimate of error) 
In this equation, ‘Xi’ is a ‘time varying’ variables which may have effect on the dependent variable 
and ‘Zi’ is a ‘time invariant’ variables which have fixed effects on the dependent variable. After 
‘t’ time, the time invariant variables are omitted as it has constant value and the equation can be 
put as: 
Δ Corruption=Δα+ Δβ1OSI+ Δβ2DI+ Δ β3GDP+ Δ β4 X + Δ Ɛ…….. (2) 
By considering the other ‘time-varying’ factors as ‘control variable’9, which means, except the 
three explanatory/intervening variables, everything is assumed as constant, i.e. CV10(Δ X, ΔƐ) =0; 
then the model can be put as: 
Δ Corruption=Δα+ Δβ1OSI+ Δβ2DI+ Δ β3GDP…….. (3) 
Now, by this model, we can try to understand the magnitude of change of the dependent variable 
with the change of the explanatory variables. The percentage of change which this model failed to 
                                                 
9The control variable is something that is constant and unchanged in an experiment. 
10 CV is Coefficient of variation 
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explain (measured through the ‘Adjusted R2’ in the Multiple Regression Analysis), may be due to 
the other explanatory variables which are not included in the model.  
Table 7: Explanations of the Variables and their Sources 
Variables Explanations Sources 
Dependent Variable   
Corruption 
 The level of corruption in a country i.e. the magnitude 
or the volume of corruption in a country. 
 Scaled between 0-10 (0-high corruption and 10- low 
corruption). 
 Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) by 
Transparency 
International. 
Explanatory Variables  
Democracy 
 Measure the quality of the democracy based on 0-10 
scale. 
 Full democracies: 8-10; Flawed democracies: 6-7.9; 
Hybrid regimes: 4-5.9 and Authoritarian regimes: 
below 4. 
 Democratic Index (DI) 
by Economic 
Intelligence Unit. 
GDP per capita 
 GDP per capita is the gross domestic product divided 
by midyear population. 
 It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data are in current 
U.S. dollars (Website: World Bank). 
 GDP per capita from 
World Banks’ 
database. 
E-governance 
 Measure the level of online service of a country by a 
scale 0-1. 
 0 is low level of online service while 1 is high level of 
online services. 
 Online Service Index 
(OSI) by United 
Nations. 
Source: Researcher’s compilations 
3.2.2 Micro Level 
The study used a number of tools to collect data from the sample two cases: Bangladesh Railway 
and the district land administrations. At first, the study used the ‘document review’ method to have 
an idea about the contexts of the respective organizations. This review helped to understand the 
associated government directives, rules and regulations and the actual legal processes for providing 
the services. The types of document that the study consults during the field data collection are: 
Table 8: Consulted Documents during the Field Data Collection  
Organizations District Land Administration Bangladesh Railway 
Types of 
Documents 
Hard Copy 
Court Fee Acts, CS (Cadastral Survey) and RS 
(Revisional/review Survey) records, file for the 
citizen’s applications, citizen charter, monthly 
statements of the provided services etc. 
Manuals, government orders, official 
files, citizen charter, monthly statements 
etc. 
Soft Copy 
Instructions for a service, online application and 
number of application, distributed number of 
Parchas (land records) etc. 
Allocation of seats, manuals for 
providing the services etc. 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s compilation 
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These archival documentations offer not only the insights on the service delivery system but also 
help to triangulate what the research finds from other sources (Yin, 2003: 87). After this initial 
overview of the respective organizations, the study then goes for ‘observation method’ to have an 
impression about the probable impacts of E-governance on corruption in an organization. At the 
beginning, it followed ‘direct observation’ method under which the researcher just passively 
observed the behavior and the activities of the officials and the service recipients. At this stage, 
the researcher identified the existence of the brokers (locally known as Dalal) in the district land 
administration and tried to understand their activities. Under the existing legally framework, there 
should not have the existence of these Dalal (brokers), but in practice they exist and considered to 
be most efficient to obtain a service. In the case of Railway, the people who are involved with 
these types of illegal activities from outside of the organizations are known as Kalobazari (black 
marketeer/scalper).To have more precise idea about the processes of the service delivery and the 
‘corruption chain’; the researcher then used the ‘participant observation’ method. As part of this 
process, the researcher took part actively and approached as a ‘service recipient’ and talked with 
both the lower level officials and the brokers about the details to have the service; like probable 
amount of bribe or how long it may take to get the services if extra amount of money is paid etc. 
The observation method and the document review gave the researcher an overall impression about 
the procedures and the ground level scenario for the service in the sample offices. Then the 
researcher conducted the ‘interviews’ to have more in-depth understanding about the situations. 
Here, both the officials and the service recipients were interviewed to have a balanced view from 
both sides. To interview the respondents, the study tries to follow the ‘interview guide’ (For details: 
Appendix 13) which is mainly prepared based on the variables and the indicators of the study. This 
interview guide also incorporates the key facts which are observed during the observation method 
and the document review; and the gap between the legal procedures and the practices. 
To ensure the validity and the reliability of the data collected through interview method, the study 
tires to follow the principles of the ‘Delphi Method11’. In social research, Focus Group Discussion 
                                                 
11 Under this method, at first, opinions of the respondents are sought individually and then their opinions are 
compiled and send back anonymously for further opinions. In this system, people can get the opportunities to know 
other people’s opinions without the identity and can give their opinions on those facts. Thus a complete picture may 
emerge which may contain less biased data as the facts are verified by all the respondents. For more about Delphi 
Method: http://is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook/delphibook.pdf or in audio format: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FFfKOSTftcs 
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(FGD) is extensively used (Khan, 1991:145) and highly applauded because of its purposeful use 
of social interactions in generating data (Merton et al., 1990, Morgan, 1996; cited in Boateng, 
2012:54). It offers qualitative researchers the opportunity to interview several respondents 
systematically and simultaneously (Babbie, 2011, cited in Boateng, 2012:54). It is considered as 
one of the most effective method to collect data as it provides the opportunities to cross check the 
data in front of all the respondents which helps to increase the reliability and the validity of data. 
However, to follow this method for a sensitive issue like corruption is challenging. Because, the 
respondents may not feel comfortable or even may not agree to participate. To overcome these 
limitations but to achieve the same objectives, the ‘Delphi Method’ seems to be effective. It helps 
to crosscheck the validity of the data anonymously. Under this approach, the extraction of the facts 
is more important rather than knowing the person. That is why, the study uses the ‘Delphi Method’ 
to get the opinions of the public officials. However, the research cannot follow the method strictly. 
The civil servants specially the senior civil servants were very busy and it was very difficult to get 
back to them for the second or third time. In addition, they were not even willing to write anything 
on corruption of their organization due to fear and the culture of victimization. That is why Delphi 
technique cannot be strictly followed for this study; but from the lower and the mid-level officials, 
data were cross checked through the verbal conversations.  
Table 9: Different Methods of the Study and their Rationales 
Methods Rationales 
Document Review To examine various kinds of documents to understand the contexts and the procedures for 
providing a service in the sample organization. 
Observation Direct Observation: To understand the activities of the officials, the service seekers and the 
brokers passively. 
Participant Observation: To take active part as a ‘service recipient’ to understand the 
‘corruption chain’. 
Interview To understand the effects of E-governance on corruption dynamics more precisely. 
Delphi Technique To crosscheck the validity and the reliability of the collected information. 
Questionnaire To map the perception of the target population in both quantitative and qualitative format. 
 
The opinions of the ‘service recipients’ and the ‘public officials’ are also obtained through 
‘questionnaire’. This method helped to gather both the quantitative and qualitative data in a 
standardized way. This method gives the opportunity to analyze the collected data more 
scientifically and objectively. The data are quantified through this method to compare and to 
measure the changes; and to test the hypotheses. This study captures the change of the different 
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variables of the study through the use of ‘Likert scale’ in the questionnaire. After capturing the 
perception of the respondents, the study analyzed the data through the statistical software. Along 
with this quantitative data, the study also collected qualitative data to analyze the relations between 
the variables. Thus, the study tried to follow different methods to triangulate and to overcome the 
shortcomings of each method and tried to complement one method by other to have more 
comprehensive, reliable and valid data. 
3.3 Target Population and Sampling  
The size of the sample for a research is determined by the optimum number necessary to enable 
valid inferences (Marshal, 1996: 522). Inappropriate and inadequate sample size can affect the 
quality and the accuracy of a research (Bartlett, et al, 2001:43). For this study, at the ‘Micro level’, 
the respondents and their numbers (N) are determined by the principles of the ‘representative 
sampling’ i.e. the samples are selected from the population12 which covers all the potentially 
relevant and significant areas so that the study does not miss any important perceptions. The study 
identifies the service recipients, the public officials and the ICT experts as the key informants for 
the study because of their involvements with the procedures of the sample organizations. The 
public officials from the different organizations are selected based on the combination of 
‘representative sampling’ and ‘convenience sampling’ techniques; so that the researcher can have 
the opinions from the different levels of officials who are involved with the processes of the service 
delivery system as well as to have the access to the respective officials. Thus, the ‘sample officials’ 
are selected based on the ‘non-probability sampling’ method. The ‘sample frame’ for the ‘service 
recipients’ are selected based on the ‘random method’ considering their involvement with the 
organizations. Then it follows the ‘stratified approach’ based on the ‘nature of services’ they 
receive from the organizations. For the selection of ICT experts, the study follows the ‘purposive 
sampling’ technique. It is a non-probability sampling method which is based on some predefined 
features and processes (Neuman, 2000: 220).The main feature which is considered during the 
selection of the ICT experts is their expertise with the relevant field to have technical explanation 
on E-governance and corruption.  
 
                                                 
12 A ‘population’ consists of all the subjects that one wants to study while ‘sampling’ is the process of selecting a 
group of subjects for a study in such a way that the individuals represent the larger group from which they were 
selected (Yount, 2006: 1). 
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Table 10: Target Population and the Sample Size for the Research 
S/N District Land Administration Bangladesh Railway Total 
 Category Respondents Category Respondents  
1. Service Recipients  5 Service Recipients  6 11 
2. Public Officials 18* Public Officials 15* 33 
3. ICT Experts 1 ICT Experts 1 2 
 Total  24  22 46 
* Details breakdowns are given in Appendix 4 and 5 
According to the directives of NSD (Norwegian Data Protection Official for Research), as it is 
necessary to keep the anonymity of the identity of the respondents, this research design clusters all 
the public officials into three groups (higher, mid-level and lower lever officials) rather than using 
their names or designations, so that they cannot be identified. Accordingly, the names of the places 
are also renamed based on their attributes like the district land administrations are labelled as ‘rural 
or urban district land administration’ rather than using the name of the respective places. The same 
principle is also followed for Bangladesh Railway. From these respondents, the study also collects 
data through questionnaire from 31 respondents; the details breakdown of the respondents for the 
questionnaire is given in Appendix 6. 
3.4 Socio-Economic Profile of the Respondents 
The socio-economic profile of the respondents can provide opportunities to understand the nature 
of the respondents. That is why; the study collected data on the different aspects of the respondents; 
like gender, age, education, occupation and nature of relations with the respective services (i.e. 
service provider/service recipients). In terms of gender, the sample is biased to male gender. 
Because, it is difficult to find the female as the service recipient or service providers. Even if 
anyone was found then it was difficult to convince her to talk on corruption. Generally, the male 
are found to come in the district land administration for the services. If any female comes, then 
usually she comes with another male relatives. Thus, all the respondents in the district land 
administration eventually turn out as male respondents. Though, in the rail station, there are 
visibilities of women as the service recipients, but they were reluctant to talk about corruption. 
They just want to leave the station right after purchasing the tickets. Therefore, the study ended up 
with one female as the respondent. There is wide variation of the age ranges of the respondents. 
The respondents’ age varies from 21-30 age group to 51 and above. In Bangladesh railway, most 
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of the respondents are from 31-50 age group (87.4 percent cumulatively); the same is also 
applicable for the district land administration (86.9 percent cumulatively). The respondents of this 
study have at least higher secondary education. This happened because the illiterate people or the 
people who have lower level of education may not use the online service, as they may not be 
capable to do so. The majority of the respondents from the district land administration has either 
Master/higher degree (60 percent) or higher secondary degree (26.7 percent). In case of 
Bangladesh Railway, most of the respondents come from either Master/higher degree or graduate 
degree streams (37.5 percent and 43.8 percent respectively). 
Table 11: Socio-Economic Profile of the Respondents 
 
Bangladesh Railway District Land Administration 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Gender     
Male 15 93.8 15 100 
Female 1 6.3 - 0 
Total 16 100.0 15 100.0 
Age   
21-30 1 6.3 2 13.3 
31-40 7 43.7 6 40.3 
41-50 7 43.7 7 46.6 
51 and above 1 6.3 - - 
Total 16 100.0 15 100.0 
Education Level   
Higher Secondary (HSC) 3 18.8 4 26.7 
Graduate 7 43.8 2 13.3 
Master's or Higher 6 37.5 9 60.0 
Total 16 100.0 15 100.0 
Occupation   
Service/Working 12 75.0 12 80.0 
Self-employed 2 12.5 3 20.0 
Unemployed 1 6.3 - - 
House Wife 1 6.3 - - 
Total 16 100.0 15 100 
 
In terms of occupation, there are wide variations among the respondents from Bangladesh 
Railway, like - self-employed, service/working, unemployed and housewife. However, most of the 
respondents belong to the ‘working’ category (75 percent). For the district land administration, the 
respondents are confined within two categories only- working (80 percent) and self-employed (20 
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percent). In both cases of the study, the respondents belong to either service providers or service 
recipient’s categories. In Bangladesh Railway, 37.5 percent respondents are service recipients and 
the rest (62.5 percent) are service providers (Figure 6). For the district land administration, 33.3 
percent is service recipients while 66.7 percent is service providers.   
 
Figure 6: Nature of the Respondents based on the Relation with the Services 
3.5 Unit of Analysis 
The research design considers two different levels (Macro and Micro) of study as the response of 
the research question. The ‘Macro level’ analysis is based on the longitudinal data analysis at the 
state level. So, for the ‘Macro level’, the ‘Unit of Analysis’ is the ‘States/Countries’. This 
longitudinal data at the state level helps to understand the changing patterns of the dynamics 
between E-governance and corruption across the globe. The ‘Micro level’ analysis of the study is 
designed to understand the mechanisms of E-governance i.e. what aspects and in what measures 
of E-governance is affecting the corruption. To understand these mechanisms, the research design 
of the study selected two public organizations from Bangladesh as the cases based on certain 
rationales, like level of E-governance, extent of corruption, importance of the service, accessibility 
etc. So, at the ‘Micro level’, the ‘Unit of Analysis’ is ‘Organization’. 
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3.6 Analytic Strategy 
3.6.1 Coding for Software and Data Analysis  
The collected data for the study is categorized and tabulated based on the variables of the study to 
examine the Hypotheses of the study. The process involves the sequential activities described by 
Miles and Huberman (1994: 10): data reduction, display and conclusion drawing. For the data 
reduction of the ‘qualitative data’ (extracted by Delphi method, interview and open ended 
questionnaire), the research follows the ‘thematic approach’13’. This process involves the 
identification of the themes through “careful reading and re-reading of the data” (Rice and Ezzy, 
1999: 258). By this thematic approach, data are reduced to certain patterns and those patterns are 
analyzed in line with the hypotheses of the study. For the data reduction, the ‘quantitative data’ 
are coded14 to simplify and to transform for the entry in the statistical software. Then reduced data 
are analyzed to draw conclusions. The research uses IBM SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences) 21.0 and Microsoft Excel to extract descriptive and inferential statistics. In Macro level, 
at first, through the ‘descriptive statistics’, the main features of the collected data are identified. 
Then in the second step, the quantitative data are analyzed to examine the nature of relationships 
that exists between the independent and the dependent variables through ‘correlation-coefficient’. 
‘Multiple regression analysis’ is used to understand the nature and the magnitude of the impacts 
of the explanatory variables over the dependent variable. At last, by using ‘cross-tabulation’, the 
study tries to understand the variations of the effectiveness of E-governance on corruption in the 
different countries based on the economic nature (like low income, high income countries etc.).  
Table 12: Approaches for the Statistical Analyses and their Objectives 
Level  Statistical Methods   Objectives 
Macro 
Level 
 
Descriptive Statistics To explore the main features of the collected data. 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
To measure the strength and the direction of the linear relationship between the two 
variables of the study 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
To understand the nature and the magnitude of the impacts of the explanatory variables 
over the dependent variable. 
Cross-tabulation 
To identify the variations of the effectiveness of E-governance on corruption based on 
the economic nature of the countries (like low income, high income countries etc.). 
                                                 
13  Thematic approach is a search for the themes that emerge as being important to the description of a phenomenon 
(Daly, Kellehear, and Gliksman, 1997; cited in Fereday and Cochrane, 2006: 82).  
14 Coding is the symbols (codes) which summarize the meaning or implications of the units of data (Layder, 1998:48). 
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Level  Statistical Methods   Objectives 
Micro 
Level 
Descriptive Statistics To explore the main features of the collected data. 
Ranking 
To measure the extent of the variations of the dependent and the intervening variables 
after the introduction of E-governance.  
Correlation 
Coefficient 
To explore the strength and the direction of the linear relationships between the 
independent, intervening and the dependent variables. 
Source: Researcher’s Synthesis 
In Micro level, at first, through the ‘descriptive statistics’, the main features like the demographic 
profile of the respondents and their nature of the involvement with the respective services are 
identified. Then, through the ‘ranking’ processes, the extent of the variations of the dependent and 
the intervening variables are measured after the introduction of E-governance. Based on the 
quantitative data from the ‘questionnaire’, the research also likes to go for cross-case synthesis to 
understand the variable impacts of the level of E-governance on corruption. For this, the study uses 
‘correlation coefficient’ to measure the changing trends and directions among the variables. 
3.6.2 Adaptive Approach  
The research strategy of this study starts with the ‘deductive approach’ as the deduction involves 
using a set of general assumptions in order to formulate empirically testable propositions about a 
phenomenon (Layder, 1998: 134). The study has different ‘hypotheses’ developed from the 
different theories of corruption and the model of E-governance. Based on the empirical findings, 
the study tries to test those hypotheses. From this perspective, the study follows ‘casual 
inferences15’. The research also follows the ‘descriptive inferences16’ along with the ‘casual 
inferences’ in the micro level analysis to understand the mechanisms of E-governance through 
which it can affect corruption. On the other hand, the study gets new understanding and dimensions 
with the progress of the analysis of the data. This nature of research is known as ‘inductive 
process’. Layder (1998:134) defined it as the process which relies more on the initial gathering of 
empirical data as a means of developing a more general (theoretical) understanding. The current 
study also likes to consider this process to generate generalized understanding on the relationships 
between E-governance and corruption. However, when a theory both shapes and is shaped by the 
empirical data that emerges from research is known as ‘adaptive theory’ (Ibid, 133). It allows the 
dual influence of extant theory as well as those that unfold from (and unfolded in) the research 
                                                 
15 Inference is the process of using the facts we know to learn about facts we do not know (King et al, 1994:58) and 
‘.causal inference’ is the learning about causal effects from the data observed (Ibid, :8). 
16Descriptive inference is using observations from the world to learn about other unobserved facts (Ibid, 20) 
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(Ibid, 133). That is why this approach is also known as the ‘middle range’ theory. By analyzing 
the nature of the research approach of this study, it can be put as ‘adaptive’ as it combines both the 
‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ natures.  
3.7 Reliability and Validity of the Study 
3.7.1 Construct Validity 
Construct Validity is the process of establishing correct operational measure for the concepts being 
studied (Yin, 2003: 34). To meet the test of the construct validity, an investigator needs to cover 
two steps: select the specific types of changes that are to be studied and demonstrate that the 
selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the specific types of change that have been 
selected (Yin, 2003: 35). For this study, the dependent variable is corruption and the independent 
variable is E-governance. Both the concepts are operationalized through their working definitions 
and tried to develop proper measures to gauge them. In ‘Macro level’ analysis, the corruption is 
measured by one of the renowned database of corruption: CPI from TI . Various studies like Husted 
(1999) and Wilhelm (2002) (cited in Shim and Eom, 2008:306) and Cavazzini and Nevado (2013: 
18), confirms the robustness of the database in measuring corruption. Comparing with the other 
corruption indexes developed by World Competitiveness Report and Political and Economic Risk 
Consultancy, Husted indicated that the construct of CPI is not only similar to other indexes but 
also more comprehensive (Shim and Eom, 2008: 306). Similarly, the development of E-
governance is measured through OSI by UN which is among the few databases having such 
comprehensive measures (in terms of coverage and robustness) of E-governance.  The ‘Micro 
level’ analysis of the study is designed to understand the processes that how E-governance can 
have an effect on corruption. To explore these processes, the study uses a widely acceptable 
equation of corruption by Klitgaard (1998) which indicates about the factors of corruption like 
power, accountability and monopoly. If E-governance has any effect on corruption then most likely 
it operates through the changes of these factors. Therefore, the study considers these factors of 
corruption as the intervening variables.  
3.7.2 Internal Validity 
Internal validity concerns about the causal relationships, whereby certain conditions are shown to 
lead to other. This type of validity test is mainly related with explanatory or casual studies and not 
for descriptive or exploratory studies (Yin, 2003: 34). There are two different types of causal 
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relationships: causal description and causal explanation (Johnson and Christensen, 2012: 
website). The ‘causal description’ involves showing that the changes in one variable causes 
changes in the other variable (Ibid). The aim of this study is to explore the casual relationships 
between E-governance and corruption. At the ‘Macro level’, the study is designed to identify the 
trends between these two variables. However, there can be one weakness - a problem for which 
many social science researches suffers as it is almost impossible to control the impacts of other 
variables (problem of extraneous variables). That is why; there are chances that the changes of the 
dependent variable (corruption) may be affected due to other variables and not necessarily because 
of only E-governance. So, from this ‘Macro level’ study findings, it cannot be conclusively said 
that the changes of the dependent variable is only due to the changes of the independent variable. 
The ‘causal explanation’ involves more than just showing causal relations. It involves explaining 
the mechanisms through which and the conditions under which a causal relationship holds (Ibid). 
The ‘Micro level’ analysis of the study is designed in line with this principle to understand the 
mechanisms and conditions through which the independent variable (E-governance) of the study 
can affect the dependent variable (corruption). 
3.7.3 External Validity 
External validity occurs when the researchers can establish the domain to which a study’s findings 
can be generalized (Yin, 2003: 34). External validity verifies the degree to which that research 
results can be generalized to other conditions, participants, times, and places (Marczyk, et al. 2005: 
67). This generalization can be drawn by two ways: statistical generalization and analytical 
generalization. Statistical generalization comes from the sample survey data whereas the analytical 
one comes from the case studies and the experiments (Yin, 2003: 37). The ‘Macro level’ analysis 
of this study can be treated as the ‘statistical generalization’ category, since it uses the statistical 
data. As, the statistical analysis is based on the data of almost all the countries, then it can be said 
that, the findings of the research have higher level of external validity. The ‘Micro level’ study is 
based on both the ‘analytical generalization’ and ‘statistical generalization’. These 
generalizations at the ‘Micro level’ are drawn based on two different organizations from 
Bangladesh. The effectiveness of E-governance and the nature and the level of corruption may 
vary based on various factors like culture, economic conditions, administrative procedures etc. So, 
the findings at the ‘Micro Level’ based on two organizations from Bangladesh may have lower 
level of external validity. 
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3.7.4 Reliability 
Reliability is the process of demonstrating the operation of a study, such as the data collection 
procedures which can be repeated, with the same results (Yin, 2003: 34). Actually, reliability is 
the degree to which a measure is free of measurement error. The robustness of data can vary based 
on the time when data were collected, people who were involved in the data collection process and 
the setting from which the data were collected (Begley, 1996; cited in Hussein, 2009: 3). At the 
‘Macro level’, the study depends on two world renowned databases on corruption (CPI by TI) and 
E-governance (OSI by UN). Many studies already showed the higher authenticity of these datasets. 
For example, Husted (1999) and Wilhelm (2002) found that CPI shows higher level of construct 
validity and reliability. The CPI database shows higher level of correlation coefficients with the 
similar indexes like Control of Corruption (CC) by World Bank and Accountability Index by 
Ibrahim (Cavazzini and Nevado, 2013: 18); which means the measures of corruption by TI is 
consistence and the data is comparatively reliable.  
Table 13: Correlation Coefficients between Different Corruption Indexes 
 CPI Accountability Control of Corruption 
CPI 1   
Accountability 0.891 1  
Control of Corruption (CC) 0.948 0.935 1 
Source: Cavazzini and Nevado, 2013: 18. 
From the Table 13, it is evident that, the Correlation Coefficient between CPI and CC is 0.948 
which means they have higher level of correlation. Similarly, CPI has higher correlation (0.891) 
with Ibrahim Index (Accountability). At the ‘Micro level’, to get more reliable data, the study is 
designed for interviewing the public officials individually by following the process of ‘Delphi 
method’ as the study topic is very sensitive in nature and people may not want to speak in front of 
others. Generally, the interview process may promote to speak the respondents but does not 
necessarily yield authentic information. To increase the authenticity of those data, the key 
information are crosschecked by the multiple sources (e.g. from the different persons by Delphi 
method and interviews; and the different documents by ‘document review’). Thus, the study tries 
to increase the reliability of the ‘micro level’ data. 
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3.8 Ethical Considerations in the Research 
The study tires to comply strictly the directives of NSD (Norwegian Data Protection Official for 
Research) and the ethical issues in social research; like: informed consent, maintaining 
confidentiality, personal integrity, and anonymity etc. The participation in this research was 
voluntary and every individual had the right to refuse to participate or to stop participation at any 
time. The research does not preserve any personal (e.g. name, email, phone no etc.) and sensitive 
(like health related information) data. If the respondents provide any such information, those were 
deleted from the notes and the transcripts. The research also tries to follow the ‘scientific honesty’ 
and refrains from any manipulation of data for the study. 
3.9 Challenges for the Study 
To understand the nature of the impacts of E-governance on corruption, the study goes for 
longitudinal data analysis. However, the study need to confine the analyses within the period of 
two years (2012-10). Because, TI has changed the methodology as well as the weights for the 
different indicators in 2010. If the research compares the present data with the data before 2010, 
then that may give improper readings. For the micro level cases, research on sensitive issues like 
corruption is always problematic because of the challenges to have valid and reliable data. The 
Delphi method is followed for this study along with other methods to reduce the biasness of data 
and to make the respondents comfortable to response. For the respondents of the study, the samples 
are gender biased; almost all the respondents are male. Getting female respondents to talk about 
corruption is very difficult. In terms of the education qualification, the respondents are biased to 
educated people. Illiterate people or the people who have lower level of education do not use the 
online service as they may not capable to do so and that is why they are not included in the sample. 
Another challenge for the study was related with the language of the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was in English, it should be in local language (in Bengali) to have more quality data. 
To overcome this problem, the enumerator himself explains the questionnaire and collects the data 
by filling up the questionnaire. The details challenges of the research and their strategic responses 
are given in Table 14: 
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Table 14: Challenges for the Research (Risk Log) 
Types Descriptions Strategic Responses 
Operational 
(Macro Level) 
 TI has changed the methodology as well as the weights for the different 
indicators in 2010. If the research compares the present data with the data 
before 2010, then that may give improper readings. 
 At the ‘Macro level’, the study is 
only confined within the period of 
2 years (2012-2010). 
Operational 
(Micro Level) 
 Access to the sensitive documents and information. 
 Getting authentic data on corruption from the key informants. 
 Culture of secrecy in the public sector. 
 Use of informal and personal 
connections to get access. 
Political 
 As the election period was approaching in Bangladesh, there was unrest in the 
country which created some kinds of disturbances in the process of data 
collection. 
 Selected convenient places for the 
study. 
 Tried to avoid potentially 
troublesome places and periods. 
Organizational 
 In land administration, the introduction of E-governance is still in embryonic 
stage and there are no variations of the levels of E-governance.  
 Selected alternative organization 
simultaneously. 
Psychological 
 As the researcher himself is a civil servant, it is difficult for him to criticize 
the public organizations or other civil servants. 
 The predispositions of the researcher as a civil servant may lead to pro- 
bureaucratic interpretations of the data.  
 Try to depersonalize the data. 
 Try to avoid the preconceived 
ideas during the interpretations of 
the data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reducing Corruption through E-governance: Rhetoric or Reality 
52 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER 4: UNDERSTANDING THE MILIEU OF THE 
SAMPLE CASES - A DESCRIPTIVE NOTE 
 
 
 
4.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to investigate whether the introduction of E-governance can 
affect the level of corruption. To understand this effectiveness of E-governance, the study 
selected two organizations from Bangladesh.  The organizations are selected to have different 
levels of E-governance as part of the ‘experimental research design’ to understand the possible 
variable effects on corruption. This chapter is a brief sketch of these organizations to accustom 
the reader with the contexts of the selected cases. It starts with the service delivery systems of 
the sample organizations and then tries to explore the corruption dynamics associated with the 
services. This brief illustrations of the two sample organizations can help to understand the 
backdrops associated with the E-governance system and the corruption dynamics of the 
respective cases.  
4.1 Case 1: District Administration 
4.1.1 Service Delivery System in the District Administration 
During the British colonial period over 200 years before, the District Administration (popularly 
known as DC office or Deputy Collector’s office) emerged as the key center for administering 
the respective areas in the Indian Subcontinent. The legacy of this administrative unit continues 
in the independent Bangladesh and still it is considered as the hub for providing different 
government services to the citizens in Bangladesh. Now, it is entrusted to provide around 37 
different types of useful services to the citizens; like control and supervision of revenue, 
maintenance of public order and security, license and certificates, land acquisitions, census, 
relief and rehabilitation, social welfare, pension matters, education and public examinations, 
public complaints and enquiries etc. (Chowdhury, 2011). In the absence of an effective local 
government system for providing these services, DC offices are playing important roles and 
are representing the Central Government at the grassroots. In spite of this importance, “the 
service delivery system of the DC offices is still backdated and largely traditional paper-based 
system, which is time consuming and labor intensive. Furthermore, it is often inflexible, causes 
frequent delays, prone to abuse or corruption, and can prohibit access by the poor, 
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marginalized and vulnerable people. Due to the shortage of manpower and infrastructure, DC 
offices are also unable to provide the high demand for services from the growing population” 
(Ibid). To start the process reengineering within the public service to overhaul this backdated- 
time-consuming system, Bangladesh government has launched an E-governance system with 
the collaboration of UNDP on November 14, 2011. The system is known as the District E-
Service Center (DESC) which is an ICT (Information Communication Technology) facilitated 
one-stop service point and has been designed to improve the accessibility and the transparency 
of the public service delivery system at the district level (Ibid). Based on the initial learning, 
the government took new initiatives to upgrade the service delivery system further. On March, 
2013; the government launched more upgraded version which is renamed as National E-
Service System (NESS).  
District Land Administration 
Bangladesh, as an agrarian country, land management is considered as one of the most 
important tasks for the DC office as a lot of people’s livelihood is related with the land. The 
DC office preserves the land records, manages Khas land (State land under administration), 
conducts land acquisition based on the government orders, and oversights the revenue 
collections under the jurisdiction. Copy of the land records (locally known as Parchas) is 
required to the citizen for the different purposes, like: for Dewani Cases (Civil Cases), transfer 
/sell of land and for taking loan. The land records are preserved in the record room of the DC 
office which were prepared during the British colonial period (the survey started in 1888 and 
finished in the year 1940). These records are now in very poor condition. Without any 
immediate initiative to preserve these records, many of these records may lost forever. This 
poor condition even helping the corrupt practices as in many cases the corrupt officials can 
mention that the respective document is missing or damaged. Such poor record keeping is also 
affecting the efficiency of the service delivery, as the officials need time to trace the documents 
physically. Digitalization of such records with searchable option may help to increase the 
efficiency of the land related services of the respective offices as they can easily be traced 
electronically. Present initiative of the digital service through DESC/NESS is yet to be like 
that.  
The introduction of DESC/NESS leads to two significant changes in the service delivery 
system: introduction of a counter and the launch of an online based service delivery system. 
The counter is established with the intention to provide the necessary information and the 
services to the citizens and to receive various applications for the various services. The 
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information is also provided through the online platform as well, but this provision by online 
is not interactive i.e. the citizen cannot communicate with the officials through online if they 
have any further query (like by E-mail). After the introduction of DESC/NESS, a citizen can 
apply for Parchas (land records) by two procedures: through internet or directly from the 
counter. For the online application, a service seeker gets a tracking number after applying 
successfully. He can have the tracking number by E-mail or mobile SMS. The tracking number 
can be used to track the progress of the application. However, as the entire process is not 
completely online based, the citizens are yet to get the benefits of a complete electronic service 
delivery system. Present system uses the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
discretely for the different purposes in the entire service delivery chain. After the initial 
application through online, one needs to print that online application and puts a revenue stamp 
on it. Then one needs to go physically to the counter to submit the application.  
DESC/NESS brings two major changes in the internal working procedures of the service 
delivery: the use of computer to compose the document and the use of the databases to store 
data. Under the present arrangement if once a document is composed through the electronic 
platform then the information of such document is preserved in the database. So, when anyone 
asked for that document again, then that specific documents can easily be retrieved by just few 
clicks. This reduces the time significantly required for providing a Porcha (land record). 
Because, tracing every document among a huge number of documents with very small working 
force is a difficult task. From the field study, it is observed that in the rural district, there was 
only 4 people who were responsible to trace out the document, to compose the document 
(around 80-100 documents each day) and then to handover the documents. Similarly, the 
number of staff is also very inadequate in the urban district (around 10 people). They also have 
to face more or less similar kind of workload each day. In terms of the steps of the service 
delivery, except the addition of the provisions for the counter, all the steps remain same as 
before (For details: Appendix 7 and 8). Thus, the present system is composed of both the 
manual and the electronic system. So, it can also be labeled as the ‘hybrid system’ where still 
there are different limitations; like the citizens cannot apply directly, need to go to the office 
physically to submit the document, cannot pay the fees through online and the land records are 
yet to be digitalized. 
4.1.2 Corruption Dynamics in the District Administration 
The persons who need land records can be considered as comparatively more solvent people. 
Because, one needs land records to sell/buy land or for Dewani cases (civil cases) or for taking 
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loans. This means the people who needs land record already has land or is going to have the 
ownership of land. Such ownership indicates their comparative affluence. The corrupt officials 
try to capitalize this opportunity by creating obstacles to increase their bargaining power for 
Ghush (bribe). Because, they know that if they can create some obstacles then they can be 
benefited. The most common technique for creating such obstacles is to mention that the 
document cannot be found or misplaced and as they are busy, it is difficult to manage time for 
searching the documents. Thus, the corrupt officials seesaw with the service seekers and make 
the entire process complicated.  Interestingly, now most of the cases, the officials do not need 
to do anything as everyone has a perception that one has to pay extra money for having a service 
from the land record office. The service seekers themselves offer Ghush (bribe) willingly. The 
perception of the probable harassments and the delay to receive the records are creating the 
‘demonstrative effects’ on the service seekers to pay bribe. Sometimes the Dalal (broker) are 
also helping to circulate such fear, even sometimes with exaggerations. This is how a ‘culture 
of automatic acceptance’ for corrupt practices already has developed in the offices. Though, if 
anyone does not pay Ghush (bribe) then s/he may face the harassments and may have 
difficulties to get the records timely. 
Sometimes to avoid these problems, many people also depend on the Dalal (broker) and make 
a deal with them about the delivery of the service. They are treated as the troubleshooters who 
can solve the “bureaucratic mazes’. Because, the Dalal (broker) manages all the officials in 
exchange of the Dalali money (broker’s fee). However, they do not have any legal existence 
or they are not registered to do so. Generally, they are the people who have good connections 
with the officials. The average rate for the Dalali (broker) money is a bit higher than the Ghush 
(bribe). It is around BDT 1,000-1,500 (80 BDT = 1 USD) while Ghush (bribe) is around BDT 
500- 1,000; but it can vary based on the urgency, importance of the document, the delivery 
time and the place of the office. Some people also depend on the Dalal (broker) as they do not 
know all the procedures for getting the services. The person who are influential or have 
networks with the influential people, they use Tadbir (lobbying) to have the record. As many 
people do not have such connections, maximum of the people rely on Ghush (bribe) or on Dalal 
(broker). There are other two forms of corruption which are known as Bakshish (tips) and 
Opodhoukon (gift). The people who deal the land related matters (like, land lawyers, housing 
companies, brokers involved with the selling and the buying land etc.); practice these two 
techniques to maintain a good rapport with the officials for the future benefits. Generally, 
Bakshish (tips) is given to the lower level officials whereas Opodhoukon (gift) is given to the 
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higher level officials. The officials who are mainly accused for the corrupt practices, they also 
have some logics in favor of their activities. Generally, every day the personnel of the record 
room work up to 7-8 p.m. (usual office hour is up to 5 p.m.), sometimes they work more and 
even work in the holidays. Such extra services from the employees are possible because of the 
kickbacks or the grease money in the form of Ghush (bribe). The employees receive very little 
amount of salary and officially there is very little provisions for ‘over time’ payment for these 
extra works. Under such situations, this extra payment of around BDT 500- 1,000 (80 BDT = 
1 USD) work as a great motivating factors for them and is helping to increase their productivity. 
By supporting this, one of the employees said,  
‘We get very poor salary which is not sufficient to maintain our families. We take extra 
money but for this we have to work hard, even we have to work after the office hours and 
in the holidays. We take money for our hard works.’ 
In many cases, these corrupt activities start with the logic of the need but it continues even 
when one does not need and eventually turn into ‘greed based’ corruption. Maximum time, one 
cannot enjoy the collected bribe by himself alone, he has to share with the associated people 
but still one can earn a good amount of money compare to his salary. The average salary for a 
lower level employee is around BDT 5,000 (80 BDT = 1 USD). However, they can earn such 
amount of money from around 10-20 cases and on an average the sample office from the urban 
area deliver 100-120 records each day. The number is a bit lower in the rural office. Most 
interestingly in this section of the office, many employees from the other sections come to work 
after the office hour and even in the holidays. The only motivation is to have the share of the 
corrupt money. The senior officials have to keep quiet in many occasions. Because, under the 
exiting organizational arrangements, they do have very few options. Recruiting extra work 
force is extremely difficult because of the strict and the complicated legal procedures; and 
providing direct monitory incentives is also difficult due to lack of resources. If the authority 
takes drastic action against these practices, then the service can be hampered and the citizen 
even may not get the services. Sometimes, the higher authorities themselves also become part 
of the ‘corruption chain’ and get benefits from such practices. 
4.2 Case 2: Bangladesh Railway 
4.2.1 Ticketing System in Bangladesh Railway System 
Bangladesh Railway (BR) started its journey during the British colonial period on November 
15, 1862 when 53.11 kilometers of line was opened for the traffic between Dorshona of 
Chuadanga district and Jogotee of Kushtia district in the Indian Subcontinent. Earlier, the 
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railway collected the fare for traveling by issuing tickets or tokens. Under this system; 
generally, the paper tickets or the tokens were issued manually but no seats were allotted 
against the tickets/tokens. Later on, the authority decided to allot seats against a ticket but this 
made the entire ticketing system more complicated and time consuming as all the activities 
were to be done manually. To modernize the ticketing system, BR introduced the computerized 
system in 1994. Though, a long time has already been elapsed after the starting of the 
computerized ticketing system but it yet to have full coverage of the computerized ticketing 
system in all over the country. Still, there are stations where paper tickets are issued manually. 
Even in the same station, it has different types of ticketing systems (both paper based and 
computerized) for the different destinations.  
To modernize and to ensure hassle free purchasing, in the year 2010, Bangladesh railway 
introduced M-ticketing (Mobile- ticketing) in collaboration with two mobile phone operators 
by using the platform of the mobile phone (text messages). Later on, Bangladesh railway also 
introduced Electronic-ticketing (E-ticketing) by using the internet platform. Twenty-five 
percent of the tickets for certain trains (train with high demand and better service quality) are 
allotted for these two types of ticketing (together can be labeled as E/M-ticketing). Due to the 
provision of these arrangements for purchasing tickets, many people are getting hassle free 
services and also can save a lot of time for traveling and standing in the queue to have a ticket. 
In Bangladesh, where the problem of traffic jam is very high as it is a densely populated country 
(45,000/km2 in the capital city17), such option comes as a great relief to the citizen. However, 
the provision for such E/M-ticketing is very limited, confined within the few destinations and 
only twenty-five percent tickets are allotted of the whole amount of ticket. The allotment for 
ticketing in the sample stations are:  
Table 15: Allocation of the Ticketing in the Sample Stations (in %) 
Criteria 
Urban Station With E/M-
Ticketing Facilities (E-
Governance Level 3.5) 
Urban Station Without 
E/M-Ticketing Facilities 
(E-Governance Level 2) 
Rural Station (E-
Governance Level 1) 
Counter Selling  65 90 90 
Online Ticketing (E/M-ticketing) 25 - - 
VIP Allotment 5 5 5 
Reservation for the Employees  5 5 5 
Total 100 100 100 
 
The main rationale for keeping the counter based system are to ensure the equity and the 
accessibility of the marginalized people, like the poor and the illiterate; and also for the 
                                                 
17 Source: Wikipedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhaka, accessed on February 2, 2014. 
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convenience of the regular passengers who may face difficulties without the provision of the 
counter system. Because, many people do not have the access to the ICT facilities or the 
knowledge to avail the opportunities of M/E-ticketing. Even, if all the tickets are given to sell 
from the online, then there could have a chance for another problem - the ‘black 
marketeer/scalper (locally known as Kalobazari) may buy all the tickets and can sell in higher 
prices. Recently around 6,500 mobile SIM cards were officially switched off, because of the 
allegation of the corrupt practices (The Daily Star-newspaper, March 27, 2012). So, the 
officials are also facing problems to increase the quota for the online ticketing. One of the 
officials informed: 
“Even within the limited quota for online ticketing (25 percent), there are evidences of 
Kalobazari (black marketing). People are buying the tickets by using the online platform 
and are selling in the higher prices, especially during the rush hours or the high season.” 
4.2.2 Corruption Dynamics in the Ticketing System in Bangladesh Railway: Demand and 
Supply Perspectives 
The corruption opportunities related with the ticketing system of Bangladesh railway can be 
attributed to the mismatch between the demand and the supply. The huge fare difference 
between the two modes of transport (the bus and the train) prompted the travelers to choose 
train as their preferred mode of transport. Apart from this factor, the hassles in the roads due to 
traffic jam, comparatively better safety record of the railway and due to relative comfort in the 
train; most of the people like to prefer train as their mode of transport, especially to travel to 
the divisional cities like Chittagong, Sylhet, Rajshahi, Khulna etc. Because, the trains which 
are running to these divisional cities are comparatively better than other trains. Table 16 may 
provide a quick overview on the comparative pictures between the bus and the train based on 
the cost and the time: 
Table 16: Comparative Pictures between Two Modes of Transportation in Dhaka-
Chittagong Route in Bangladesh 
Sr. 
No. 
                        Types of Transport 
 
Types of Tickets 
Bus Train 
Fare 
(in BDT) 
Travel 
Time 
Fare 
(in BDT) 
Travel 
Time 
1. Air-conditioned Sleeping Berth - - 1,093 7- 10 hrs 
2. Air-conditioned Seats 1,250 10-12 hrs 673 7- 10 hrs 
3. Non Air-conditioned Seats 450 10-14 hrs 320 7- 10 hrs 
(Note: 80 BDT= 1 USD) 
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Table 16 indicates that one needs to spend less money as fare for train then bus and can reach 
to the destinations more quickly. This is more or less true for most of the divisions and the 
districts. If even one pays bribe (100-200 BDT) to have a train ticket, still s/he does not need 
to pay much more than the bus fare. The price of the train fare is adjusted in 2012 after a long 
period. It is adjusted after around 20 years (last adjusted in 1992). In between, the operating 
cost increases significantly due to price hiking. For example, per liter diesel was BDT 13 at 
that time which is now increased to BDT 61 (80 BDT= 1 USD). Still, the adjusted prices are 
less than the operating cost and cheaper than the other modes of transport. Before the 
adjustment, the gap between the bus and the train was almost double or even more. During the 
holidays, a huge number of people travel though all modes of transports. Due to this heavy 
movement of the people, there are huge traffic jams in the roads. These obstacles motivate the 
people to have the train as their mode of transport at any cost. Thus, there is a huge pressure 
from the ‘demand side’.  
On the other hand, from the ‘supply side’ the provision for transportation through railway is 
limited and not sufficient to meet this huge demand. For a long time period, the government of 
Bangladesh was reluctant to invest in railway sector. The railway cannot do its regular 
maintenance and capacity enhancement works due to lack of the government’s approval. Some 
statistics may reflect government’s negligence more precisely. In 1970, total railway track 
length was 4,448 km. while in 2011, it was reduced to around 3,873 km. The total number of 
coaches was 1,633 in 1970 while in 2011, it was 1,509. Similarly, the number of locomotive 
(railway engine) was 484 in 1970 but in 2011; it reduced to 296. Many of these locomotives’ 
‘economic lifetime’ (generally 20 years) already expired but still they are used on the track 
(The Daily Stay-newspaper, March 31, 2013). Meanwhile the population of the country has 
increased more than double (from around 75 million to 165 million). Instead of enhancing the 
capacity of BR with the increasing demand, the key indicators indicate that the capacity of BR 
has reduced significantly over the last four decades (1971-2011). Even up till now, the situation 
does not change that much in terms of the capacity of BR. These discrepancies between the 
demand and the supply open the opportunities for corruption for the different sections of the 
peoples both from inside and outside of the railway. Sometimes, there is a nexus between the 
outsider and the railway employees. The outsiders act as the broker and build a network with 
the corrupt railway employees and share a certain percentage of money with the employees of 
railway for each ticket sells in Kalobazar (black market). When the citizens do not get tickets 
from the counters, they may get tickets from the Kalobazar (black market). This market does 
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not have any formal place or specific person to sell tickets. For getting tickets from Kalobazar 
(black market), someone needs to spend extra money, generally double of the usual price for a 
ticket or even more. Though, it can fluctuate based on the demand. Some regular traveler builds 
some kinds of understanding with the people from Kalobazar (black market). The 
blackmarketeers/scalpers keep tickets after getting phone call from them and handover the 
tickets just before the journey. Sometimes, the corrupt booking clerks (people who sell tickets 
from the counters) directly claim Ghush (bribe) for selling tickets to the citizen. However, most 
of the cases they do not claim Ghush (bribe) directly. Rather, they create an environment where 
people are compelled to pay Ghush (bribe) or Bakshish (tips) for getting the ticket/s. Generally, 
they tell that all the tickets are sold or show the display monitor which may indicate that no 
tickets are left for selling.  If anyone offers extra money as Ghush (bribe) or Bakshish (tips), 
then they may say that they will try to manage or they have some personal tickets which they 
can sell. Usually the business people pay Bakshish (tips) to maintain a good rapport with the 
lower level officials to have the tickets regularly. The people who are influential or have 
connection with the influential people from railway, use Tadbir (lobbying) to have the tickets. 
Generally, the politicians, the bureaucrats (civil, military and the judicial) and the journalists 
use this Tadbir (lobbying) to have their tickets. 
4.3 Conclusion 
The study selected two cases for more precise and better understanding on the dynamics 
between E-governance and corruption, especially the probable processes to effect corruption 
by E-governance. First case of the study is about the service delivered by the district land 
administration in Bangladesh and the second case is on the ticketing system from Bangladesh 
Railway. This chapter provides a brief note to familiarize the reader with the contexts of the 
cases and the corruption dynamics in those areas. It tries to give an overview of the 
conventional service delivery system along with the changes after the introduction of E-
governance in the sample organizations. This brief overview can quickly accustomed one with 
the sample cases.  
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS OF THE 
MACRO LEVEL TRENDS: AN EMPIRICAL GAZE 
 
 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter is a detailed illustration of the statistical trends between E-governance and 
corruption based on the macro level statistics. The macro level data are extracted from the 
different renowned databases; like, Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency 
International (TI) and Online Service Index (OSI) by United Nations (UN). The study first tires 
to test the Hypothesis 1 of the study by analyzing the global trends and then tries to explore the 
probable variations of the effectiveness of E-governance based on the nature of the countries. 
One of the main challenges of these statistical analyses is to draw the causality, because such 
inference is difficult in social science as the variables can be connected with each other. The 
study tries to optimize the output based on the available data and the methodological rigor to 
explore the possible causalities and at the same time, it also indicates the possible limitations 
for such inferences.  
5.1 Mapping the Trends between Corruption and the Explanatory Variables 
5.1.1 Correlation Coefficients: Exploring the Trends between the Variables 
Correlation coefficient is used as a statistical tool to explore the strength of the relationship 
between two continuous variables (Pallant, 2010: 103). Based on this statistical tool, the study 
tries to understand the strength and the nature of the relationships between corruption and its 
major explanatory variables identified through the theoretical arguments and from the various 
empirical studies. Table 17, indicates that there is a strong correlation between the level of 
corruption and E-governance at the country level. The ‘r’ value is 0.686 (p < 0.01) between 
CPI value and OSI value. This means both the variables move to the same direction together 
i.e. with the increase of CPI value, OSI value also increases. Increase of CPI value means the 
reduction of corruption as 1 indicates low level of corruption and 10 indicates high level of 
corruption. The dependent variable corruption also shows strong level of correlation with the 
economic development (measured through GDP per capita of a country from the World Bank’s 
data) and the degree of the democratic governance (measured through the democratic index by 
Economic Intelligence Unit). Table 17 shows that r = 0.661(p < 0.01) between the economic 
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development (GDP) and the corruption (CPI) and r = 0.741(p < 0.01) between democratic 
governance (DI) and the corruption (CPI). This means, the more a country is developed and 
become democratic, the country is less likely to be corrupted. 
Table 17 : Pearson Correlation among the Variables in Macro Level (N=150) 
 CPI OSI GDP DI 
CPI 1    
OSI .686** 1   
GDP .661** .517** 1  
DI .741** .581** .594** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 (Note: CPI- Corruption Perception Index, OSI- Online Service Index, GDP- Gross Domestic Product and DI- Democratic 
Index) 
Source: Researcher’s calculation based on different databases 
If we compare the relative effectiveness of the three explanatory variables (E-governance, 
economic development and democratic governance) on the dependent variable (corruption), 
then we can see that democratic governance can demonstrate stronger level of effectiveness in 
controlling corruption compared to other two variables as its r = 0.741 (p < 0.01), which is 
higher than the ‘r’ values of the other two variables; then the next one is E-governance. Though, 
the correlation coefficients are indicating about the higher level of correlation between the 
independent and the explanatory variables but we should not forget that it provides only an 
indication that there can be a relationship between the two variables; it does not, however, 
indicate that one variable causes the other (Pallant, 2010: 124). 
The correlation of Table 17 is based on 150 countries; if we add the countries that are excluded 
in this correlation coefficient due to unavailability of the data of GDP and the democratic index; 
then we can get a total of 161 countries for analysis. In that case, the ‘r’ value drops slightly 
between CPI and OSI from 0.686 (p < 0.01) (in Table 17) to 0.676 (p < 0.01) (in Table 18). 
Still, both the variables of the study indicate that there is a strong positive correlation. Thus, 
from the correlation coefficient test of the study, we can get the trend between the dependent 
(corruption) and the independent variable (E-governance); which support the Hypothesis 1 of 
the study. This means with the increase of the E-governance level (measured through OSI 
value), the level of CPI value also increases i.e. corruption reduces (as high level CPI value 
indicates less corruption).  
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Table 18 : Correlation between E-governance and Corruption Level in the Different 
Countries (N=161) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.2 Multiple Regression Models: Understanding the Effects of the Explanatory 
Variables 
‘Multiple regression’ is a more sophisticated extension of the correlation and is used to explore 
the predictive ability of a set of independent variables on one continuous dependent variable 
(Pallant, 2010: 103). Through this statistical tool, the study likes to explore the predictive 
ability of the explanatory variables (E-governance, Democratic Governance and Economic 
Development) in explaining the dependent variable (Corruption). Based on the explanatory 
variables, the study develops different models to assess how far these explanatory variables 
can explain the changes in the dependent variables. The main model (Model 4) of the study 
includes all the three explanatory models and the study mainly discusses this model elaborately.  
Overall Model Fit 
The model summary table (Table 19) is about the overall fit of the model 4. This indicates how 
far the variation of the explanatory variables, which are included in the model, can explain the 
variations of the dependent variables.  Table 19 indicates about the predictors, which are used 
in the model to explain the changes of the dependent variable. Here, one of the significant value 
is R-square (R2) (also known as coefficient of determination). R is the coefficient of the 
multiple correlations, which ranges from 0 to 1 (Elite Research, 2013: 6). Higher the value of 
R-square, the better the predictive power of a regression model. Because, it tells how much of 
the variation of the dependent variable is explained by the regression model (Pallant, 2007: 
158). When a small sample is involved, the R-square value in the sample tends to be rather 
optimistic observation of the true value in the population. The Adjusted R-square statistics 
‘corrects’ this value to provide a better estimate of the data (Ibid, 6).  
Table 19: Summary of the Model 4 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
 .829a .687 .681 1.046 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DI, GDP, OSI 
 Change of CPI Value Change of OSI Value 
Change of CPI Value 1  
Change of OSI Value .676** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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For this study, the value for R-square is 0.687. This means 68.7 percent variation of the 
dependent variable i.e. changes of corruption (CPI value) can be explained by the model. For 
more conservative estimation, adjusted R-square can be considered. This value is 0.681, which 
indicates that though the predictive power slightly decline but still it can explain maximum of 
the changes (68.1 percent). The ‘standard error of the estimate’ is an estimate of the accuracy 
of the predictions made by the regression model - smaller the standard error of estimate, the 
better the prediction. In this study, as the value is around 1, it can be said that the standard error 
of the regression model is comparatively low. 
ANOVA Test 
To assess the statistical significance of the explanatory power of a model, it is necessary to 
have ANOVA (Analysis of variance) test (Pallant, 2010: 161). This test can help to understand 
whether the predictive power of a model appears really or randomly. In ANOVA test, the 
variance of the dependent variable is divided into two parts: one part is about the ‘Regression’, 
which indicate the predictable portion by the regression model, and the other part is the 
‘Residual or error’ which cannot be predicted by the model (Kirkpatrick and Feeney, 2011:85). 
Table 20 indicates that F (3, 14618) = 106.815 and the model is statistically significant with p 
< 0.01. This lower level of the ‘p’ value indicates that the model is statistically significant to 
explain the changes in the dependent variable.  
Table 20: ANOVA Test Results for Model 4 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
 
Regression 350.694 3 116.898 106.815 .000a 
Residual 159.782 146 1.094   
Total 510.475 149    
a. Predictors: (Constant), DI, GDP, OSI 
b. Dependent Variable: CPI 
Coefficients of the Regression Models 
The ANOVA test is mainly to understand the statistical significance of the model but it does 
not explain which parts of the model contribute to explain the variation of the dependent 
variable. For this, the coefficients of the regression model can help us. The Coefficients of the 
regression model can help to know which of the independent variables contributed to the 
prediction of the dependent variable (Pallant, 2010: 161). The model can provide two types of 
coefficients: unstandardized and standardized. Standardized means that the values for each of 
the different variables have been converted to the same scale so that they can be comparable 
                                                 
18  3 and 35 are the degree of freedom (df) for the regression and residual respectively. 
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(Ibid, 161). By analyzing the beta value (β), we can compare the contribution of each of the 
explanatory variable. The statistical significances of the variable’s contribution can be 
measured by the ‘p’ values. Table 21 indicates that for all the variables; the ‘p’ value is less 
than .01 i.e. they are showing statistically significant coefficients. Model 4 in the Table 21 
indicates that the largest beta coefficient is 0.403, which is for DI (measure of the democratic 
governance). This means, DI makes the largest contribution to explain the dependent variable. 
The next variable which contributes in explaining the changes in the dependent variable is OSI 
(measure of E-governance) as β = 0.320 (p < 0.01).  
Table 21: Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Model 4 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.(p) Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) .874 .288  3.037 .003   
OSI 2.413 .445 .320 5.425 .000 .617 1.621 
GDP 2.292E-5 .000 .255 4.282 .000 .602 1.661 
DI .346 .054 .403 6.429 .000 .545 1.836 
a. Dependent Variable: CPI 
Table 22 presents the summary of all the regression models. In model 1, 2 and 3 (Table 22); 
each of the independent variables (GDP, OSI and DI) is controlled by turn and then the 
explaining power of the models are measured through the Adjusted R2. These models can 
explain 64.3 percent, 62.4 percent and 59.8 percent changes of the dependent variables 
respectively. Among the comparisons of the models (Model 1, 2 and 3), model 1 can explain 
most of the changes in the dependent variable. It indicates that when GDP is controlled in 
Model 1, the model still can explain 64.3 percent of the changes of the dependent variable 
(corruption measured by CPI). This means these two variables (OSI and DI) can explain most 
of the variations of the dependent variable. 
Table 22: Summary of the Linear Regression Models (N=150) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
OSI .386*  .470* .320* 
DI .517* .538*  .255* 
GDP  .341* .417* .403* 
Constant .310 1..471* 2.049* .874* 
Adjusted R2 .643 .624 .598 .687 
F for change in R2 135.125 121.932 109.507 106.815 
 
*p < .01 
 
(Note: CPI- Corruption Perception Index, OSI- Online Service Index, GDP- Gross Domestic Product and DI- 
Democratic Index) 
Reducing Corruption through E-governance: Rhetoric or Reality 
66 | P a g e  
 
The most interesting and the relevant findings for this study can be identified if we compare 
Model 2 and Model 4. When the model (Model 2) is composed of the variables DI and GDP, 
then it can explain 62.4 percent of the variation of the dependent variable (CPI value) as the 
Adjusted R2 is .624. Such explaining power of the model can increase significantly if the 
variable OSI is added (Model 4). The explaining power of the model increases from 62.4 
percent (Model 2) to 68.7 percent (Model 4) as the Adjusted R2 is increased from .624 to .687. 
This increased explaining power of the model 4 can be attributed to the ‘OSI’ as there is only 
variation of this variable among the explaining variables between the two models. All the three 
models (model 1, 3 and 4) indicate that OSI can have significant positive impacts on CPI, as β 
= .386 and p < .01; β = .470 and p < .01 and β = .320 and p < .01 respectively. ‘β’ values 
indicate the unit of changes of the dependent variable due to one unit change of the respective 
explanatory variables. Like, in model 4, this means with the increase of one unit of OSI value, 
there is a change for the increase of 0.320 unit in CPI value and the increase of CPI value means 
the improvement of the corruption situation. Similarly, other two models (model 1 and 3) also 
indicate that E-governance can have positive impacts due to positive β values. Thus, the 
regression models indicate that OSI can explain significant amount of the variations of the 
dependent variable and accordingly support Hypothesis 1 of the study.  
5.2 E-governance and Corruption: Exploring the Variations of the Effectiveness of E-
governance in the different Countries 
The Correlation coefficient and the regression models can provide the indications of the 
aggregate level trends between the variables. To understand the effectiveness of E-governance 
on corruption in the different countries, it is also necessary to analyze the trends more 
elaborately. Based on the changing trends of the index values of both the dependent and the 
independent variables, a graph can be derived (Figure 7) which can help us to understand the 
trends between the variables more clearly. In this graph, the independent variable (OSI) is 
plotted in the ‘X’ axis while the dependent variable (CPI) is plotted in ‘Y’ axis. The first 
Quadrant (Q1) denotes a situation where the index values of CPI increase with the increase of 
OSI value. The graph shows that most of the countries’ data support this trend (118 countries 
out of 161 countries). This means, the corruption level is reduced (as 0 = high level corruption 
and 10 = low level of corruption) with the increase of E-governance level in those countries. 
These countries constitute 73.29 percent of the sample countries (for details: Table 23). 
Inversely the Quadrant 3 (Q3) indicates a situation where both the variables’ values decrease. 
This means with the decrease of E-governance level, the corruption situation also deteriorate 
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(decrease of CPI value). Here, we can find the data of only one country which CPI value drops 
with the decreases of OSI value. Thus, the data in these two quadrants show the consistent 
trends with the proposition of Hypothesis 1. The data which fit in these two quadrants (together 
73.91 percent of the sample countries) demonstrate consistent trends with the assumption of 
Hypothesis 1 i.e. the level of corruption decreases or increases with the increases or decreases 
of the E-governance level respectively. 
 
 
Figure 7: Changing Trends between Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Online 
Service Index (OSI) 
 
Source: Develop by the researcher based on the data from CPI and OSI 
The data in the other two quadrants (Q2 and Q4) are showing trends, which are inconsistent 
with the proposition of the Hypothesis 1 of the study. Because in Q2, in spite of the decrease 
of E-governance level, the CPI value improved i.e. corruption level is reduced. Four countries 
show such trends as the corruption scenario improved in spite of the deterioration of the level 
of E-governance. One country’s (South Korea) corruption level reduces without the change of 
the value of OSI. Similarly in Q4, the level of E-governance increases but the CPI value 
decreases. Altogether 32 countries show such trend among the sample 161 countries. The 
countries which data are found in Q4, indicates that with the improvement of the E-governance 
level, the corruption situations do not improve rather deteriorated (deteriorates in 32 countries). 
Five countries show stable corruption level though there are improvements in the level of E-
governance. Table 23 provides the summary of all the countries’ trends based on the relation 
between the dependent and the independent variables of the study. 
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Table 23 : Patterns of Change between Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Online 
Service Index (OSI) 
Trends Number of countries In % 
Increase of both OSI and CPI Values   118 73.29 
Decrease of both OSI and CPI Values 1 0.62 
Increase of OSI Value  but Decrease of CPI 
Value 
32 19.88 
Decrease of OSI Value  but Increase of CPI 
Value 
4 2.48 
Stable OSI Value  and Increase of CPI 
Value 
1 0.62 
Increase OSI Value  and Stable CPI Value 5 3.11 
Total 161 100 
 
(Note: Increase of OSI means increase of E-governance and the increase of CPI means the reduction of corruption; and the 
decrease of the respective variables indicate the reverse relationships) 
Now, if we summarize the changing patterns (Table 24) that exist between CPI and OSI, it 
appears that maximum of the countries, 119 countries out of 161 countries i.e. 73.91 percent 
support Hypothesis 1 of the study i.e. corruption reduces with the increase of E-governance. 
At the same time, a significant number of the countries, 42 countries out of 161 countries i.e.  
26.09 percent countries’ CPI value does not changes in the same direction with the change of 
OSI. This means an opposite scenario of the assumption of Hypothesis 1 exists between these 
two variables in those countries. 
Table 24 : Changing Patterns between CPI and OSI 
Trends Number of countries In % Comments 
CPI Values Increase or Decrease with the 
Increase or Decrease of the OSI value 
Respectively  
119 73.91 
Consistent with the 
Hypothesis 1 
CPI Values do not Increase or Decrease 
with the Increase or Decrease of the OSI 
value Respectively 
42 26.09 
Not Consistent with 
the Hypothesis 1 
Total 161 100  
 
5.2.1 Variation of the Effectiveness of E-governance based on the Nature of the Countries 
From the statistical trends of the study, it appears that a significant number of the countries are 
showing inconsistent trends of the main proposition of the study (Hypothesis 1). This demands 
further inquiry on the probable variations of the effectiveness of E-governance based on the 
nature of the countries. This can generate a better understanding on the dynamics between the 
variables. The effectiveness of E-governance may vary based on the different attributes of a 
country like culture, system of governance, level of development etc. This study only considers 
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the distinctions of the countries based on the level of the economic development due to the 
time constraint and the limited scope of the research. For this, the study considers the World 
Bank’s categories of the countries, which are constructed based on GNI per capita.   
Table 25: Distribution of the Countries which Shows Inconsistent Trends with the 
Hypothesis 1 of the Study based on the Economic Nature of the Countries (Measured 
through GNI per capita) 
Trends 
Number of 
countries 
High Income 
Countries: 
$12,476 or 
more 
 
Upper Middle 
Income 
Countries: 
$4,036 to 
$12,475 
Lower Middle 
Income 
Countries: 
$1,026 to $4,035 
Low Income 
Countries: 
$1,025 or less 
Increase of OSI Value  but 
Decrease of CPI Value 
32 
24 (18 are 
OECD 
Countries) 
4 0 4 
Decrease of OSI Value  but 
Increase of CPI Value 
4 
1 (OECD 
Country) 
2 0 1 
Stable OSI Value  and 
Increase of CPI Value 
1 
1(OECD 
Country) 
0 0 0 
Increase of OSI Value  and 
Stable CPI Value 
5 
2 (1 OECD 
Country) 
1 2 0 
Total 42 (100%) 28 (67%) 7 (16%) 2 (5%) 5 (12%) 
 
Note: The classifications of the countries are based on World Bank 
Table 25 indicates that the countries which shows inconsistent trends with the Hypothesis 1; 
are mostly from the high income countries. The number is 28 out of 42 countries i.e. 67% 
countries are from high income countries. Most interestingly, among these high-income 
countries, 21 countries are from OECD countries (for details: Appendix 10). In general, the 
OECD countries have less corruption (based on CPI values by TI) and higher level of E-
governance (based on OSI by UN) compared to other countries in the world. In spite of higher-
level presence of E-governance, there are indications from the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) that the magnitude of corruption is increasing in many high income countries, especially 
in the OECD countries. Because of the format of the CPI data, it is also not possible to say that 
which kinds of corruption are increasing (like petty or grand corruption), as CPI only provides 
the aggregate perception on the corruption of a country. It is also not possible to say concretely 
about the possible roles of E-governance in such increasing trend. From the existing data, 
simply we can say that E-governance is failing to control the increasing trend of corruption in 
spite of higher presence in those countries. A total 21 countries out of 34 OECD countries show 
inconsistent trends with the proposition of Hypothesis 1. Oppositely, it is evident from the 
statistics that E-governance is showing more effectiveness in the developing countries 
(countries other than the high-income countries). From the lower middle-income group, only 
2 countries show inconsistent trends with the Hypothesis 1 of the study while the number is 5 
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and 7 respectively for the low income and the upper income countries. The rest of the 
developing countries are showing the trends which indicate about the possible effectiveness of 
E-governance on corruption. These findings are consistent with the findings of Anderson 
(2009: 209) who also found that E-government had led to reductions of corruption over the 
decade 1996-2006 in the Non-OECD countries, but it showed insignificant trends for the 
OECD countries. He tested the proposition by another important database of corruption: 
‘Control of Corruption Index’ by World Bank. 
5.2.2 Triangulation through the other Studies: Patterns of Corruption - a Possible 
Explanation of the Variation? 
By combining the trends of both the developed and the developing countries, it can be said that 
E-governance is showing more effectiveness in controlling corruption in the developing 
countries compared to the developed countries. One of the possible explanations can be about 
the effectiveness of E-governance on certain patterns of corruption, which exist in the 
developing countries, and the possible successes on those patterns may contribute in the 
improved perception on corruption in the developing countries. If this is true then the problem 
of the ‘petty’ corruption may provide a possible explanation. Petty corruption is mostly done 
by the lower/street level bureaucrats in exchange of the provided services (Anderson, 2009: 
2008). E-governance may be more effective on this type of corruption by changing the service 
delivery channels and by eliminating the provision for direct human interaction. The direct 
human interaction can increase the bargaining power of the respective officials who is 
providing the services. The change of the service delivery channel to the electronic platform 
can reduce or completely eliminate such options. It also can enhance the monitoring capacities 
to track the work processes and can increase the probabilities to be detected after the corrupt 
activities. This changing dynamics may help to reduce the corruption; especially the petty 
corruption in the developing countries. In contrast, in the OECD countries, the problem of such 
petty corruption (like bribe) is not significant (EU Anti-Corruption Report, 2014: 5-6, 16 and 
Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013:3, Anderson, 2009: 208). EU Anti-Corruption Report by European 
Parliament (2014: 16) indicates about low experience of the problem of bribery in the different 
member countries. Mungiu-Pippidi (2013:3) from Hertie School of Governance also indicated 
about similar trends. Her policy paper indicates that on an average more than 90 percent of 
Europeans in the 27 EU member states were not asked for bribe. However, 79 percent fully or 
partially agree that corruption exists in their countries. Even all most half of the respondents 
(47 percent) think that the level of corruption has increased in their countries over the past three 
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years (Ibid, 3). This trend may by indicative for the OECD countries as OECD is mostly 
composed by the EU member countries.  
EU Antic-Corruption Report (2014:27) identified construction, energy, transport, defense and 
the health sector, which are most vulnerable to corruption, especially during the procurement 
processes. The report also mentioned about other studies which indicated that the costs added 
to a contract as a result of corrupt practices may amount to between 20% to 25%, and in some 
cases even 50 percent of the total cost of the contract (Ibid, 21). Approximately one fifth of the 
EU’s GDP is spent every year by the public authorities and by the entities governed by the 
public law in procuring goods, works and services (Ibid, 21). Different forms of corruption can 
be found in these procurement processes like drafting of tailor-made specifications to favor 
certain bidders, splitting of public tenders in smaller bids to avoid competitive procedures, 
disproportionate and unjustified selection criteria, unjustified exclusion of bidders, unjustified 
use of emergency procedures, inadequate analysis of situations where the bid prices were too 
low, excessive reliance on the lowest price as the most important criterion, unjustified 
exceptions from publication of bids etc. (Ibid: 26). If we analyze these corruption patterns then 
we can put many of these into strategic or policy level corruption. Because, for executing many 
of these corruption, someone first need to set the policy level decisions to create favorable 
grounds, like the tailor-made specifications to favor certain bidders. E-governance may have 
limited effectiveness when any such policy level decisions are taken to favor some interest 
groups in exchange of the corrupt benefits; because E-governance operates based on those 
inputs (the policy decisions). Like, in a tendering process, the ‘criteria’ for selecting the best 
bidder are very important. The authority may set some criteria to favor some interest groups. 
In that case, Electronic Tendering (E-tendering) may have limited role to control those 
corruption but to select the best bidder based on those preset criteria. This type of policy level 
corruption may provide an explanation of the variation of the success of E-governance. 
However, from the present data, it is difficult to say anything conclusively about the nature of 
corruption; all these are possibilities. Because, Transparency International’s data just indicates 
about the overall perception of corruption, but not the elaborate descriptions of the patterns of 
corruption.  
5.3 The Statistical Challenges and the Caveats on the Macro Level Trends and Inferences 
5.3.1 Multicollinearity Problem 
“The term ‘multicollinearity’ is used to describe the problem when an approximate linear 
relationship among the explanatory variables leads to unreliable regression estimates” 
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(Verbeek, 2008: 43). It indicates a situation when two or more explanatory variables are highly 
correlated. Highly correlated independent variables may make the inclusion of the redundant 
variable and make it difficult to discern the effects of a specific independent variable on the 
dependent variable, as they tend to offset each other. The most easiest and convenient way to 
check the problem of the multicollinearity is by checking the correlation matrix. When two 
independent variable shows correlation value 0.7 or more, then may need to ponder the 
probable problem of multicollinearity (Pallant, 2010: 158). In this study, all the three 
independent variables show the correlation less than 0.7 with the other variables (Table 17). 
For more precise estimation and understanding of the problem of multicollinearity, the 
‘Collinearity Diagnostics’ can be more effective. Collinearity Diagnostics can pick up on the 
problems with multicollinearity that may not be evident from the correlation matrix (Pallant, 
2010: 158). For this, two popular tests are: Tolerance and VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) 
(Ibid, 158). If the value for Tolerance is very small (less than 0.1) then it indicates that the 
multiple correlation with other variable is high, suggesting the possibility of the problem 
multicollinearity (Ibid, 158). Table 21 specifies the tolerance level of the three independent 
variables of this study. None of the value is less than 0.1. Another test for multicollinearity is 
the analysis of the variance inflation factor (VIF). VIF values above 10 can be a matter of 
concern for a model, indicating the probable problem of multicollinearity (Pallant, 2010: 158). 
In this study, none of the VIF value is close to 10. The highest value is 1.836 (Table 21). 
Therefore, it can be said that the values of the independent variables have not violated the 
multicollinearity assumption. 
5.3.2 Endogeneity Problem 
Endogeneity is a term that is used to describe the presence of an endogenous explanatory 
variable in a regression model (Wooldrige, 2013:848). It is an explanatory variable which is 
correlated with the error term, either because of an omitted variable, measurement error or 
reverse causality (Verbeek, 2008:133). Each of these sources of endogeneity bias can lead to 
questionable causal inferences. This can cause the coefficient estimators to be inconsistent. A 
coefficient may adequately reflect the hypothesized relationship in a model but in the presence 
of endogeneity, it can become inconsistent (Antonakis, 2012:2). Omitted variables bias arises 
if a relevant explanatory variable that is correlated with the depended variable is omitted from 
a model (Verbeek, 2008:137). For the regression models of the study, only three key 
independent variables (E-governance, economic development and level of democratic 
governance) are included. Some of the important determinants of corruption like culture, role 
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of the civil society and the watchdog agencies, freedom of media etc. are not included in the 
model. Measurement error is defined as the error resulting from an imperfect observation or 
measurement of a variable (Wooldrige, 2010:55). It is another situation where the regression 
model can become inconsistent. The dependent variable of the study (corruption) is measured 
based on the peoples’ perception- mainly from the opinions of the business people. Such 
technique may not be able to capture the actual level of corruption in a country. Because, the 
perceptions on corruption may vary based on the background of the respondents and the 
opinions of the business people may be different from the other people. Reverse causality refers 
to the possibility that not only independent variable has an impact on the dependent variable 
but at the same time dependent variable has an impact on one or more independent variables 
(Verbeek, 2008:137). The reverse causality happens when the relationship between the 
independent variable and the depended variable is either backwards or circular. Such 
tendencies may also exist between the dependent and the independent variables of this study. 
The establishment of infrastructure for E-governance can be effected by the corruption; 
because the corrupt people may try to get the contract to install the system in illegal way. After 
getting the contract, they may install cheap instruments which may not be durable and may 
hamper the development of E-governance.  
5.4 Conclusion 
The trends between E-governance and corruption in most of the countries support Hypothesis 
1 of the study i.e. E-governance can help to reduce corruption. The empirical evidences show 
a declining trend of corruption in many countries around the world with the increase of E-
governance level. In addition, the research also observed an inconsistent trend of E-governance 
with corruption in some of the countries, particularly in some of the OECD countries. Now the 
question is how far E-governance is contributing to these changing trends of corruption. In the 
study, the macro level statistical data only shows the trends but it is difficult to establish the 
causality between the variables. So, it cannot be said conclusively that those changes of 
corruption are only due to the changes of the E-governance level of the respective country. In 
general, these changes can be attributed to the overall institutional quality of a country. E-
governance may play a part with the other factors to these changes by changing the rules of the 
game for corruption. For more precise understanding and drawing causality; the research 
design considers two cases for analyses at the micro level.  
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CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS OF THE 
MICRO LEVEL CASE STUDIES- MAPPING THE EFFECTS 
OF E-GOVERNANCE ON CORRUPTION 
 
 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter is an effort to test the hypotheses of the study based on the micro level data 
collected from the sample cases. To understand the probable effects of E-governance on the 
corruption, first, the study tries to test the hypothesis 1 of the study. In the macro level analysis, 
the study only test this hypothesis to explore the degree of effect on the corruption level by E-
governance, but in the micro level, the research also tries to understand the processes to effect 
corruption by E-governance. For this, the study tries to test three hypotheses which can be 
associated with the processes of effecting corruption by E-governance. The chapter concludes 
with the ‘cross-case syntheses’ to have more robust understanding of the effects of E-
governance on corruption.   
6.1 Mapping the Corruption Dynamics in the Sample Cases 
The theoretical logics of this study indicate that E-governance may have a positive impact in 
curbing corruption and higher level of E-governance may have more effective impacts 
compared to lower level E-governance. To capture these probable variations of the 
effectiveness of E-governance, the study design of this research includes two different cases 
with four different levels of E-governance. This enables the research to assess the probable 
variable effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable in natural settings. The 
variations of the dependent and the intervening variables are measured through the ranking by 
the respondents’ perceptions. For this, the respondents were asked to rank the level of 
corruption both before and after the introduction of E-governance. Based on the variation of 
the perceptions of the respondents, the study tries to understand the effects of E-governance.  
6.1.1 Case 1: District Land Administration - Test of Hypothesis 1 
The first case of the study is from the district land administration in Bangladesh. In the district 
land administration, as the level of E-governance is same in every district, it is not possible to 
understand the variations of the effectiveness of E-governance on corruption due to variations 
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of its levels. However, this case can provide the feedback on the effects of E-governance. So, 
for this case, the study only tries to understand the effects of E-governance, not its variable 
impacts due to the variations of the levels. From the feedback of the respondents, it appears 
that there were higher level of corruption before the introduction of E-governance and the level 
of corruption remains more or less the same even after the introduction of E-governance. Table 
26 indicates that in the urban areas, it remains same while in the rural district, there is indication 
for slight improvement of the corruption scenario as the level drops from 5.29 to 5.14. 
However, with the very small sample size, this variation may not be that much significant. 
Thus, the feedback of the respondents indicates that only the introduction of E-governance is 
not sufficient enough to control corruption in the district land administration. 
Table 26: Levels of Corruption Before and After the Introduction of E-governance in 
the District Land Administration (Scale 1-6) 
Study Areas 
Level of E-
governance 
Before the Introduction 
of DESC/NESS 
After the Introduction 
of DESC/NESS 
Rural Area 2.5 5.29 5.14 
Urban Area 2.5 4.63 4.63 
Questions were asked: 1) How do you rank the ‘magnitude of corruption’ before the introduction 
of DESC/NESS? (Low =1 and 6 = High) 
2) How do you rank the ‘magnitude of corruption’ after the introduction of DESC/NESS? (Low =1 
and 6 = High) 
To understand the corruption dynamics more elaborately, the respondents were also asked 
about the patterns of corruption in the district land administration. Before the introduction of 
E-governance in the district land administration, the most prevalent problems were Ghush 
(bribe) and the existence of Dalal (broker). They are ranked in the top positions by the 
respondents (Table 27). For this case, all the respondents mentioned about the problem of 
Ghush (bribe) while 75 percent mentioned about the problem of Dalal (broker). There were 
also the existence of the problem of Tadbir (lobbying) but it was only confined within the 
powerful people or with those people who had some kinds of networks with the powerful 
people (like political leaders, bureaucrats or renowned persons). Those persons, who do not 
have such connections or power are more prone to face the problem of Ghush (bribe) and Dalal 
(broker) for getting the services. Some of the people, especially the people who were involved 
with the land related business, also maintained some kinds of relations through providing 
Upodhoukon (gifts) to the higher level officials or Bakshish (tips) to the lower level employees. 
Most of the cases, they maintain the relations with the lower level officials, as the higher level 
officials are frequently transferred and the lower level officials sometimes act as the brokers to 
collect Ghush (bribe) for the higher level officials. So for them, it is better to maintain a long 
term relationships with the lower level officials. This rapport building mechanisms were done 
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with the intention to have the anticipated future benefits from them. The respondents also 
mentioned about other kinds of problems, like intentional delay, breaking serial etc. 
Sometimes, these are used as the instruments to force the service seekers to pay Ghush (bribe). 
Table 27: Patterns of Corruption in the District Land Administration based on the 
Respondents Opinions (in %) 
Patterns of Corruption 
Urban Area Rural Area 
Level of E-
governance : 2.5 
Level of E-
governance : 2.5 
Before After Before After 
Ghush (Bribe) 100 100 100 100 
Dalal (Broker) 75 62 71 71 
Tadbir (Lobbying) 63 75 72 86 
Bakshish (Tips) 25 25 14 14 
Others (Delay, Breaking Serials etc.) 25 25 14 14 
Questions were asked: 1) If there was corruption before the introduction of DESC/NESS, then which 
types of corruption were dominant? (Low =1 and 6 = High) 
2) If there is corruption after the introduction of DESC/NESS, then which types of corruption were 
dominant? (Low =1 and 6 = High) 
 (Note: Respondents have multiple responses) 
From the Table 27, there are indications of the changes of certain patterns of corruption like 
Dalali (broker) and Tadbir (lobbying). In the urban district, the problem of Dalali (broker) 
reduces from 75 percent to 62 percent while in the rural district it remains the same. Such 
reduction in the urban district is attributed to a number of reasons by the respondents; like the 
introduction of the ‘counter system’ which is helping to provide information for a service and 
the provision for online system through which one even can get the desired information without 
visiting the office. Both of the provisions are playing significant role to empower the people 
by providing information. As one of the respondent said:  
“Most of the general people do not have any idea about the exact location and the detail 
procedures for a service. When they were roaming around the district offices for such 
information then the brokers take that opportunity and approach them in the name of 
helping them. Now, one can get such information easily from the ‘front desk’ and the 
‘district web portal’.” 
From the respondents’ feedback, it appears that the problem of the broker reduces slightly as a 
specific counter is designated for the services. Now, the people can find the service providing 
points easily and the details of the procedures for a service. Earlier, a person struggles to find 
the place for the services as there were no clear information and the broker took this 
opportunity. The respondents also indicated about other reasons, like the introduction of the 
citizen charter, raising level of awareness due to increasing education level etc. Apart from this 
slight improvement, the way the E-governance is introduced in the district land administration; 
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it is yet to bring any significant improvement in reducing the level of corruption. Now, in many 
cases, the front desk officials directly negotiates with the service recipients about the amount 
of Ghush (bribe), which earlier was done by the brokers. Because, the provision of the counter 
enabled them to directly communicate with the service seekers. The interesting trend which is 
observed from the patterns of corruption is the increased use of Tadbir (lobbying) in both the 
rural and the urban areas. Such trends are attributed to the increasing number of the influential 
people, especially the increase of the politically connected people. Earlier most of the Tadbir 
(lobbying) came from the senior bureaucrats, renowned businessmen and other local elites. 
Now, the numbers of the politically influential and the connected people are increasing 
significantly who are trying to influence the system through Tadbir (lobbying) and the present 
provision of E-governance has failed to show its effectiveness to prevent such kinds of 
interferences from outside. One of the officials said about the ineffectiveness of the present 
form of E-governance as:  
“We have started the system of E-governance, but still there are loopholes which made it 
ineffective to control corruption. If all the land records can be digitalized with searchable 
options and the system can be connected with the different organizations, like with the 
court and the banks; then even the citizens do not need to have Parchas (land records) as 
the respective organizations can directly check the ownership of the land. If any person 
needs the record then he can also have the record by himself through online system where 
he will not be required to visit the respective office physically. He can have everything 
through the online system. In that case, all sorts of associated corrupt practices may be 
curbed, since one does not need to visit the office and everything is supposed to be decided 
automatically through the electronic platform and the officials may not have the chance 
to interfere the system. Though, the present level of E-governance can bring some 
efficiency but cannot affect that much on the dynamics of corruption”. 
This view of the respondent indicates about the deficiencies of the present E-governance 
system and the need for higher level of E-governance in controlling corruption. Because, when 
all the organizations are in a position to communicate with each other through online to share 
the information then it indicates about the ‘connected stage’ as described by the model of E-
governance by UN and ASPA. At this stage, even one will not need the traditional paper based 
Parcha (land record), because other organizations can easily check the claim of the ownership 
and the authenticity of the land record directly through the internal network with the land 
administration. For example, for providing loan, a bank can check the ownership of a person if 
it has direct network with the land administration. Nevertheless, the system is yet to be like 
this, and still people even need to visit to the office physically for the service which enables 
the officials to claim Ghush (bribe). Thus, the corruption dynamics remain more or less same 
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in the district land administration, even after the introduction of E-governance. So, from these 
statistical and analytical trends, it can be conferred that Case 1 is not supporting Hypothesis 1 
of the study. It indicates that just the introduction of E-governance is not sufficient to control 
corruption, its level and nature may also be important to have significant effect on corruption.  
6.1.2 Case 2: Bangladesh Railway - Test of Hypothesis 1 
To capture the probable variances of the effectiveness of E-governance, the study includes 
those places which have different levels of E-governance. This enables the research to assess 
the probable variations of the effectiveness of the different levels of E-governance. From Table 
28, it appears that except the E-governance level of 3.5, the corruption levels do not change 
that much in other two levels (level of 1 and 2), as at level 2, it reduces from 5 to 4.75 and in 
the rural area (level 1), it remains same. At the level 3.5 of E-governance, there is indication 
for better improvement of the corruption scenario as it drops from 4.83 to 3.50. In the urban 
station, where there is provision for E/M-ticketing and those people who can buy the tickets by 
using these two platforms, do not encounter corruption, as they can buy tickets directly. So, 
such kind of direct transactional arrangement by the use of E-governance is beneficial to avoid 
corruption. According to UN and ASPA model of E-governance, this transactional arrangement 
can be put as the third stage of E-governance. However, as only 25 percent tickets are sold 
through this platform, its overall impacts are not that much significant. Most of the people are 
still facing harassments like before as majority of the tickets is sold through the conventional 
counter system (75 percent). Interestingly, there are number of challenges which is also 
restraining the increase of the quota for E/M-ticketing. As explained by one official: 
“Increase of the quota for E/M-ticketing may shift the actors of corruption. Because, there 
are indications that many people are buying the tickets from online and selling them in 
higher prices to others. So, the complete transformation to the online system based on the 
present arrangements may not be effective to reduce the corruption and the harassments 
of the citizens. In addition, for the equity purpose, there is a necessity to keep the tickets 
in the counter as many people do not have access to the internet and the online banking 
facilities, even many of them do not have the knowledge to buy the tickets by using the 
online platform”. 
Thus, some of the respondents indicate about the challenges for the expansion of the online 
ticketing services and the possibilities to open new windows for corruption as well, as some 
people are now buying the tickets ahead of the journey and selling them in higher prices. This 
trend indicates about the changing techniques of an older type of corruption which is locally 
known as Kalobazari (black marketing/scalping). 
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Table 28: Levels of Corruption Before and After the Introduction of E-governance in 
Bangladesh Railway (Scale 1-6) 
Study Areas Level of E-governance 
Before the 
Introduction of 
E/M/C-ticketing 
After the 
Introduction of 
E/M/C-ticketing 
Urban Area 
3.5 4.83 3.50 
2 5.00 4.75 
Rural Area 1 4.83 4.83 
Questions were asked: 1) How do you rank the ‘magnitude of corruption’ before the 
introduction of E/M/C-ticketing in Railway? (Low =1 and 6 = High) 
2) How do you rank the ‘magnitude of corruption’ after the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing 
in Railway? (Low =1 and 6 = High) 
 
In case of the patterns of corruption in Bangladesh railway, the respondents indicate about the 
existence of different kinds of corruptions before the introduction of E-governance; like Ghush 
(bribe), Kalobazari (black-marketing/scalping), Tadbir (lobbying) and Bakshish (tips). From 
their responses, it also appears that E-governance has varying impacts on the level of 
corruption. For E-governance level 1 and 2, there are almost no changes of the different patterns 
of corruption while in the case of level 3.5; there is significant improvement as indicated by 
the respondents’ feedback (Table 28). This improvement in level 3.5 and the failure in the other 
two levels of E-governance may provide some important insights to understand about the 
dynamics between E-governance and corruption. The main explanation of the successes of the 
E-governance level 3.5 can be found in one of the respondent’s opinion:  
“Due to online ticketing, one does not need to depend on anybody for the tickets. One can 
buy tickets directly from any places through online. So, under this platform, we do not face 
any corruption”. 
This statement can be indicative in explaining the factors of the success of E-governance at 
level 3.5. It is successful because it can become an alternative service delivery channel for 
which one does not need to have human interaction. This elimination of ‘human interaction’ 
reduces the intensity of corruption done by the corrupt officials. Usually, the corrupt officials 
take extra money in the form of Ghush (bribe) or Bakshish (tips) by creating different obstacles 
when someone comes for services; and people have little options but to comply to their 
demands to get any service. There can be corruption from the citizen side as well. The 
influential peoples or those who have the right connections, try to interfere through Tadbir 
(lobbying) to obtain ticket. They use Tadbir (lobbying) to avoid harassment of the corrupt 
officials or to get undue favors like having large number of higher class tickets. In contrast, 
when the ticketing system shifted to online platform then it becomes difficult to interfere by 
the officials or by the outsiders. Interestingly, under the online system, the problem of 
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Kalobazari (black marketing) has widen because now anyone can buy the tickets through 
online and can sell in higher prices. Thus, it widens the opportunities of Kalobazari (black 
marketing), because earlier one has to have a good rapport with the officials to have tickets but 
now s/he can buy without any such relations.  
Table 29: Patterns of Corruption in the Ticketing System of Bangladesh Railway based 
on the Respondents Opinions (in %)  
Patterns of Corruption 
Urban Area Rural Area 
Level of E-
governance : 3.5 
Level of E-
governance : 2 
Level of E-
governance : 1 
Before After Before After Before After 
Ghush (Bribe) 100 0 100 100 100 100 
Kalobazari (black marketing/scalping) 75 0 83 83 67 67 
Tadbir (Lobbying) 50 0 50 50 50 33 
Bakshish (Tips) 50 0 33 33 33 33 
Other (harassment, delay) 25 0 50 33 25 25 
Questions were asked: 1) If there was corruption before the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing, then which types 
of corruption were dominant? (Low =1 and 6 = High) 
2) If there is corruption after the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing, then which types of corruption were dominant? 
(Low =1 and 6 = High) 
(Note: Respondents have multiple responses) 
Though, Table 29 indicates that the problem of Kalobazari (black marketing/scalping) is 
reduced to 0. It happens because of the nature of the question asked to them. They were asked 
to give their feedbacks on whether they face any corruption if they buy tickets through E/M/C-
ticketing. In that case, they only indicate about the probable problem of buying tickets through 
the respective channels. During the interview with both the service providers and the service 
seekers, it was found that E-governance can also open the opportunities for Kalobazari (black 
marketing). Earlier, there were allegations of such kinds of corruptions by the employees of 
railway or someone who have some kinds of connections with the railway officials. In that 
case, they share the profits within themselves. Now, people who do not have any connections 
with the officials are also getting involved with the process. Some respondents also indicate 
that the people who are involved with the operation of the ticketing system are also getting 
involved with the corrupt practices by blocking or slowing down/jamming the system. Apart 
the tickets from the E/M-ticketing system (level 3.5); for rest of the tickets, the citizens are still 
facing difficulties that they used to face before the introduction of the automated ticketing 
system. Thus, there are indications that in the lower level E-governance (level 2 and 1), the 
dynamics of corruption are remained more or less same.  
At the E-governance level 1, there are indications for another problem where the computerized 
system itself is used by the corrupt employees to trick the service seekers. By using the software 
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the employees sometimes change the composition of the ticket in the database and even 
sometime remove the tickets and show in the display that those tickets are not available or 
pretend that they are sold. They can do it easily as the respective place is not connected with 
the central server which disables the provision for remote monitoring. Thus, the different levels 
of E-governance have different levels of challenges. Even the higher level E-governance is not 
necessarily always help to control corruption or they may help to control some kinds of 
corruption (like controlling Ghush or Tadbir) but they may help to open the opportunities for 
new types of corruption (like deceiving tickets from the system) or may create favorable 
grounds for the existing patterns of corruption by changing the actors (like Kalobazari). The 
net impacts of the existing system is not satisfactory on corruption as still the citizens are 
suffering and facing the challenges to get the tickets. Thus, from the field evidences of the case 
2, we can get mixed feedbacks on the proposition of Hypothesis 1. E-governance level 3.5 
supports the hypothesis to some extent while the other two levels of E-governance do not 
support the hypothesis. 
6.2 Understanding the Changing Dynamics between Corruption and E-governance 
6.2.1 E-governance and Power Relations: the Test of Hypothesis 2 
Case 1 
The discretionary power of the officials can act as the ‘veto point19’ for the service recipients. 
Because, when a citizen applies for a land record (Parcha) then the officials can act as the ‘veto 
point’ by creating obstacles for having the services. In that case, the citizens become helpless 
as there are no effective mechanisms against such behavior. If anyone tries to take any steps 
against such behavior then s/he may face further troubles. That is why one service seekers told 
that: 
“If we complain against the officials to the higher authorities, then there can be 
possibilities for further harassments and delay of getting the service. So, it is better to give 
some extra money to have hassle free services.” 
Thus, the best alternative choice is to comply with those corrupt people and fulfill their demand 
or to do something which can make them satisfied. Someone who has power to counter such 
behavior (like by Tadbir); s/he can handle such problems without paying Ghush (bribe). 
General excuse for delaying the service is to mention that the respective document is missing 
or misplaced and as they are busy, they need extra time to trace it out. Present level of E-
governance failed to bring any significant change in these dynamics. Still the corrupt officials 
                                                 
19Veto points means the creation of obstacles 
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can deny or make delay to a citizen by the same excuse. If all the land records can be digitalized, 
then such provision can easily be eliminated and the corruption by raising such excuse may not 
be possible.  
Table 30: Perception on the Level of Power of the Officials in the District Land 
Administration 
Study Areas 
Level of E-
governance 
Before the Introduction 
of DESC/NESS 
After the Introduction of 
DESC/NESS 
Rural Area 2.5 5.43 5.29 
Urban Area 2.5 5.25 5.25 
Questions were asked: 1) How do you rank the level of ‘discretionary power’ on the land related 
services before the introduction of DESC/NESS in the DC office? (Low =1 and 6 = High) 
2) How do you rank the level of ‘discretionary power’ on the land related services after the 
introduction of DESC/NESS in the DC office? (Low =1 and 6 = High) 
 
From the Table 30, we can see that the level of power of the officials slightly reduces in the 
rural district as it drops from 5.43 to 5.29 but in the urban district, it remains same like before. 
This means, the discretionary power of the officials still remains more or less same in both of 
the places even after the introduction of E-governance. The slight improvement which is visible 
in the rural district is attributed by the respondents to the various factors, like the introduction 
of the counter system, the availability of the information through online and citizen charter, the 
raising education level etc. This unchanged power relation can provide one of the explanations 
for the continuation of the corrupt practices even after the introduction of E-governance. 
Because, the corrupt official still can exercise their discretionary power for the corrupt benefits. 
So, from the evidences of Case 1, it appears that this case is not supporting the proposition of 
Hypothesis 2 of the study. It indicates that the mere introduction of E-governance does not 
lead to significant change in the power relations and accordingly the corruption dynamics 
remain more or less same. 
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Figure 8: The Effects of E-governance on Corruption at the District Land Administration  
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Case 2 
The discretionary power of the officials is one of the main factors that can enable a person with 
more opportunities for corruption. They use it as a bargaining tool to get Ghush (bribe) or for other 
benefits. In Bangladesh railway, earlier in the traditional manual system for the service delivery, 
the Booking Clerks (the person who are responsible to sell the ticket from the counter) had higher 
level of discretionary power as they can claim that all the tickets are sold in spite of having tickets 
in the counter. If anyone pays some extra money in the form of Ghush (bribe) then s/he may get 
those tickets. The Booking Clerks can capitalize their discretionary power because of the high 
demand for the tickets, Due to this demand, the citizens were compelled to enter into some kinds 
of understandings with these Booking Clerks to get the tickets in exchange of extra payments. 
Some influential people also use ‘counter power’ by using their influence or connections for the 
services which is popularly known as Tadbir (lobbying). The general perception on the power of 
the officials is reflected in Table 31. In the sample areas, the power level is ranked as 5 or more 
out of 6 and it continues even after the introduction of E-governance. Only for E-governance level 
3.5, it drops from 5 to 2.83 whereas in other two places, it remains the same.   
Table 31: Perception on the Level of Power of the Officials in Bangladesh Railway 
Study Areas Level of E-governance 
Before the 
Introduction of 
E/M/C-ticketing 
After the 
Introduction of 
E/M/C-ticketing 
Urban Area 
3.5 5.00 2.83 
2 5.75 5.75 
Rural Area 1 5.00 5.00 
Questions were asked: 1) How do you rank the level of the ‘discretionary power’ for the officials related 
with selling of the tickets for Railway before the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? (Low =1 and 6 = High)  
2) How do you rank the level of the ‘discretionary power’ for the officials related with selling of the 
tickets for Railway after the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? (Low =1 and 6 = High) 
 
As Bangladesh Railway introduces different levels of E-governance at the different places, its 
impacts on the discretionary power of the officials are also contingent on the levels of E-
governance. In level 1, there is no so much change of power compare to the manual system. 
Because, still the officials can keep the tickets to them either by printing out from the system or 
even by blocking or removing from the software. As at level 1, the local computers are not 
connected with the central servers, the local officials can do the tricks of blocking or removing 
tickets from the software; because they know that they cannot be monitored from outside. Only 
option to control such tendencies is by surprised field visit. However, the effectiveness of this 
system also reduces for a number of reasons; main two reasons are: firstly, there are limited number 
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of people- generally 1-2 persons have to cover 200-300 k.m. area and most of the cases they are 
also involved with other activities along with the inspection duty; and another reason is most of 
the cases the corrupt people has their agents in the train; so if anyone starts to go for the inspection 
by train then they alert all the stations in the respective directions. In the level 2, the discretionary 
power reduces as the higher authority can monitor from any places through the internet. If anyone 
blocks the tickets, then that can easily be detected. However, as still the corrupt officials can take 
the print out of the tickets and keep those tickets to them, they can continue with the corrupt 
practices by taking the corrupt activities outside of the electronic platform. Thus, these two levels 
of E-governance failed to bring changes in the discretionary power of the officials and accordingly 
failed to have qualitative impacts on reducing corruption. In case of level 3.5, E-governance can 
eliminate the discretionary power of the officials; it can change the power relations as the citizens 
do not need to interact with the officials to get their tickets. They can buy the tickets directly 
through the internet or the mobile phone. Such options make the traditional forms of corruption 
difficult; like seeking Ghush (bribe) by the official or getting tickets by Tadbir (lobbying). 
Because, a specific percentage (25 percent) of the tickets is allocated for these E/M-ticketing and 
the people from the counter have nothing to do with these 25 percent tickets since they do not have 
any control on them. Though, there are also allegations against the people who are maintaining 
these 25 percent tickets. This control mostly belongs to a private company to whom the system is 
outsourced to maintain. One of the respondents said,  
‘If you can have good relations with the people who are working for the companies and pay 
some extra money to them, then you can get tickets easily.”  
This can be an indication for shifting of the actors of corruption. Earlier, the actor was mainly the 
employees from railway but now it is the persons from the private companies who are getting 
involved with the corrupt practices. Some of the respondents also said about their dissatisfaction 
about the mobile phone companies as they cannot get tickets through mobile SMS. It can be both 
for the scarcity of the tickets or the possible corrupt practices by the mobile operators. As an IT 
expert mentioned that technically it is possible to block the tickets. However, this study does not 
investigate further on the activities of the mobile phone operators but from the respondents’ 
opinions, it appears that there can be possibilities of some anomalies. Other proved evidences 
indicate that these companies can also get involved with the corrupt practices like one of the mobile 
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operator paid a fine of BDT 2.5 billion (USD 37 million) for its corrupt practices in 200820. To 
remove the allegation, the proper monitoring system need to be established. 
The entrance of the new actors makes the entire corruption dynamics more fluid. Though, initially 
there are indications for the possible improvements of the corruption scenario at the level 3.5; but 
there are also indications of the inclusion of new actors which are making the ‘corruption scenario’ 
more volatile and complicated. These possibilities can lead to further increase of corruption rather 
than reducing corruption. Further success to curb corruption is heavily dependent on controlling 
these actors’ corrupt practices. One of the challenges to stop these corrupt practices comes from 
the unregistered mobile SIM cards and these issues do not belong to Bangladesh Railway. Many 
people are using unregistered mobile SIM cards to buy tickets. Thus, from the Case 2, we can get 
variable results about the probable effects of E-governance on the power relations. It indicates that 
the level of E-governance is important to effect the power relations. Lower level E-governance, 
specially level 1, may not be effective for changing power. For level 2, there are provisions for the 
improvement by reducing discretionary power through ‘monitoring’, but still there are loopholes 
to deceive the monitoring system. In case of level 3.5, it shows its effectiveness by removing the 
possibilities of the interaction with the officials though it has more or less same problems like E-
governance level 2. As the process is completed automatically in level 3.5, the lower level officials 
have nothing to do from the counter and thus their power is curtailed significantly.  
The proposition of Hypothesis 2 indicates that the introduction of E-governance may affect the 
power relations which may have an effect on the corruption level. From the case study 2, it appears 
that just the introduction of E-governance (like in level 1 and 2) is not sufficient to change the 
power relations in way which can have positive impacts on the corruption. However, if E-
governance can change the power relations like in level 3.5, then there are possibilities to affect 
the corruption level of an organization by E-governance.  
6.2.2 E-governance and Accountability: the Test of Hypothesis 3 
Case 1 
An effective monitoring system is the key to make the employees accountable for their activities 
in an organization. If anyone tries to exercise his positional power (like administrative or political 
                                                 
20 For more of this: http://www.grameenphone.com/about-us/media-center/press-release/2008/212/grameenphone-
pay-fine-bdt-2500-million 
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power) for the illegal benefits, then such activities can be prevented through an effective 
accountability system. From the theoretical logics, it is evident that E-governance can increase the 
monitoring capacity of the authority by providing enhanced tracing capacity of a work process. 
However, the way, the E-governance is implemented in the district land administration, it appears 
that the accountability system is not sufficiently improved so that the level of corruption can be 
affected significantly. Though, from the field data it is observed that there are slight improvements 
of the accountability level in both the rural and the urban district. Table 32 indicates that in the 
urban district; it improves from 1.57 to 2 while in the rural district, it improves from 1.75 to 2.13.  
Table 32: Perception on the Level of Accountability in the District Land Administration 
(Scale 1-6) 
Study Areas 
Level of E-
governance 
Before the Introduction of 
DESC/NESS 
After the Introduction 
of DESC/NESS 
Rural Area 2.5 1.57 2 
Urban Area 2.5 1.75 2.13 
Questions were asked: 1) How do you rank the level of ‘Accountability’ on the land related services 
before the introduction of DESC/NESS in the DC office? (Low =1 and 6 = High)  
2) How do you rank the level of ‘Accountability’ on the land related services after the introduction of 
DESC/NESS in the DC office? (Low =1 and 6 = High) 
The improvement of the accountability system is attributed to the process of the tracking system 
through which one can detect the location of one’s application. Nevertheless, there are quite a 
number of ‘black holes’ where the service providers can breach the formal monitoring system. It 
is observed that different activities are performed outside the platform of the E-governance system 
which cannot be traced through the electronic platform. The process is fragmented between the 
manual and the electronic platform. Through this fragmented level of E-governance, a proper 
monitoring system cannot be built to protect corruption. By capitalizing these loopholes, the 
corrupt peoples are continuing their bad practices. From the field experiences, it also appears that 
the problem of corruption in the district land administration is not only related with the monitoring 
and the investigation to detect a corrupt person; the problem is mainly associated with the 
‘enforcement’ of the laws. Because, most of the cases, the authority more or less knows what is 
happening or who are involved with the corrupt activities. As one of the respondents mentioned: 
“It is not matter of the detection rather the punishment can be the key to control corruption; 
everyone more or less knows who are involved with the corrupt practices. The problem is to 
punish them.” 
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Figure 9: Corruption Dynamics in the District Land Administration and the Role of E-
governance 
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not want to disrupt the existing system. This lack of enforcement of law has created a ‘culture of 
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without any fear. They can claim that the land record is missing or misplaced or can raise any such 
excuses to delay the process so that they can have more bargaining power to claim illegal benefits. 
E-governance failed to bring change to this culture. Because, as a tool, E-governance can at best 
detect the corrupt activities, but the enforcement of laws does not belong to it. Due to this reason, 
the concerned officials also get demotivated to use the online system to monitor. Under the present 
arrangements, though there are provisions to monitor on the movements of the applications of the 
service seekers from any places through internet; but in the study areas, it is observed that the use 
of online platform to monitor is not that much in practice. Though, for the other services, this 
monitoring practice was seen in the study area. Thus, the E-governance initiative in the district 
land administration become ineffective and does not have significant impact on curbing corruption. 
So, the proposition of Hypothesis 3 which assumes that the introduction of E-governance can 
affect the accountability system in an organization and consequently may affect the extent of 
corruption but this is not visible in Case 1 of the study. 
Case 2 
The second case of this study is from Bangladesh Railway which indicates about the enhancement 
of the accountability level due to E-governance but it appears that such improvement is not 
sufficient enough to have significant impacts on reducing corruption. For the E/M-ticketing (level 
3.5), the accountability level increases from 1.83 to 2.50 while in level 2, it increases from 2.25 to 
2.50. This enhancement trend is also visible in level 1 as it increases from 2.17 to 2.67.  
Table 33: Perception on the Level of Accountability in Bangladesh Railway (Scale 1-6) 
Study Areas Level of E-governance 
Before the 
Introduction of 
E/M/C-ticketing 
After the 
Introduction of 
E/M/C-ticketing 
Urban Area 
3.5 1.83 2.50 
2 2.25 2.50 
Rural Area 1 2.17 2.67 
Questions were asked: 1) How do you rank the level of ‘Accountability’ for the officials related 
with selling tickets for Railway before the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? (Low =1 and 6 = High)  
2) How do you rank the level of ‘Accountability’ for the officials related with selling tickets for 
Railway after the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? (Low =1 and 6 = High) 
Reasons for such improvement in the accountability system are attributed to the provisions of 
monitoring capacities by enhancing the traceability through computerized ticketing system. 
According to the existing arrangements, every booking clerk (who is responsible to sell ticket from 
the counter) has individual ID number and password. Their activities through the software are 
preserved in the system and can easily be retrieved later on. Based on the analysis of such login 
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information and selling history, a person’s activities can be traced and the discrepancies can easily 
be identified. For these types of monitoring, one needs to visit the respective places. The corrupt 
officials capitalize this opportunity, especially in level 1. They mainly follow two techniques to 
deceive the authority. Sometimes they just buy the tickets as a customer and then sell in higher 
prices to the passengers. As they are in charge of the ticketing system, they can do that easily and 
then pretend that all the tickets are sold. If they cannot sell the tickets then they can return the 
tickets for refund as a customer by paying some administrative charges. Usually, they do not need 
to return the tickets, because always there are higher demands for the tickets and from their 
experiences they can also predict more or less precisely about the demand. Some of them also take 
the advantage of the electronic system. Officially, there are systems of blocking tickets. This 
provision is kept to provide tickets to the VIPs (very important persons) (like Member of the 
Parliament, senior bureaucrats, judge, military personnel, and other important persons). Some of 
the corrupt officials use this to hide tickets from the public. As they know that their ticketing is not 
connected with the central server, they can block more tickets than the permitted number and no 
one from outside can identify that.  
This practice is comparatively difficult in the stations where the E-governance level is 3.5 and 2. 
Because, the ‘blocking’ of tickets through software can easily be detected as they are connected 
with the central servers. In these levels, the higher officials can monitor the activities of the field 
officials from any places through internet. Though, such monitoring is yet to be institutionalized 
properly because of a number of challenges like lack of equipment and logistic supports, proper 
training, manpower etc. There is no formal process to monitor the ticketing system by the 
divisional officials21; though they are mainly entrusted with the duty to oversight the entire system. 
Most of the officials use their own laptops/tabs/computers and internet connections to monitor the 
system. Generally the salary of the public officials is very poor compared to the private sector. On 
the top, the officials are not given proper training to do so and thus, the entire monitoring system 
become ineffective. The monthly salary of an assistant level official’s (one of the main monitoring 
officer at the field) salary is around BDT 11,000 (80 BDT = 1USD) and the per month rent for the 
internet connection is around BDT 1,000 which is one eleventh of his salary. Under such situation, 
                                                 
21The hierarchical arrangements of Bangladesh Railway are: Headquarter → Zone → Division→ Stations 
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it is difficult for a civil servant to spend such a large portion of his own salary for the work of his 
office.  
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Figure 10: Corruption Dynamics in the Ticketing System in Bangladesh Railway and the 
Role of E-governance 
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places but the available information are not that much comprehensive. Because, in the existing 
system, there is no provision for generating inquiry in the database from the remote places. It just 
presents the seat allocation and the sells information. If there are searchable options to generate 
query, then the monitoring can be more comprehensive; like when someone enters in the system, 
which ID is responsible for suspicious transactions etc. In spite of these limitations, the existing 
provision for monitoring from the remote can act as a deterrent; because it can create a fear to get 
detected for the corrupt practices. So usually, in these two levels of E-governance, the corrupt 
officials do not follow this technique until the senior officials become part of the corruption chain. 
Usually, they buy the tickets and then sell it to the people in higher prices. Sometimes they buy 
for their regular clients when they receive the demand over telephone. Thus, though there are 
indications for more enhanced monitoring system and the higher opportunities for investigation, 
but these provisions are seemed to be insufficient and ineffective to reduce corruption. In addition, 
there are also challenges for ‘enforcement of the laws’ to punish the corrupt officials. In many 
cases, they cannot be punished due to the political influence or the pressure from the trade unions, 
or due to the shortage of manpower. Sometimes, it also happens due to the corruption of the higher 
authorities as well. Thus, the overall accountability mechanism in Case 2 becomes ineffective to 
have significant effect on curbing corruption and the case shows inconsistent trend with 
Hypothesis 3 of the study.  
6.2.3 E-governance and Monopoly: the Test of Hypothesis 4 
Case 1 
The monopoly of the service delivery system can increase the scope for corruption as the people 
do not have any other options. The introduction of E-governance can provide an alternative 
channel for the service delivery instead of the traditional system. However, just the introduction 
of E-governance, does not necessarily lead to curtail the monopoly power of the service providers. 
Because, for curtailing monopoly, the automated platform needs to be transformed as an alternative 
service delivery channel. In both the sample districts of case 1, the system of E-governance has 
failed to become an alternative channel for the service delivery. This is also reflected in the ranking 
of the respondents. They identified an absolute monopoly in both the urban and the rural district. 
The level remains same even after the introduction of E-governance as indicated in Table 34. One 
of the main obstacles for going complete online is the existing laws. According to the ‘Court Fee 
Findings and Discussions of the Micro Level Cases 
93 | P a g e  
 
Act, 1870’, one has to pay the fees through buying the government revenue stamp. This acts as an 
obstacle for online payment. 
Table 34: Perception on the Level of Monopoly in the District Land Administration    
(Scale 1-6) 
Study Areas 
Level of E-
governance 
Before the Introduction 
of DESC/NESS 
After the Introduction 
of DESC/NESS 
Rural Area 2.5 6.00 6.00 
Urban Area 2.5 6.00 6.00 
Questions were asked: 1) How do you rank the level of ‘Monopoly’ of the desk based service 
delivery channel before the introduction of DESC/NESS in the DC office? (Low 1 and 6 = High).  
2) How do you rank the level of ‘Monopoly’ of the desk based service delivery channel after the 
introduction of DESC/NESS in the DC office? (Low =1 and 6 = High) 
 
Though, the electronic platform is used discretely in the different phases of the entire service 
providing chain in the district land administration; but, still, a lot of tasks are done manually; even 
one cannot complete the application electronically. A service seekers need to visit the office 
physically to complete the application. This provision continues the monopoly of the traditional 
service delivery system and helps to retain the bargaining power of the officials. If the officials are 
corrupt then most of the cases one has to fulfill the demand of the corrupt officials or have to play 
counter power games through Tadbir (lobbying). Otherwise, they might be in difficulties in getting 
the services. Such difficulties can have negative consequences on the ultimate objectives of 
collecting the land records like selling/buying the land or taking loan from an organization. So, the 
service seekers usually fulfill the demand of the corrupt officials by paying the bribe. However, E-
governance has the potentiality to become an independent channel for this service delivery which 
can eventually reduce the monopoly of the traditional platform of the service delivery. In that case, 
if a service seekers face any difficulties then s/he can have an alternative option to switch to avoid 
the corruption prone service delivery channel. That is why one of the service seekers mentions: 
“For getting benefits from the E-governance, there should have provision for complete online 
services where one does not need to go to the offices physically. He should get the whole 
service from his own home and then he can avoid the corrupt peoples and their undue 
demands.” 
As the present level of E-governance cannot change the monopoly of the traditional desk based 
service delivery channel, it fails to have significant impact on the level of corruption. Thus, it 
appears that Case 1 is not supporting Hypothesis 4 of the study.  
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Case 2 
In the second case of the study, only in the case of E/M-ticketing (level of E-governance 3.5), the 
monopoly is curtailed significantly as it drops from 6 to 3.50, but in the other two levels (the level 
2 and 1), it remains same as before (Table 35). For these two levels, the system is automated but 
such automation cannot transform the service providing system into an alternative channel for the 
service. The monopoly is reduced in E/M-ticketing as the service seekers can bypass the traditional 
counter based system and can buy the tickets directly through electronic platform. However, for 
the other two levels (level 2 and 1), still the services are provided from the traditional counter 
system and thus the monopoly of the earlier channel continues. Though, the respondents mentioned 
that the introduction of E-governance has increased efficiency but it fails to effect the corruption 
dynamics significantly; still the general people are facing the harassments and the problem of 
corruption. So, from the sample areas, it appears that when E-governance can become an 
alternative channel for the service delivery (like in level 3.5), then it may demonstrate positive 
effects on controlling corruption level i.e. can support Hypothesis 4 but if it fails (like in level 2 
and 1), then it may not support Hypothesis 4. Thus, from the sample case, it appears that the nature 
of E-governance is an important factor to affect the corruption level of an organization. 
Table 35: Perception on the Level of Monopoly in Bangladesh Railway (Scale 1-6) 
Study Areas Level of E-governance 
Before the Introduction 
of E/M/C-ticketing 
After the Introduction of 
E/M/C-ticketing 
Urban Area 
3.5 6.00 3.50 
2 6.00 6.00 
Rural Area 1 6.00 6.00 
Questions were asked: 1) How do you rank the level of ‘Monopoly’ of the traditional counter based 
ticketing system before the introduction of E/M-ticketing? (Low =1 and 6 = High)  
2) How do you rank the level of ‘Monopoly’ of the traditional counter based ticketing system after the 
introduction of E/M-ticketing? (Low =1 and 6 = High) 
Findings and Discussions of the Micro Level Cases 
95 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: The Effects of the different Levels of E-governance on the Corruption level of the Ticketing System in Bangladesh 
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6.3 Cross-Case Syntheses 
Cross-case syntheses of the sample cases are performed to produce more valid and robust 
understanding on the impacts of E-governance on corruption, because it can confirm the nature of 
relationships across the cases.  In Case 1 of the study, E-governance cannot get success because of 
the problem of incomplete implementation of E-governance. This is incomplete in a sense that it 
partially provides online services as still one needs to visit the office for the application of the 
service. It also fails to change the power relations significantly in the offices as still the corrupt 
officials can exercise the discretionary power. There are also indications for the improvements of 
the monitoring capacity but lack of implementation of the established rules make the system 
ineffective. This lack of enforcement also demotivates the respective authorities to use the system 
to monitor as in many occasions it appears that the corrupt people are not punished or cannot be 
punished based on the detection through the monitoring system.  
Table 36: Cross-Case Syntheses of the Case Studies 
 
Indicators Case 1 Case 2 
Level of E-
governance 
E-governance Level: 
2.5 
E-governance Level: 3.5 E-governance Level: 2 E-governance Level: 1 
Power Not affected 
Affected;  curtail the 
power of the officials by 
removing the officials 
from the service delivery 
channel 
Not affected Not affected 
Accountability 
 Monitoring and 
investigation 
capacity increases 
due to the tracking 
system 
 Problems with 
enforcement of 
the laws make the 
system ineffective 
 Monitoring and 
investigation capacity 
increases  due to the 
connectivity of the local 
servers with the central 
servers 
 Problems with 
enforcement of  the laws 
make the system 
ineffective 
 Monitoring and 
investigation 
capacity increases  
due to the 
connectivity of the 
local servers with 
the central servers 
 Problems with 
enforcement of  the 
laws make the 
system ineffective 
 Monitoring and 
investigation 
capacity increases 
but less than the E-
governance level 
3.5 and 2,  due to 
lack of the 
connectivity of the 
local servers with 
the central servers 
 Problems with  
enforcement of  the 
laws make the 
system ineffective 
Monopoly 
Monopoly continues 
as before 
Monopoly reduced 
Monopoly continues as 
before 
Monopoly continues as 
before 
Probable 
Effects on 
Corruption 
Not significantly 
affected 
Help to reduce corruption 
though there are also 
indications for the opening of 
the new opportunities for 
corruption like Kalobazari 
(black marketing) 
Not significantly 
affected 
Not significantly 
affected 
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In the second case, only in the level 3.5, E-governance can become an alternative service delivery 
channel and can affect the power relations significantly. Though, there are improvements of the 
monitoring capacities, specifically in the level 3.5 and 2; but still there are loopholes to deceive 
the system; and the organization is also suffering due to lack of enforcement of the laws. When E-
governance level is 3.5, the monopoly of the traditional counter system is also reduced. Thus, case 
2 provides variable impacts of E-governance on the different intervening variables and accordingly 
the variable effectiveness on corruption. Now, if we combined the trends of both the cases, there 
are indications that if E-governance cannot change the power relations by curtailing the discretion 
of the officials, E-governance may not be successful in curbing corruption. If E-governance can 
provide an alternative service delivery channel through the electronic platform, the power relations 
can significantly be affected and the monopoly of the traditional service delivery system can be 
reduced. From both the cases, it appears that E-governance may enhance the monitoring ability 
but the lack of enforcement of the laws and the existing loopholes of the E-governance system 
may make the system ineffective to have significant impact on corruption.  
These qualitative generalizations of the sample cases can also be confirmed by the statistical 
generalization. For this, based on the rankings of the variables of the study, correlation coefficients 
can be generated which may indicate the nature and the magnitude of the probable relationships 
among the variables of the study. If we consider the relation between the dependent (corruption) 
and the independent variable (E-governance), the statistics shows that there is higher level of 
negative correlation between the level of E-governance and the level of corruption as r = - 0.534 
and p < 0.01 (Table 37). This means with the increase of E-governance level, corruption reduces. 
Now the question is how E-governance is effecting corruption. For this, the intervening variables 
of the study may help us by indicating the trends. There is a negative correlation between E-
governance and the level of monopoly as r = - 0.697 and p < 0.01. This means with the increase 
of E-governance level, the monopolistic nature of the organizations reduces. Similarly, there is 
also a negative correlation between E-governance and the level of power in an organization. Here 
power indicates the discretionary power of the officials which decline with the increase of E-
governance level as r = - 0.533 and p < 0.01. However, in the case of accountability, the study 
does not show any statistically significant relation as p > 0.05. Though, it shows a very low positive 
correlation between E-governance and accountability. This may happen due to the nature of the E-
governance in the sample areas. Because, the way E-governance is implemented in the respective 
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offices, that does not have significant impact in improving the overall accountability system of the 
respective offices.  
Table 37: Pearson Correlation Coefficient among the Variables (N= 31) 
 Level of E-
governance 
Level of 
Corruption 
Level of 
Monopoly 
Level of 
Power 
Level of 
Accountability 
Level of E-governance 1     
     
Level of Corruption -.534** 1    
.002     
Level of Monopoly -.697** .746** 1   
.000 .000    
Level of Power -.533** .745** .804** 1  
.002 .000 .000   
Level of Accountability .108 -.142 -.178 -.118 1 
.564 .447 .337 .527  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Now, the next question is how far these intervening variables can explain the changes of the level 
of the dependent variable (corruption). The statistical findings of the study indicate that the 
changing dynamics of the intervening variables; especially the variables ‘monopoly’ and ‘power’ 
have significant impact on decreasing the corruption level. For the level of monopoly and the 
corruption; r = 0.746 and p < 0.01, which means there is a positive correlation between these two 
variables i.e. with the decrease of monopoly, corruption level also decreases. Similarly the variable 
‘power’ shows a positive correlation as r = 0.745 and p < 0.01.  This means, both the variables 
move in the same direction i.e. with the decreases of power, the corruption level also decreases. 
However, the variable ‘accountability’ does not indicate any statistically significant trends as p > 
0.05. Thus, from these intervening variables, we can get some of the explanations of the probable 
ways to influence corruption by E-governance which also support the finding from the previous 
qualitative generalization.  
6.4 Caveats on the Statistical Trends of the Micro Level Findings 
To map the extent of variations of the variables, the study depends on the rankings constructed 
through the opinions of the respondents. As this ranking is based on the perception of the 
respondents and the sample size is very small, the ranking can be just an indication of the trends, 
strict comparison between and within the services may be misleading. Different people may also 
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have different levels of ranking trends i.e. someone can rank the level of an indicator as 1 while 
other can put that as 2. Such variation may have significant impacts on the results within the small 
sample size. The ranking of the variables and their ‘correlation coefficient’ can provide an idea of 
the probable effects of E-governance on corruption. Though, drawing causality based on the 
correlation coefficients is not statistically correct as it can only indicate about the trends. However, 
the qualitative data as discussed before also confirmed the same trends which are emerged from 
the statistical analyses. 
6.5 Conclusions 
The micro level case studies are included in the research design to have better understanding of 
the effects of E-governance on corruption. The sample cases indicate that just the introduction of 
E-governance is not enough to control corruption, its natures and levels are also important to have 
significant affects. Because, the degree of the discretionary power, the level of the effectiveness 
of the accountability system and the extent of monopoly are contingent on the natures and the 
levels of E-governance. When an E-governance system can change these factors i.e. can curtail the 
discretionary power, enhance the accountability system and provide an alternative service delivery 
channel, then it may affect the level of corruption in an organization. Though, from the case of 
Bangladesh Railway, it appears that only the change of the power relations due to E-governance 
can have impacts on curbing corruption. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
7.0 Introductions 
The concluding chapter summarizes and provides a brief overview of the key findings of the 
relationships between E-governance and corruption. The findings are based on the empirical 
evidences collected from both the macro level data and the micro level cases. The macro level data 
are based on the state level aggregate indexes while the micro level cases are from two 
organizations from Bangladesh, selected on certain rationales, like the level of E-governance, 
intensity of corruption, accessibility etc. This chapter starts by recapitulating the research questions 
and the hypotheses of the study and then proceeds with the brief illustration of the major findings 
and their relations with the research question and the hypotheses. Due to the inductive nature, the 
study also tries to generalize the findings and the trends; and combined them in the theoretical 
relevance section. However, along with this theoretical implications, the study also tries to delve 
into the practical implications of the findings. Finally, it outlines the limitations of the study and 
suggests the possible avenues for further research.  
7.1 Research Question and the Key Empirical Findings 
The research question for the study was “What E-governance does and how it reduces 
corruption?”. It is a single question but has two major parts: the first part is related with the 
probable relationships between E-governance and corruption; and the second part is related with 
the processes of affecting corruption by E-governance. Based on the research question and its 
theoretical responses, the study develops four hypotheses to test by empirical evidences. The first 
hypothesis is developed as the response of the first part of the research question i.e. to explore the 
probable relations between E-governance and corruption while the other three hypotheses are 
related with the second part of the research question which are developed to understand the 
processes of effecting corruption by E-governance.  
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7.1.1 Research Question and Review: Part 1 
The first part of the question is about the inquiry of the relationship between E-governance and 
corruption. Based on the theoretical arguments and the earlier findings, the study draws 
Hypothesis 1, which postulates that E-governance has a positive role in reducing corruption. At 
the macro level, the study considers 161 countries’ statistics to understand the effects of E-
governance on corruption. To explore the statistical trends, the study uses different statistical tools 
like the ‘correlation coefficient’ and the ‘regression analysis’. The ‘correlation coefficient’ 
indicates that there is higher level of correlation between E-governance and corruption as r = .676; 
p < 0.01(Table 18). The regression analysis indicates that its models can explain maximum of the 
variation of the dependent variable (variation of the corruption level); such as Model 4 can explain 
68.7 percent variation, and E-governance (measured though OSI) has the second highest 
explanatory power among the three explanatory variables (GDP, DI and OSI) of the study. The 
country specific analysis indicates that 119 countries out of 161 countries i.e. 73.91 percent of the 
sample countries support Hypothesis 1 of the study. Thus, the macro level findings indicate that 
maximum of the countries’ data are supporting Hypothesis 1.  
From the micro level cases, it appears that the case from the district land administration does not 
support Hypothesis 1 while the case from Bangladesh Railway, it supports only where there are 
higher level of E-governance (level 3.5). Though, there are also indications that even in that higher 
level of E-governance, the scopes for certain types of corruption may also increase like Kalobazari 
(black marketing/scalping). However, it can help to reduce the problem of Ghush (bribe) by 
creating new service delivery channel through the electronic platform. This change of the service 
delivery channel curtails the bargaining power of the officials for Ghush (bribe). Except this level, 
in other two levels (level 2 and 1), the corruption dynamics do not change that much, rather in the 
lower level (level 1), E-governance itself is used sometimes to continue corruption as it lacks the 
scope for external monitoring through online. The lower level corrupt officials capitalize this 
opportunity and sometimes block tickets more than the permitted amount or even sometimes they 
remove the tickets from the system as well. When they get extra money in the form of Ghush 
(bribe), then they put back the tickets in the system and sell it. Thus, the sample cases indicate that 
mere implementation of E-governance is not adequate to have positive impacts on corruption, the 
nature and the level of maturity of E-governance are also very important to have significant 
impacts on corruption.  
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7.1.2 Research Question and Review: Part 2 
The second part of the research question is related with the processes of effecting corruption by E-
governance. To understand this dynamics, the study develops three hypotheses to test them by 
empirical data. Hypothesis 2 of this study is the first hypothesis which emphasizes the processes 
of effecting corruption. This hypothesis is about the power relations which indicate that changing 
power relation due to E-governance may lead to the reduction of corruption in an organization. 
The cases of the study support this assumption but also indicate that mere implementation of E-
governance may not be enough to change the power relations and to have a positive impact on 
corruption. When E-governance can ‘depersonalize’ a service delivery system i.e. can remove the 
interactions of the service seekers with the officials, then it can significantly affect the power 
relations and may have a positive impact on corruption. This change of power relation is only 
observed in the sample cases when the E-governance level was 3.5, but in the other levels (level 
2.5, 2 and 1), the power relations remain more or less same and consequently there are no 
significant positive impacts of E-governance on corruption. 
The next hypothesis (H3) is about the system of accountability, which assumes that changing of 
the accountability patterns due to E-governance may reduce the level of corruption. The main 
argument in favor of this hypothesis is about the E-governance’s ability to trace a task process; 
and by this monitoring ability, E-governance can expose the corrupt activities. The sample case 
from Bangladesh Railway indicates that in all the E-governance levels, the monitoring capacity 
has enhanced, especially in the levels of 3.5 and 2, as they can be monitored from any places 
through internet. However, still there are loopholes in all the levels (especially in level 2 and 1) to 
deceive the existing monitoring system. In the lower level E-governance (like level 1), the 
effectiveness of monitoring does not improve that much as the system is disconnected from the 
central servers. Because of this disconnected nature, the higher authority cannot oversight the 
activities without visiting of the respective places. Similarly, in the district land administration, the 
provision for monitoring is also enhanced after the introduction of E-governance. However, one 
of the main challenge for both the cases are related with the ‘enforcement’ of the rules and the 
regulation; not the detection of corruption as more or less everyone knows who are involved with 
the corrupt practices, especially in the district land administration. Taking legal actions against the 
corrupt people are difficult for various reasons, like the problem of trade unions, political 
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interferences, corruption of the higher authorities, shortage of manpower etc. This lack of 
enforcement of laws makes the E-governance system ineffective in curbing corruption.  
The last hypothesis (H4) is about the monopoly which assumes that by reducing the monopoly in 
the service delivery system, E-governance can help to reduce corruption. The main logic of the 
hypothesis is when E-governance can provide an alternative platform for the service delivery 
instead of the traditional desk based channel then corruption may reduce. Because, then the citizen 
have an option to avoid the corrupt officials. In the sample case of Bangladesh Railway, only E-
governance level 3.5 can provide an alternative service delivery channel, but other two levels (level 
2 and 1) still depend on the traditional counter based system.  The same situation also exists in the 
district land administration where the traditional counter system has the absolute monopoly. As a 
result, when someone faces any problem then s/he does not have any other options and most of the 
cases they have to comply with the corrupt demand of the officials to avail the service. So, from 
the findings, it appears that just the introduction of E-governance is not sufficient enough to control 
corruption; it may have impact when it can provide an alternative service delivery channel through 
the electronic platform.  
7.3 Juxtaposing the Macro and the Micro Level Findings: Looking through Each other’s 
Lenses 
The main objective of the study is to understand the probable effects of E-governance on 
corruption. The macro level study is based on the statistical analysis of two renowned datasets to 
understand the probable nature of the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable. 
This statistical analysis can indicate the trends between E-governance and corruption. However, 
such statistical trends cannot indicate how the independent variable can affect the dependent 
variable. So, to understand the processes, the study considers some cases from the micro level. The 
micro level analysis provides the trends between the dependent and the independent variables and 
the possible explanations of those trends. This section is an effort to combine both the micro and 
the macro level trends to increase the analytical robustness. 
7.3.1 Introduction of E-governance is Beneficial to Control Corruption 
Macro Level Trend:  
The majority of the countries (119 countries out of 161 countries) show consistent trends 
with the Hypothesis 1 of the study i.e. the corruption level reduces/increases with the 
increases/reduces of the E-governance level. 
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Reflections from the Micro Level Trends 
Theoretical analysis indicates that by improving monitoring capacity, reducing discretionary 
power and by providing alternative channel for the delivery of services, E-governance can have 
positive impacts on corruption. The empirical findings from the micro level cases indicate that by 
reducing discretionary power and by providing alternative channel for the service; E-governance 
can control some kinds of corruption. In the findings from the cases, we can see when E-
governance can bring change in the power relations then it can successfully reduce corruption. In 
the case of E/M-ticketing, the power of the officials curtailed as the system is operated 
electronically without human interference. Such kind of ‘depersonalized’ system makes the power 
of the official’s ineffective and can help to control the associated corruption; like controlling 
Ghush (bribe). This higher level E-governance (like E/M-ticketing) can also help to curtail the 
power of the interest groups which disable the exercise of Tadbir (lobbying) by ‘depersonalizing’ 
the process; thus under such system, their Tadbir (lobbying) also become ineffective. The E/M-
ticketing also reduces the monopoly of the traditional service delivery system by providing an 
alternative service delivery channel in the electronic platform. However, as only 25 percent tickets 
are sold through these two channels, the overall impacts on corruption is not that much significant. 
The micro level cases, however, do not show that there has been much improvement in the 
accountability system. In all the cases, E-governance contributes to improve the monitoring 
capacities but lack of ‘enforcement of the laws’ are making the overall effort ineffective. Though, 
the possible improvement in enforcing the law may also can contribute to reduce corruption. These 
trends can indicate about some of the explanations of the reduction of the corruption levels in 
maximum of the countries with the enhancement of the E-governance level.  
7.3.2 Mere Introduction of E-governance May not be sufficient to Control Corruption: 
Contingent on a Number of Factors 
Macro Level Trend:  
Significant number of countries’ (42 countries out of 161 countries) corruption levels does 
not improve with the improvement of E-governance level.  
Reflections from the Micro Level Trends 
Monitoring Capacities May Varies 
One of the main argument to treat E-governance as an effective anti-corruption tool is because of 
its ability to increase the capacity to trace a work process by enhancing the monitoring capacity. 
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However, just the introduction of E-governance may not be sufficient enough to ensure such 
enhancement of the monitoring power. The available provisions and the maturity level of E-
governance are also important factor. The micro level case from Bangladesh Railway indicates 
about such trend. The places where computerized ticketing system are introduced but the remote 
databases are not connected with the central severs (level 1), the monitoring capacities do not 
improve that much like the other higher levels of E-governance (level 3.5 and 2). As a result, the 
officials cannot monitor the activities of the field from other places and fail to know what the 
respective officials in the field are doing. Such ‘disjointed silo types’ i.e. fragmented 
implementation of E-governance may not be effective to have significant impacts on corruption. 
This trend may indicate about a possible explanation for the inconsistent trends in the different 
countries. 
Power Relations May not be Sufficiently Changed 
Discretionary power is attributed as one of the key factors that can create the supporting 
environment for corruption. When E-governance can bring change to this discretionary power of 
the officials, then it may be effective to have positive impacts on corruption. The cases also support 
this assumption. In the sample cases, E-governance with the lower levels (like level 1 in 
Bangladesh Railway) fail to bring change in the power relations. In the lower level of E-
governance, still the corrupt officials can exercise their discretionary power for continuing the 
corrupt practices. However, such power is curtailed when higher level of E-governance (level 3.5) 
can depersonalize the system by providing the service through the electronic platform. This 
changing power relation can help to affect the extent of the corruption in an organization. Thus, 
the level of corruption may depend on the degree of the effectiveness of E-governance in changing 
the power dynamics. The unchanged power relations may provide another explanation of the 
inconsistent trend between E-governance and corruption in some of the countries.  
Enforcement of Law 
E-governance as a tool can detect corrupt activities and can expose corrupt persons but the key to 
control corruption is to take necessary actions based on those detections. If such actions are not 
taken then the implementation of E-governance cannot be effective to control corruption. Rather 
such tendencies may promote corruption as the corrupt people can see that they are not punished 
even after the detection of their corrupt activities. Such tendencies are visible in the findings, 
especially in the district land administration. It appears that the monitoring and the detection of the 
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corrupt persons is not the key to control corruption there; as more or less everyone knows who are 
involved with the corruption, rather taking actions can be the key to control corruption. There are 
hardly any evidences to take action against them and this leads to a ‘culture of impunity’ where 
one can easily continue his corrupt practices. This trend may explain the inconsistent trend in some 
of the countries, especially in the developing and the Non-OECD countries. Because, in the OECD 
countries, such tendencies are rare where if someone is detected for corruption and not punished. 
May Eliminate Older Actors but New Actors May Emerge 
From the micro level cases, it is evident that just the introduction of E-governance or just the 
upgradation from one stage to another is not sufficient to control corruption. The sample cases 
indicate that corruption may shift its arena and new actors may emerge due to new opportunities. 
In the micro level findings, we can see that at first, railway introduces computerized ticketing 
system. Later on, it improves its service delivery system by introducing higher level E-governance 
system, like the online ticketing (E-ticketing) and the mobile ticketing (M-ticketing).  Initial 
computerized ticketing system improved the work efficiency by making the maintenance of the 
accounts for the tickets easier or by helping faster selling of the tickets. Nevertheless, such 
provision cannot change the corruption dynamics that much. Because, when the local database of 
the ticketing system is not connected with the central sever, then it is not possible to monitor the 
selling process from outside, one needs to visit the respective place. Under such environment, the 
corrupt officials can continue their corrupt practices. When the ticketing system is upgradated to 
higher level of E-governance i.e. introduces E/M-ticketing, then new problem starts to emerge. 
New actors from outside of the office are getting the opportunities to get involved with Kalobazari 
(black marketing) due to the provision for E/M-ticketing while the scopes for the corrupt Booking 
Clerks are shrinking due to such online ticketing. In the earlier system, the officials had some kinds 
of discretion which they now lost due to the online ticketing. Now, the people from outside of the 
office start to buy the tickets and sell them in higher prices. This is how even the higher level of 
E-governance can open new opportunities for new actors to get involved with the corrupt practices. 
Higher level E-governance can reduce the corruption opportunities of the officials but it can 
include new actors from outside. Thus, the problem of corruption may persist due to the emergence 
of new actors. Earlier, the outsider got involved with the nexus of the corrupt officials, but under 
the present arrangements, the outsider can involve with the corrupt practices without the 
collaboration of the officials and this encourages the new people to get involved with corruption. 
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Many of these people even do not know anyone from the railway. Because, now, they can buy 
tickets through E/M-ticketing by themselves. Thus, the sufferings of the service seekers continue 
even after the introduction of higher level E-governance. These trends may provide an important 
insight regarding the relationships between E-governance and corruption. From the observations 
of the sample cases, we can say that the improvement of corruption scenario is not always linear 
with the enhancement of E-governance level. These trends may partially explain some of the 
countries’ trends which show inconsistent trend with the Hypothesis 1 of the study. The measure 
of corruption by CPI index is based on the people’s perception on corruption. If the sufferings of 
the people continue due to corruption, then the effectiveness of E-governance on controlling 
corruption in some areas may not be reflected in the people’s opinions.  
Implementation Challenges May Reduce the Effectiveness 
Manipulation of Software 
The problems of manipulation of software and the hacking of an electronic system are now the 
emerging challenges for the E-governance system in all around the world. Various countries and 
organizations are working on enhancing the security of the electronic systems. In the sample cases, 
there is no information on the incidents of hacking but there are feedbacks of the manipulation 
about the software. Due to lack of proper security features in the software, some of the corrupt 
officials bring changes in the database for bad intentions. Such changes are easier in the places 
where the local databases are not connected with the central servers. Though, such practices can 
easily be prevented by adding some of the security features in the software like limiting the access 
to the database and by creating the provision to track the person who enters in the system. In the 
existing system, such features are missing and the corrupt persons are taking the advantages. 
Lack of Infrastructure 
For proper monitoring, there should be sufficient infrastructure and provisions in the E-governance 
system. Lack of such provisions may make the effort of the E-governance weaker to control 
corruption. Like in Bangladesh Railway, there is no formal mechanism to monitor the ticketing. 
Some officials use their own laptops and internet connections for monitoring. Such approach is 
not sustainable when the officials are also ill paid; this is a huge burden for an honest officer. That 
is why, most of the cases they get demotivated to monitor and the monitoring system loses its 
effectiveness. Even the existing available online monitoring is not that much comprehensive as the 
officials can only see some front end outputs, like the composition of the ticketing for a train or 
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the sells information; they cannot generate quarries for the details of a transaction in the database; 
like which ID is responsible for the sell and the refund of the suspicious amount of tickets. For 
more details data, one need to visit the respective station. This lack of provision in the E-
governance system also makes the monitoring ineffective. 
Lack of Training 
To operate the electronic devices, one should have sufficient knowledge on the processes of the 
operation of those devices. For this, training can be the key, as it is an effective tool to inculcate 
proper knowledge. From the sample cases, it appears that the officials do not have proper training. 
Most of the cases, they learn the operation of the system by themselves or consulting with the older 
officials. In the railway, the booking clerks mostly learn the operation from the senior booking 
clerks by just observing their activities and by asking where they get stuck. Similarly, the higher 
officials’ training is not sufficient to have detail operational knowledge. This lack of knowledge is 
acting as an impediment for the proper monitoring. The situation of the land administration is a bit 
better. The higher officials get training under A2I (Access to Information) project run by UNDP 
(United Nations Development Programme) and the Bangladesh Government. Nevertheless, the 
lower level officials lack proper training. Such lack of knowledge becomes as one of the key 
obstacles for the proper implementation of E-governance. All of these implementation challenges 
can limit the effectiveness of E-governance in controlling corruption and can provide some of the 
explanations for the inconsistent trends, especially in the developing countries where E-
governance cannot have expected impacts on corruption level. 
7.3.3 Effectiveness of E-governance may Varies between the Developed and the Developing 
Countries 
Macro Level Trends 
a) Inconsistent Trend in the OECD Countries 
The countries which show inconsistent trends with the Hypothesis 1 are mostly from the 
developed countries - particularly OECD countries. Total 42 countries shows inconsistent 
trends and among them 28 countries can be treated as the high-income countries by the 
definition of World Bank (per capita GNI $12,476 or more) and out of these 28 countries, 21 
are from the OECD countries. This inconsistent trend also confirmed by other studies like 
Andrew (2009). He conducted the study based on the Control of Corruption Index by World 
Bank. However, in general, in the OECD countries, the overall corruption problem is lower 
than the other countries, especially the problem of the petty corruption done by the street level 
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bureaucrats. At the same time, these countries also have higher level of E-governance compare 
to other countries. However, from the statistical analysis, it appears that the overall corruption 
levels are increasing to a significant number of OECD countries in spite of the increase of E-
governance level. From the existing data, it is not possible to say conclusively about the nature 
of corruption, which are increasing, and the probable roles of E-governance in such increase.  
b) More Effective in the Developing countries? 
Macro level trends are indicating that E-governance is more effective in the developing 
countries than the developed countries. Because, out of 42 countries, only 14 are from the 
developing countries which showed inconsistent trends with the Hypothesis 1 of the study. 
Reflections from the Micro Level Trends 
Nature of Corruption 
E-governance may not be equally effective against all types of corruption. It may be comparatively 
more effective for checking petty corruption than the grand corruption like the policy or strategic 
level corrupt practices. For most of the petty corruption, street level bureaucrats receive bribes or 
some kinds of illegal benefits in exchange of the provided services. If the service delivery channel 
can be changed i.e. can be converted to the electronic platform then the bargaining power of the 
corrupt officials for the illegal benefits can be curtailed. Thus, the degree of ‘petty corruption’ of 
an organization can be reduced by E-governance. There can be a possibility that these 
improvements in controlling the petty corruption (if any) in the developing countries may 
contribute in the improved perception on the corruption level of the respective countries. 
In contrast, most of the grand corruption originates in the policy or strategic level. Such types of 
corruption are difficult to control through E-governance. Like, if the higher authority sets some 
tailor-made policies in exchange of illegal benefits to favor an interest group to win a bidding 
process, then E-governance may have limited role to play. Introduction of Electronic Tendering 
(E-tendering) may not have significant impact to control such types of corruption. E-tendering can 
suggest the best suitable bidders based on the criteria/policies which are set before. If the criteria 
are set in a way to favor any interest groups then E-governance may have little role to curb those 
corruption. Though, the sample cases of this study are from a developing country, but there is an 
example, which can provide some insights regarding this trend. In Bangladesh Railway, there is 
an allegation for a policy level corrupt practice when there was a bidding process to outsource the 
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ticketing system of the railway to a private company (third party). There were allegations that some 
of the conditions were set to favor a particular company; like, to have 15 years of relevant working 
experience within the country and to have financial transaction more than BDT 20 million (80 
BDT = 1 USD). There is only one company, which can fulfill such conditions. Thus, the strategic 
or policy level corrupt practices can ensure the wining of the desired company in a bidding process. 
If these types of corruption exists or increase in a country then E-governance may have little impact 
in controlling corruption. E-governance is just a tool, which can select best suitable options based 
on the preset criteria. As the problem of petty corruption is low in the OECD countries, but 
corruption is increasing, there can be possibilities that the strategic or the policy level corruption 
is increasing; but this observation is just a possibility. It needs further study to explore the patterns 
of corruption. If these possibilities are true then it may provide an explanation for the inconsistent 
trend of the OECD countries. 
Table 38: Juxtaposing the Micro and the Macro Level Findings 
No Macro Level Trends Micro Level Trends 
1. The majority of the countries (119 
countries out of 161 countries) show 
consistent trends with the Hypothesis 1 of 
the study i.e. the corruption level 
decreases/increases with the 
increases/decreases of the E-governance 
level. 
 The empirical findings from the micro level data indicate that 
by reducing discretionary power and providing alternative 
channel for the service delivery, E-governance can contribute 
to control some kinds of corruption.  
2. Significant number of countries’ (42 
countries out of 161 countries) corruption 
levels do not improve with the 
improvement of the E-governance level.  
Incomplete E-governance 
 Mere introduction of E-governance is not sufficient to change 
the key factors of corruption. From the sample cases, it 
appears that incomplete implementation of E-governance may 
not be able to change the power relations and to increase the 
monitoring capacity. Specially, until a system does not 
become an alternative channel to provide a service, it may not 
be able to effect the power relations. Lack of necessary 
infrastructure and training of the officials can act as the 
impediments to enhance the monitoring capacity and may 
make the initiative of E-governance ineffective to control 
corruption.  
Shifting of Arena or Displacement of Corruption and the 
Emergence of New Actors 
 Another explanation may come from the shifting of the arena 
of corruption and the possible emergence of new actors of 
corruption. In the case 2, the provision of E/M-ticketing 
system indicates that it can also open new opportunities of 
corruption for the Kalobazari (black marketing).  
Nature of Corruption 
 From the sample cases, it appears that E-governance is better 
in controlling some kinds of corruption. For example, in the 
sample cases; by changing the service delivery channels to the 
electronic platform, E-governance can reduce the 
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No Macro Level Trends Micro Level Trends 
opportunities for Ghush (bribe). However, that may not be 
equally effective for policy level or strategic corruptions. If 
someone sets any standard or criteria at the policy level which 
can favor some interest groups then that will be difficult to 
control by E-governance. Because, E-governance may run 
based on such preset standards or criteria.  
3. Inconsistent Trend in the OECD 
Countries 
 The countries, which show 
inconsistent trends with the 
Hypothesis 1, are mostly from the 
developed countries - particularly from 
the OECD countries. 
 Total 42 countries shows inconsistent 
trends and among them 28 countries 
are from the high-income countries 
and out of these 28 countries, 21 are 
from the OECD countries (the number 
of total OECD counties is 34).  
 
 There can be a number of possibilities; like the emergence of 
new patterns of corruption, change of arena of the traditional 
corruption, the emergence of new actors, even the use of E-
governance as the tool for corruption or all of these 
possibilities can be true. 
 From the micro level cases, we can have some supporting 
evidences for these possibilities. The micro level findings 
indicate about the emergence of new actors and the shifting of 
arena of the corruption (Ex: Kalobazari-black marketing) and 
the new ways to do the older/traditional corruption (Ex: 
manipulation of software to increase the bargaining power for 
Ghush – bribe) or the problem of policy/strategic corruption 
(Ex: the tailor-made specifications to favor someone in the 
bidding). 
 However, in general, in the OECD countries, the overall 
corruption problem is lower than the other countries, 
especially the problem of the petty corruption. At the same 
time, these countries also have higher level of E-governance 
compared to the other countries.  From the existing data, it is 
not possible to say conclusively about the nature of corruption 
and the role of E-governance in such increase. 
4 More Effectives in the Developing 
countries? 
 Macro level trends are indicating that 
E-governance is more effective in the 
developing countries than the 
developed countries. 
 Because, only 14 developing countries 
showed inconsistent trends with the 
Hypothesis 1 of the study. 
 
 Some of the micro level trends may indicate the probable 
explanations of the trends in the developing countries. E-
governance can be effective for certain patterns of corruption 
like petty corruption done by the street level bureaucrats. By 
changing the service delivery channel, E-governance can 
demonstrate its effectiveness on the petty corruption. 
 There can be a possibility that the improvement in controlling 
the petty corruption (if any) in the developing countries may 
contribute in the improved perception on the corruption of the 
respective countries. 
 
7.4 Theoretical Relevance of the Study 
7.4.1 Power Relations and Corruption 
From the corruption incidences of the study, we can find two main actors who are related with the 
corruption process of an organization: in one side, there are corrupt officials and in the other side, 
there are interest unit/s. This unit/s can be an individual or a group or a number of groups. The 
corruption of an organization depends on the dynamic power game between these two main actors. 
Their level of power and the willingness to exercise such power enable their bargaining capacity 
to influence an incidence or a course of action from which the respective party may make illegal 
benefits. From this dynamic power game, we can find two types of power: effective and 
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ineffective. When one party can successfully exercise his power for his own interests then that can 
be defined as ‘effective’ power for that actor and accordingly the ‘ineffective’ power is the 
opposite. By this distinction of power, we can derive the following grid: 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Power Relations and Corruption 
Source: Researcher’s synthesis 
Quadrant 1: 
The provisions for the exercise of the discretionary power of the officials may enable them to 
misuse power. Corrupt officials who have such discretionary power may utilize the power to claim 
illegal benefits from the service seekers. Such type of exercise of power is overt in nature. To get 
the services, the service aspirants may have nothing to do but to comply the desire of the corrupt 
officials. If we analyze this exercise of the discretionary power, we can find the similarities with 
the ‘first dimension’ of power. Because, the first dimension indicates about ‘power over’ or the 
coercive nature of power. In this quadrant, the officials also use their coercive power to have undue 
benefits. There is an example of this kind of power exercise in the sample cases; the discretionary 
power of the officials enable them to force the service seekers to provide Ghush (bribe).  
Quadrant 2: 
This quadrant indicates that the interest unit/s can be more powerful to make the power of the 
officials ineffective. This nature is similar to the ‘second dimension’ of power where the people 
can ‘covertly’ influence a course of action to bend the decisions in favor of them or to certain 
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Quadrant 3: Collaboration or 
negotiation between the 
officials and outsiders for the 
probable mutual benefits 
Examples: Formulation of 
favorable policies or soft 
interpretation of laws in 
exchange of the different 
benefits 
 
Quadrant 2: Power of the 
interest unit/s may influence 
the decisions of the officials 
Example: Tadbir 
(lobbying) is used to have 
both legal and illegal 
benefits 
 
 
Quadrant 1: Discretionary 
power of the officials may 
lead to corrupt practices 
Example: Use of the 
discretionary power to have 
Ghush (bribe) 
 
Quadrant 4: Lack of discretionary 
power of the officials or inability of 
the interest unit/group to influence 
may lead to decisions based on the 
prevailing rules and regulations 
Example: Higher level E-governance 
can make all the agents’ power 
ineffective and can lead to 
‘depersonalized decision’ making  
 
 
Nature of Power of the 
Officials 
Effective 
Ineffective 
Effective Ineffective 
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interest groups. From the micro level findings, the mechanisms of Tadbir (lobbying) can be treated 
as the exercise of such kind of power which can make the officials’ power ineffective and through 
this power, the interest unit can get both legal and illegal benefits. 
Quadrant 3: 
In quadrant 3, there is a dynamic balancing in the power game between the officials and the interest 
unit/s. The situation is a bit different compared to the previous two types of power. In earlier two 
cases, both the actors try to use coercive nature of power but here each may know about the 
capacities of the other. They know that they may not completely win if they try to exercise the 
power over the opposition. So, in most of the cases both parties go for negotiation and collaboration 
and try to maintain a calculative good rapport with each other so that  both can be benefited from 
such relationships. This kind of collaboration may be evident when the officials formulate policies 
to favor some particular interest groups or interpret the laws in a way that may help someone or 
some interest groups. The micro level cases of the study indicate that by presenting expensive 
Upodhoukon (gift) to the higher officials or giving Bakshish (tips) to the lower officials, the interest 
units maintain some kinds of relationships with the officials to get support from them in the 
different events.  
Quadrant 4: 
In Quadrant 4, both the parities’ power becomes ineffective. From the sample cases, we can see 
that higher level E-governance can make a system of decision making ‘depersonalize’ i.e. decision 
are taken automatically or the process is completed electronically without the scope of 
interference. It can curtail both the external and the internal agents’ power significantly to 
influence a decision or a process and thus can make them ineffective to influence the system. Such, 
provisions may control associated corruption. Though, absolute ‘depersonalization’ of a task 
process may be difficult. In maximum E-governance system, there are provisions to influence the 
system but only few have such opportunities and authorities. Like, few have the authority to access 
the system or the knowledge to manipulate the software or the electronic system. Without proper 
monitoring mechanisms that may open new windows for corruption and may fail to control the 
entrance of new actors of corruption. 
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7.4.2 Transformation of Corruption 
From the sample cases of the study, it appears that E-governance may have positive impacts on 
some of the patterns of corruption but it may also open new opportunities for new patterns of 
corruption or provide more effective tool to continue the old corruption. Thus, corruption may be 
controlled in one place but it can grow in other places and the problem of corruption may persist. 
By changing its forms and natures, corruption may linger even after the implementation of higher 
level E-governance. This study indicates that during such mutation of corruption, three elements 
can be the key: 
Change of Actors 
The options for the old actors may be eliminated but may open opportunities for the new actors. 
In the cases of the study, it appears that due to E/M-ticketing, the provision for Ghush (bribe) is 
shrinking for the corrupt booking clerks (who sell the ticket in the counter), but it is also opening 
the opportunities for the new actors who are mostly from outside of the organization; popularly 
they are known as Kalobazari (black marketeers). Earlier the outsider can get involved with the 
process in collaboration with the officials but now they can operate by themselves as they can buy 
tickets directly through E/M-ticketing. For these kinds of technology based corruption, people who 
have more technical knowledge are getting competitive advantage. 
Table 39: Transformation of Corruption 
Elements Processes 
Change of Actors New actors may enter while the scopes for the older actors’ may shrink. 
Change of Patterns 
The older patterns of corruption may be reduced or eradicated but new patterns of 
corruption may emerge. 
Change of Tools 
To make the corruption more convenient and efficient, corrupt agents may try to look 
for more efficient tools. 
 
Change of Patterns 
Corruption is about undue/illegal profit maximizing tendencies. If a corrupt agent finds any area 
problematic for the continuation of corruption then s/he may look for new avenues. That is why, 
the older patterns of corruption may be reduced or eradicated but new patterns of corruption may 
emerge. The case study from the railway indicate that due to the introduction of E/M-ticketing; 
Ghush (bribe), Tadbir (lobbying) can be reduced; but it can open the opportunities for Kalobzari 
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(black marketeers). Earlier one needs to keep relation with the officials; but now, one can do such 
corrupt activities independently. 
Change of Tools 
To be corrupt, one needs to be creative and needs to go for innovative tools. The micro level 
findings show that, the corrupt persons are using the E-governance system itself as a tool for their 
corrupt practices. In earlier manual system, one tries to manipulate the paper works. Sometimes 
they make delay or improperly give entry to the registry or follow other techniques. Now, such 
types of tendencies are reducing. People are using various devices and techniques for corruption 
and illegal activities. In the sample cases of Bangladesh Railway, we can see the problem of 
manipulating the software and this appears as the new tool for continuing the corruption. 
7.5 Policy Implications of the Findings: Lessons Learnt and Measures to Curb Corruption 
The findings of the study can add some new insights in the discourse of corruption and can lead to 
some policy directives for the policy makers and the practitioners. The study empirically examines 
the argument that E-governance can be a significant tool to affect the level of corruption and both 
the macro level statistical trends and the micro level case studies provide some of the supportive 
evidences in favor of the argument. Though, in most of the countries, E-governance can explain 
the variation of the level of corruption but the case studies indicate that just the introduction of E-
governance is not sufficient to control corruption, its effects are contingent on a number of factors. 
The findings of the cases indicate that when E-governance can become an alternative platform for 
the delivery of a service then it can influence the power relations of an organization which can 
help to reduce corruption. Another important insight emerges from the findings that E-governance 
may enhanced the monitoring or the oversight capacity of an organization but that may not be 
sufficient to have significant impact on corruption; it should be combined with ‘enforcement of 
the laws’; because lack of this provision may make the efforts of E-governance ineffective. Various 
implementation challenges like lack of sufficient infrastructure, training of the officials, limited 
access of the citizen to the ICT facilities, limited facilities of the online banking services, 
interruption of the electricity supply etc. can also affect the processes of E-governance. 
7.6 Limitations of the Study and the Future Scopes 
The macro level study is based on a single database to measure each of the variables; but there are 
other databases, like Bribe Payers’ Index (BPI) or Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), which can 
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be used to check the validity of the present findings. The regression model of the present study 
may suffer the problem of ‘Endogeneity’. To overcome this problem, ‘instrumental variable’ can 
be a good solution. Someone can find an appropriate instrumental variable for E-governance and 
then can conduct the study. The present study only considers the economic nature of the countries 
(like high income, low income etc.) to understand the probable variation of the effectiveness of E-
governance but other variations like culture, geography, governance system can provide more 
deeper and interesting insights on the dynamics between E-governance and corruption. Present 
study is only based on the UN index of E-governance, but there are other indexes for E-governance 
like Brwon index, Waseda index etc. which can also be used to check the validity of the present 
findings. At the micro level cases, the small sample size (N) is a major challenge, because a small 
variation of the opinions may have significant impacts on the ranking of the respective variables. 
To have more valid findings, another study can be conducted with larger samples. As both of the 
cases are from a developing country, their finding may be more relevant for the other developing 
countries. To understand the dynamics of the developed countries, a study can be conducted based 
on the cases from the developed countries. Thus, it is evident that the research left many questions 
and areas unexplored which are left as the scopes for further research of the future researchers. 
7.7 Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of the research was to investigate whether E-governance can reduce corruption. The 
findings of the study affirm this effectiveness of E-governance with some observations and 
conditions. The macro level findings indicate that E-governance can explain most of the variations 
of corruption in the different countries i.e. it supports the main argument of the study that E-
governance may have positive impacts in reducing corruption in different countries. The findings 
seem to be robust and more consistent in the developing countries though some of the developed 
countries, particularly the OECD countries show inconsistent trend. This inconsistent trend also 
confirmed by other studies, e.g. Andrew (2009). From the micro level case studies, it appears that 
just the introduction of E-governance is not sufficient to control corruption, its nature and maturity 
level is also important. As part of the natural experimental design, the study includes different 
levels of E-governance to understand the dynamics between E-governance and corruption. The 
dynamics that emerged from the different levels of E-governance provide some understandings 
about the nature of E-governance which can have greater impacts on corruption and some insights 
on explaining the limited success of the different E-governance projects/initiatives. From the 
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sample cases, it appears that E-governance may have better impacts when it can affect the power 
relations in an organization. This power can be affected when E-governance can provide an 
alternative service delivery channel through the electronic platform. Because, then the officials 
may lose their power to influence the process as the system is automated and run electronically. 
The discretionary power of officials can also be affected if the accountability system can be 
improved. In the sample cases, though there are indications for the improvement of the monitoring 
and the investigation capacities due to higher traceability by E-governance; but such development 
fails to achieve the desired success due to lack of ‘enforcement of the law’ and some other 
implementation related challenges. E-governance as a tool can detect corrupt activities and can 
expose the corrupt persons but the key to control corruption is to take necessary actions based on 
the detections. If these conditions are fulfilled, then an E-governance initiative may demonstrate 
more effectiveness in combating corruption. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1: Research Design at a Glance (in Macro Perspective) 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Indicators Operational Definitions Source of Data Hypothesis 
Dependent 
Variable 
Indicator 
Operational 
Definitions 
Source of Data 
E-governance 
Degree of 
Emerging 
Level 
This indicates the degree of 
information available 
through online. 
United Nations’ 
Online Service 
Index (OSI) 
H1: E-governance 
may reduce the 
level of corruption 
 
Corruption 
Level of  
Corruption 
 
The ‘level of 
corruption’ 
means the 
magnitude or 
the volume of 
corruption in a 
country. 
Transparency 
International’s 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index (CPI) 
Degree of 
Enhanced 
Level 
This is the measure of one-
way or simple two-way e-
communication (use of 
online platform) between 
government and citizen or 
government and the business 
people. 
Degree of 
Transactional 
Level 
This indicator is about the 
degree of engagement of the 
government in two-way 
communication with their 
citizens through online. 
Degree of 
Connected 
Level 
‘Connected Service’ 
measures the degree of 
integration across the 
agencies to provide 
government services. 
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Appendix 2: Research Design at a Glance (in Micro Perspective) 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Indicators Hypotheses 
Intervening 
Variables 
Operational 
Definitions 
Indicators 
Dependent 
Variable 
Indicators 
Source of 
Data 
E-governance 
Level of E-governance: 
 Emerging Level 
 Enhanced Level 
 Transactional 
Level 
 Connected Level 
H2: E-governance may 
change power relations, 
which may help to reduce 
the level of corruption 
Power 
Power is the ability to 
participate in decision 
making process 
(Lasswell and Kaplan, 
1950; cited in 
Bacharach and 
Bartaz, 1962:948) 
 Dimensions of 
Power  
 Power 
Distance 
 Accessibility 
to Services 
Corruption 
 Level of 
Corruption 
 Patterns of 
Corruption 
Case study on 
two public 
organizations 
from 
Bangladesh 
E-governance 
Level of E-governance: 
 Emerging Level 
 Enhanced Level 
 Transactional 
Level 
 Connected Level 
H3: E-governance may 
change the patterns of 
accountability, which may 
contribute to reduce the 
level of corruption 
Accountability 
Accountability is the 
obligation of a person 
(the accountable) to 
another person (the 
accountee), according 
to which the former 
must give account of, 
explain and justify his 
actions or decisions in 
an appropriate way 
(Weber, 2011:133) 
and if the former fails 
then the later can 
impose sanctions 
(Lindberg, 2009:1) 
 Oversight 
Capacity (Both 
External and 
Internal 
Mechanisms) 
 Rules and 
Regulations 
 Working 
Procedures  
 Investigation 
 Enforcement 
 
Corruption 
 Level of 
Corruption 
 Patterns of 
Corruption 
Case study on 
two public 
organizations 
from 
Bangladesh 
E-governance 
Level of E-governance: 
 Emerging Level 
 Enhanced Level 
 Transactional 
Level 
 Connected Level 
H4: By reducing the 
monopoly in service 
delivery system, E-
governance may help to 
reduce corruption 
Monopoly 
Monopoly is the lack 
of competition to 
produce a good or a 
service and a lack of 
viable substitute 
(Baumol and Blinder, 
2012: 220). 
 Degree of 
Choice 
 Transaction 
Cost 
Corruption 
 Level of 
Corruption 
 Patterns of 
Corruption 
Case study on 
two public 
organizations 
from 
Bangladesh 
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Appendix 3: Sources of Corruption Measures by TI 
 
No. Sources 
1.  African Development Bank Governance Ratings.  
2.  Asian Development Bank Country Performance Assessment.  
3.  Bertelsmann Foundation Sustainable Governance Indicators.  
4.  Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index.  
5.  Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Assessment.  
6.  Freedom House Nations in Transit.  
7.  Global Insight Country Risk Ratings.  
8.  IMD World Competitiveness Year Book.  
9.  Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence.  
10.  Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide.  
11.  Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey.  
12.  World Bank – Country Performance and Institutional Assessment.  
13.  World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey (EOS).  
14.  World Justice Project Rule of Law Index.  
 
Source: Mistry and Jalal, 2012: 156 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Sample Respondents from the District Land Office 
 
 
 Rural District  Urban District  
 Category Total 
Officials 
Sample 
Size 
% Category Total 
Officials 
Sample 
Size 
% 
1. Higher Level Officials (DC, 
ADC )  
4 3 75 Higher Level Officials 
(DC, ADC )  
6 1 16.67 
2. Mid-Level Officials (AC, 
Programmer) 
8 4 50 Mid-Level Officials (AC, 
Programmer) 
14 4 28.57 
3. Lower Level Officials 
(Record Keeper, Office 
Assistant) 
4 2 50 Lower Level Officials 
(Record Keeper, Office 
Assistant) 
12 4 33.33 
 Total 16 9 56.13 Total 32 9 28.13 
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Appendix 5: Sample Respondents from Bangladesh Railway 
 
 Rural Station Urban Station 
 Category Total 
Officials 
Sample 
Size 
% Category Total 
Officials 
Sample 
Size 
% 
1. Higher Level Officials 
(JDG, CCM, DRM and 
other equivalent officials) 
6 3 50 Higher Level Officials 
(JDG, CCM, DRM and 
other equivalent officials) 
6 3 50 
2. Mid-Level Officials (DCO, 
ACO, DD) 
5 3 60 Mid-Level Officials 
(DCO, ACO, DD) 
5 3 60 
3. Lower Level Officials (TI, 
JTI, Booking Clerk) 
3 1 33.33 Lower Level Officials 
(TI, JTI, Booking Clerk) 
20 2 10 
 Total 14 7 50 Total 31 8 25.80 
 
 
Appendix 6: Target Population and the Sample Size for the 
Questionnaire Method  
S/N District Land Administration Bangladesh Railway Total 
 Category Respondents Category Respondents  
1. Service Recipients  5 Service Recipients  6 11 
2. Public Officials 10 Public Officials 10 20 
 Total  15  16 31 
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Appendix 7: Conventional Manual System of Service Delivery in the 
District Land Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Revenue Deputy Collector 
(RDC) 
Record Keeper (RK) Citizens 
Comparer  
Copier 
Dalal (Broker) 
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Appendix 8: Service Delivery System after the Introduction of 
DESC/NESS in the District Land Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counter 
Revenue Deputy Collector 
(RDC) 
 
Copier 
Comparer  
Record Keeper (RK) 
DESC/NESS 
Citizens 
Submission of the Printed 
Application 
Delivery of Land 
Records 
Online Application 
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Appendix 9: Descriptive Statistics of the Macro Level Data 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CPI 2010 150 1.4000 9.3000 4.064000 2.1130239 
CPI 2012 150 1.3000 9.0000 4.348667 1.9193377 
OSI 2010 150 .0000 1.0000 .324087 .2062217 
OSI 2012 150 .0784 1.0000 .482360 .2235463 
GDP 2010 148 210.7692 103574.1713 1.285286E4 1.8512884E4 
GDP 2012 140 250.9708 107475.9479 1.310291E4 1.9405672E4 
DI 2010 149 1.52 9.80 5.7046 2.15369 
DI 2012 149 1.62 9.93 5.7558 2.11043 
 
Appendix 10:  List of the Counties which Indicate Inconsistent Trends 
with the Hypothesis 1 of the Study 
 
No. Country CPI 10 CPI 12 
Difference 
D = (CPI 12 - 
CPI 10) 
OSI 10 OSI 12 
Difference 
D = (OSI 12 - 
OSI 10) 
Nature of the Countries 
Nature: Increase of OSI Value and Decrease of CPI Value 
1 Ireland 8 6.9 -1.1 0.4984 0.5359 0.0375 High income: OECD 
2 Austria 7.9 6.9 -1 0.4762 0.7451 0.2689 High income: OECD 
3 Qatar 7.7 6.8 -0.9 0.2794 0.7386 0.4592 High income: Non-OECD 
4 Singapore 9.3 8.7 -0.6 0.6857 1 0.3143 High income: Non-OECD 
5 Afghanistan 1.4 0.8 -0.6 0.2317 0.2353 0.0036 Low income 
6 Oman 5.3 4.7 -0.6 0.3683 0.6667 0.2984 High income: Non-OECD 
7 Canada 8.9 8.4 -0.5 0.8825 0.8889 0.0064 High income: OECD 
8 Luxembourg 8.5 8 -0.5 0.381 0.6993 0.3183 High income: OECD 
9 Zimbabwe 2.4 2 -0.4 0.127 0.3007 0.1737 Low income 
10 Japan 7.8 7.4 -0.4 0.673 0.8627 0.1897 High income: OECD 
11 Sweden 9.2 8.8 -0.4 0.527 0.8431 0.3161 High income: OECD 
12 Denmark 9.3 9 -0.3 0.673 0.8562 0.1832 High income: OECD 
13 Iceland 8.5 8.2 -0.3 0.3968 0.5425 0.1457 High income: OECD 
14 Netherlands 8.8 8.5 -0.3 0.6794 0.9608 0.2814 High income: OECD 
15 New Zealand 9.3 9 -0.3 0.6381 0.7843 0.1462 High income: OECD 
16 Slovenia 6.4 6.1 -0.3 0.4 0.6667 0.2667 High income: OECD 
17 Somalia 1.1 0.8 -0.3 0 0.183 0.183 Low income 
18 Sudan 1.6 1.3 -0.3 0.1556 0.2549 0.0993 Lower middle income 
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No. Country CPI 10 CPI 12 
Difference 
D = (CPI 12 - 
CPI 10) 
OSI 10 OSI 12 
Difference 
D = (OSI 12 - 
OSI 10) 
Nature of the Countries 
19 Saudi Arabia 4.7 4.4 -0.3 0.3111 0.7974 0.4863 High income: Non-OECD 
20 Barbados 7.8 7.6 -0.2 0.2 0.3725 0.1725 High income: Non-OECD 
21 South Africa 4.5 4.3 -0.2 0.3079 0.4575 0.1496 Upper middle income 
22 Australia 8.7 8.5 -0.2 0.7651 0.8627 0.0976 High income: OECD 
23 Finland 9.2 9 -0.2 0.4794 0.8824 0.403 High income: OECD 
24 United Kingdom 7.6 7.4 -0.2 0.7746 0.9739 0.1993 High income: OECD 
25 Eritrea 2.6 2.5 -0.1 0.0222 0.2092 0.187 Low income 
26 Kazakhstan 2.9 2.8 -0.1 0.527 0.7843 0.2573 Upper middle income 
27 Venezuela 2 1.9 -0.1 0.3048 0.4837 0.1789 Upper middle income 
28 Estonia 6.5 6.4 -0.1 0.5016 0.8235 0.3219 High income: OECD 
29 Israel 6.1 6 -0.1 0.5841 0.8497 0.2656 High income: OECD 
30 Kuwait 4.5 4.4 -0.1 0.4603 0.5817 0.1214 High Income: Non-OECD 
31 Norway 8.6 8.5 -0.1 0.7365 0.8562 0.1197 High income: OECD 
32 Switzerland 8.7 8.6 -0.1 0.4444 0.6732 0.2288 High income: OECD 
Nature: Stable OSI Value and Increase of CPI Value 
33 Korea (South) 5.4 5.6 0.2 1 1 0 High income: OECD 
Nature: Increase of OSI Value and Stable CPI Value 
34 Albania 3.3 3.3 0 0.3111 0.4248 0.1137 Lower middle income 
35 Brunei 5.5 5.5 0 0.2825 0.5948 0.3123 High Income: Non-OECD 
36 Chile 7.2 7.2 0 0.6095 0.7516 0.1421 Upper middle income 
37 Germany 7.9 7.9 0 0.5492 0.7516 0.2024 High income: OECD 
38 Laos 2.1 2.1 0 0.0794 0.2157 0.1363 Lower middle income 
Nature: Decrease of OSI Value and Increase of CPI Value 
39 Jordan 4.7 4.8 0.1 0.5333 0.3922 -0.1411 Upper middle income 
40 Angola 1.9 2.2 0.3 0.3397 0.3333 -0.0064 Upper middle income 
41 Spain 6.1 6.5 0.4 0.7651 0.7582 -0.0069 High income: OECD 
42 Mauritania 2.3 3.1 0.8 0.0889 0.0784 -0.0105 Low income 
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Appendix 11: Impacts of E-governance and the Processes of Effecting the Corruption Patterns in the 
District Land Administration 
 
Critical Issues that 
Trigger Corruption 
Patterns of 
Corruption 
Impacts of E-
governance 
Process of Effecting Corruption Potential Future Scopes  and Caveats of E-
governance 
Push Factors: 
 Do not know 
the procedures 
for the service 
 Do not know 
the place 
precisely to 
have the 
services 
 Fear of 
harassments 
 Uncertainty for 
the service 
 
Create the 
dependency on 
the Dalal 
(brokers) 
Have limited 
success to control 
this type of 
corruption; failed 
in maximum cases 
Reasons for Limited Success 
 Some of the challenges are addressed by the 
present level of E-governance like to inform the 
detail procedures, and the place for submission, 
but that is not sufficient enough to control this 
type of corruption.  
 Because the present level of E-governance: 
 Cannot curtail the discretionary power of the 
service providing staffs, still they can create 
obstacles and claim bribe. 
 Failed to increase the monitoring capacity 
i.e. not sufficient to identify someone who is 
involved with corruption, even if someone is 
identified, then s/he is not given exemplary 
punishment in many cases. 
 Thus a ‘culture of impunity’ is developed 
where E-governance may detect someone for 
the corruption/crime but may not be 
punished. 
 Because of these factors, still there are fear of 
harassment and uncertainty among the service 
seekers; and to avoid these troubles, many people 
depend on the Dalal (brokers). 
 In higher online system where one can 
directly apply through electronic platform, 
a citizen may avoid this type of corruption 
as they do not need to interact with anybody 
or to know the place where or to whom one 
has to submit the document. 
 If anybody delays to provide any service 
then s/he can easily be traced through 
online monitoring system 
Caveats 
 E-governance is a tool, its success depends 
on the proper use of the tool, it may detect 
the crimes but if based on that detection, 
proper legal actions are not taken then E-
governance can never be effective to 
control corruption. 
 
Pull Factors 
 Offers from 
the Dalal 
(brokers) to 
have the 
service 
without any 
hassles in 
exchange of 
extra money 
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Critical Issues that 
Trigger Corruption 
Patterns of 
Corruption 
Impacts of E-
governance 
Process of Effecting Corruption Potential Future Scopes  and Caveats of E-
governance 
If someone even 
manage to get the 
right place and the 
person to submit the 
application, one still 
has to face difficulties 
to have the services 
because of the 
obstacles created by 
the officials 
themselves 
Pay Ghush 
(bribe) to have 
the service  
 
 
Existing level of E-
governance has 
failed to address 
this type of 
corruption. 
 
Reasons for Limited Success 
 The officials still have the discretionary power to 
create obstacles to have the services by the 
service seekers. 
 
 There are lots of potentials to curb the 
corruption by enhancing the level of E-
governance, like by creating the provisions 
for online application, online payment, and 
digitalization of the documents. 
 Online application and online payment can 
help a service seeker to avoid the human 
interactions which enable an employee to 
exercise his discretionary power over him. 
 Digitalization may help to preserve the 
documents more efficiently and the official 
cannot give excuse that the document is 
missing. 
Try to do Tadbir 
(lobbying)  
Existing level of E-
governance has 
failed to address 
this type of 
corruption. 
 
Reasons for Limited Success 
 The present level of E-governance has failed to 
depersonalize22 the entire service delivery 
system. That is why, Tadbir (lobbying) can play 
a significant role in influencing the decision of the 
public officials. 
 In many cases, Tadbir (lobbying) is used as the 
counter measure of corrupt demand of the 
officials. For this reason, it can be labeled as the 
second dimension of power which helps to 
neutralize the illegal use of power of the officials. 
 Sometimes Tadbir (lobbying) is also use to get 
illegal favors or services from the officials. 
 Higher level of E-governance may lead to 
depersonalize the decision making 
processes, i.e. the possibilities for the 
interventions through Tadbir (lobbying) 
can be minimized or will become difficult 
which may help to reduce this type of 
corruption. 
 
                                                 
22 There should not have any provisions for human interactions and everything need to be done electronically. 
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Appendix 12: Impacts of E-governance and the Processes of Effecting Corruption in the Ticketing 
System of Bangladesh Railway 
 
Critical Issues that Trigger 
Corruption 
Patterns of 
Corruption 
Impacts of E-governance and the Processes of Effecting 
Corruption 
Potential Future Scopes  of E-
governance 
 Pull factors: 
o Rate of return from 
selling the tickets by 
corruption 
o Lack of enforcement 
of law 
o Availability of tickets 
from the corrupt 
officials 
 Push factors 
o Scarcity of tickets 
o Unemployment 
Create the provision for 
Kalobazar (black 
market) 
E-governance Level - 3.5: 
 As the people can purchase the tickets directly without any human 
interaction, this level of E-governance is helping to reduce 
corruption significantly if anyone can use the platform. 
 However, as only 25 percent tickets are selling through this 
platform and the total number of tickets is incompatible with the 
demand, the overall impact of this system is not very significant 
on the total volume of corruption. 
 There are also evidences that this higher level of E-governance is 
opening new opportunities for corruption to some people. They 
buy tickets through online and then sell them in higher prices in 
the black market.  
E-governance Level -2: 
 Improve the monitoring system because of the provisions to 
monitor from the remote places. 
 However, still has loopholes, cannot detect who is buying the 
tickets, so the corrupt officials can buy the tickets and can maintain 
the supply of tickets to the ‘black marketeers’ to have certain 
percentage of corrupt money. Thus, the improvement of 
monitoring system becomes ineffective for these loopholes. 
E-governance Level -1: 
 Though, this level of E-governance can help to increase the work 
efficiency but failed to control the corruption. It remains more or 
less same as it was during the manual system of ticketing. 
 
Potential Scopes: 
 Can use the ICT tools more 
efficiently; like to ensure the 
identity of the travelers through 
different ID cards (like the 
checking of the authenticity of 
the traveler in the arilines) or 
mobile phone number etc. 
Under such situation, the 
corrupt people may buy the 
tickets but cannot sell to 
anybody as other people cannot 
travel buy those tickets. 
Caveats 
 Such arrangements may not be 
cost effective and user-friendly. 
 
 Pull factors: 
o Rate of return from 
selling the tickets by 
corruption 
Create the provision for 
Ghush (bribe)  
E-governance Level - 3.5: 
 As this level of E-governance can depersonalize the ticketing 
system, the corrupt officials cannot exercise their power to have 
Ghush (bribe). 
 Increase of E-governance level 
may help to reduce this type of 
corruption. 
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Critical Issues that Trigger 
Corruption 
Patterns of 
Corruption 
Impacts of E-governance and the Processes of Effecting 
Corruption 
Potential Future Scopes  of E-
governance 
o Lack of enforcement 
of law 
o Availability of tickets 
from the corrupt 
officials 
 Push factors 
o Scarcity of tickets 
o Unemployment 
E-governance Level -2: 
 This level of E-governance failed to change the corruption 
dynamics because under this system, a corrupt person still can buy 
tickets and keep it to himself to claim Ghush (bribe). Though, the 
monitoring provision has enhanced but still it is not sufficient 
enough to address the problem. 
E-governance Level -1: 
 This level of E-governance is helping the corrupt practices rather 
than controlling the corruption in many instances. By manipulating 
the software, the corrupt official can pretend that all the tickets are 
sold. However, if anyone pays extra money then they put the 
tickets into the system again and sell it to them. As these computers 
are not directly connected with the central database, the monitoring 
is difficult from the distance which is possible in level 2 or 3.5. 
o Scarcity of tickets 
o Anticipated future 
benefits 
Bakshish (tips) to 
maintain a good 
relationship to get 
favors  
E-governance Level - 3.5: 
 Need not to maintain the relation with the officials as one can 
purchase the tickets directly 
E-governance Level -2 and 1: 
 As the citizen still face challenges to have the tickets, they 
maintain a good rapport by providing Bakshish (tips) to the lower 
level officials. 
 
 Higher level of E-governance 
may curtail the discretionary 
power of the officials and then 
the people may not feel the need 
to maintain the relationships 
with the officials by providing 
Bakshish (tips). 
o Scarcity of tickets 
o Behavior of the 
employees (like 
telling lie about the 
tickets, hassles etc.) 
Use of Tadbir 
(lobbying) who has 
connection with the 
influential persons (like 
politicians or high 
officials) 
E-governance Level - 3.5: 
 Need not to do Tadbir (lobbying) as one can purchase the tickets 
directly 
E-governance Level -2 and 1: 
 As the citizen still face the challenges to have the ticket, still need 
to do Tadbir (lobbying)  to have tickets. 
 Depersonalizing or complete 
automation of the system may 
make difficult the processes of 
Tadbir (lobbying). 
 Because under such situation 
persuasion may not be effective 
as the process is automated. 
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Appendix 13: Interview Guide for the Case Studies 
 
District Land Administration 
 
For Service Providers 
 
1. For how long have you been involved with the district land administration?  
2. What is the background of the establishment of DESC/NESS? 
3. What is your general impression about the District e-Service Center (DESC) or National E-Service 
System (NESS)? 
4. What are the general merits and demerits of the DESC/NESS? 
5. What was the condition of corruption before the introduction of DESC/NESS? 
6. Is there any change of the level of corruption after the introduction of DESC/NESS? If yes then how?   
7. If DESC/NESS cannot bring any changes of the corruption level in the district land administration 
then please explain the causes. 
8. Does DESC/NESS bring any change in the accountability system of the district land administration? 
If yes then how?   
9. If DESC/NESS cannot change the accountability system of the district land administration, then 
please mention the causes. 
10. Can DESC/NESS bring any changes in the power relations in the organization? If yes then how?   
11. If DESC/NESS fails to change the power relation then what are the probable causes? 
12. Does DESC/NESS can affect the monopoly of the service delivery system? If yes then how?   
13. If DESC/NESS fails to change the monopoly then what are the reasons? 
14. What are the challenges of the implementation of DESC/NESS? 
 
For Service Seekers 
 
1. What is your general impression about the District e-Service Center (DESC) or National E-Service 
System (NESS)? 
2. Does DESC/NESS have any significant impact on the ‘accessibility to the service’ in the district land 
administration and how? 
3. What was the condition of corruption before the introduction of DESC/NESS? 
4. Is there any change of the level of corruption after the introduction of DESC/NESS? If yes then how?   
15. If DESC/NESS cannot bring any changes of the corruption level in the district land administration 
then please explain the causes. 
5. Does DESC/NESS has any change in the accountability system of the district land administration and 
how? 
6. If DESC/NESS cannot change the accountability system of the district land administration, then then 
please mention the causes. 
7. Can DESC/NESS bring any changes in the power relations in the organization and how? 
8. If DESC/NESS fails to change the power relation then what are the probable causes? 
9. Does DESC/NESS can affect the monopoly of the service delivery system and how? 
10. If DESC/NESS fails to change the monopoly then what are the reasons? 
11. What are the general merits and demerits of the DESC/NESS? 
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Bangladesh Railway 
 
For Service Providers 
 
1. For how long have you been involved with Bangladesh Railway?  
2. What is your general impression about the E/M/C-ticketing? 
3. What is the background of the establishment of E/M/C-ticketing? 
4. What are the general merits and demerits of the E/M/C-ticketing? 
5. What was the condition of corruption before the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? 
6. Is there any change of the level of corruption after the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? If yes, then 
how?   
7. If E/M/C-ticketing cannot bring any changes of the corruption level in the ticketing system of BR 
then please explain the causes. 
8. Does E/M/C-ticketing has any change in the accountability system of the ticketing system of BR? If 
yes, then how?   
9. If E/M/C-ticketing cannot change the accountability system of the ticketing system of BR, then why? 
10. Can E/M/C-ticketing bring any changes in the power relations in the organization? If yes, then how?   
11. If E/M/C-ticketing fails to change the power relation then what are the probable causes? 
12. Does E/M/C-ticketing can affect the monopoly of the service delivery system? If yes, then how?   
13. If E/M/C-ticketing fails to change the monopoly then what are the reasons? 
14. What are the challenges of the implementation of E/M/C-ticketing? 
 
For Service Seekers 
 
1. What is your general impression about the E/M/C-ticketing? 
2. Does E/M/C-ticketing have any significant impact on the ‘accessibility to the service’ in the district 
ticketing system of BR and how? 
3. What was the condition of corruption before the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? 
4. Is there any change of the level of corruption after the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? If yes then 
how?   
5. If E/M/C-ticketing cannot bring any changes of the corruption level in the ticketing system of BR 
then please explain the causes. 
6. Does E/M/C-ticketing has any change in the accountability system of the ticketing system of BR? If 
yes, then how?   
7. If E/M/C-ticketing cannot change the accountability system of the ticketing system of BR, then why? 
8. Can E/M/C-ticketing bring any changes in the power relations in the organization? If yes, then how?   
9. If E/M/C-ticketing fails to change the power relation then what are the probable causes? 
10. Does E/M/C-ticketing can affect the monopoly of the service delivery system? If yes, then how?   
11. If E/M/C-ticketing fails to change the monopoly then what are the reasons? 
12. What are the general merits and demerits of the E/M/C-ticketing? 
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Appendix 14: Questionnaire for District Land Administration 
 
Form No.:  
 
Reducing Corruption through E-Governance: Rhetoric or Reality? 
An Empirical Inquiry 
 
Objective: The objective of the questionnaire is to understand the probable effects of District e-Service Center (DESC) 
or National E-Service System (NESS) on corruption. The study is being undertaken for partial fulfillment of the 
requirement of the course Master of Philosophy in Public Administration under the University of Bergen, Norway.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part A: Socio-economic background of the respondent 
 
1. Gender:    
Code Gender Put a (√) mark 
1 Male  
2 Female  
 
2. Age :  
 
Code Age Range Put a (√) mark 
1 < 20  
2 21-25  
3 26-30  
4 31-35  
5 36-40  
6 41-45  
7 46-50  
8 51 and above  
 
 
 
3.  Education:  
 
Code Education Level Put a (√) mark 
1 Illiterate  
2 Literate  
3 Primary level  ( 1-5 )  
4 Lower secondary level ( high school 6-8)  
5 Secondary level  (S.S.C passed)  
6 Higher secondary level (H.S.S passed)  
7 Graduate degree  
8 Master’s degree or higher  
 
Note: 
 Data collected through this questionnaire will be used for research purpose only and 
personal identity of the respondents will not be disclosed. So, I am humbly seeking your 
kind cooperation to help the research work by providing the valuable information.  
 There is no right or wrong answers; we want to hear your own personal views. 
 Please tick wherever applicable. 
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4. Occupational Status:  
 
Code Occupational Status Put a (√) mark 
1 Service/Working  
2 Self-employed  
3 Unemployed  
4 Retired  
5 Student  
6 House wife  
7 Other (Plz. mention)…………………….  
 
Part B: Quality of Services in District Land Administration (DC Office)   
 
5. Nature of the District:  
 
Code Area Put a (√) mark 
1 Urban  
2 Rural  
 
6. You know about District e-Service Center (DESC) or National E-Service System (NESS) by: 
  
1) Providing Services           2) Receiving Services               3) Others, (Plz. mention)…………. 
 
7. Please state your satisfaction level of the services of the DC office on land related services after the 
introduction of DESC/ NESS 
 
Very 
unsatisfactory(1) 
Unsatisfactory (2) Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory (3) 
Satisfactory (4) Very Satisfactory (5) 
     
 
8. Please state your satisfaction level of the services of the DC office on land related services before the 
introduction of DESC/NESS 
 
Very 
unsatisfactory(1) 
Unsatisfactory (2) Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory (3) 
Satisfactory (4) Very Satisfactory (5) 
     
 
9. If the quality of the services varies then please mention the reasons: 
1. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
2. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
10. How do you rank the ‘magnitude of corruption’ before the introduction of DESC/NESS on land related 
services in the DC office? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
11. How do you rank the ‘magnitude of corruption’ after the introduction of DESC/NESS on land related 
services in the DC office? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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12. If the magnitude of corruption varies for land related services then please mention the reasons: 
1. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
2. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
13. If there is corruption before the introduction of DESC/NESS, then which types of corruption were 
dominant? (Like bribe, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, favoritism, political/ bureaucratic influence etc.)  
Code Types of Corruption 
Lowest                          Highest 
1  1 2 3 4 5 6 
2  1 2 3 4 5 6 
3  1 2 3 4 5 6 
4  1 2 3 4 5 6 
5  1 2 3 4 5 6 
6  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
14. If there is corruption after the introduction of DESC/NESS, then which types of corruption were 
dominant? (Like bribe, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, favoritism, political/ bureaucratic influence etc.)  
Code Types of Corruption 
Lowest                          Highest 
1  1 2 3 4 5 6 
2  1 2 3 4 5 6 
3  1 2 3 4 5 6 
4  1 2 3 4 5 6 
5  1 2 3 4 5 6 
6  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
Part C: Changing Patterns and Explanations  
 
15. How do you rank the level of ‘Accountability’ on land related services before the introduction of 
DESC/NESS in the DC office? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
16. How do you rank the level of ‘Accountability’ on land related services after the introduction of 
DESC/NESS in the DC office? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
17. If the level of ‘Accountability’ varies for the land related services in DC office then please mention the 
changing processes: 
1. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
2. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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18. How do you rank the level of ‘Discretionary Power’ of the officials for the land related services before 
the introduction of DESC/NESS in the DC office? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
19. How do you rank the level of ‘Discretionary Power’ of the officials for the land related services after 
the introduction of DESC/NESS in the DC office? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
20. If the level of ‘Discretionary Power’ of the officials varies for the land related services in DC office 
then please mention the changing processes: 
1. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
2. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
21. How do you rank the level of ‘Monopoly’ of the desk based service delivery channel before the 
introduction of DESC/NESS in DC office? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
22. How do you rank the level of ‘Monopoly’ of the desk based service delivery channel after the 
introduction of DESC/NESS in DC office? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
23. If the level of ‘Monopoly’ of the officials varies for the land related services in DC office then please 
mention the changing processes: 
1. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
2. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
24. If you have any comments or observations on the provable effects of DESC/NESS on the level of 
corruption in land related services of the DC office, then please mention: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Thank you for your kind cooperation. 
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Appendix 15: Questionnaire for Bangladesh Railway  
 
Form No.:  
 
Reducing Corruption through E-Governance: Rhetoric or Reality? 
An Empirical Inquiry 
 
Objective: The objective of the questionnaire is to understand the probable effects of E/M/C-ticketing on associated 
corruption. The study is being undertaken for partial fulfillment of the requirement of the course Master of Philosophy 
in Public Administration under the University of Bergen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part A: Socio-economic background of the respondent 
 
3. Gender:    
Code Gender Put a (√) mark 
1 Male  
2 Female  
4. Age :  
 
Code Age Range Put a (√) mark 
1 < 20  
2 21-25  
3 26-30  
4 31-35  
5 36-40  
6 41-45  
7 46-50  
8 51 and above  
 
4.  Education:  
 
Code Education Level Put a (√) mark 
1 Illiterate  
2 Literate  
3 Primary level  ( 1-5 )  
4 Lower secondary level ( high school 6-8)  
5 Secondary level  (S.S.C passed)  
6 Higher secondary level (H.S.S passed)  
7 Graduate degree  
8 Master’s degree or higher  
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
 Data collected through this questionnaire will be used for research purpose only and 
personal identity of the respondents will not be disclosed. So, I am humbly seeking your 
kind cooperation to help the research work by providing the valuable information.  
 There is no right or wrong answers; we want to hear your own personal views. 
 Please tick wherever applicable. 
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5. Occupational Status:  
 
Code Occupational Status Put a (√) mark 
1 Service/Working  
2 Self-employed  
3 Unemployed  
4 Retired  
5 Student  
6 House wife  
7 Other (Plz. mention)…………………….  
 
 
Part B: Quality of Services in Bangladesh Railway and E/M/C-ticketing  
 
5. Nature of the District:  
 
Code Area Put a (√) mark 
1 Urban  
2 Rural  
 
6.  You know about E/M/C-ticketing by: 
 
1) Providing Services           2) Receiving Services               3) Others, (Plz. mention)…………. 
 
7. Please state your satisfaction level for purchasing tickets to travel through Railway after the introduction 
of E/M/C-ticketing: 
 
Very 
unsatisfactory(1) 
Unsatisfactory (2) Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory (3) 
Satisfactory (4) Very Satisfactory (5) 
     
 
8. Please state your satisfaction level for purchasing tickets to travel through Railway before the introduction 
of E/M/C-ticketing: 
 
Very 
unsatisfactory(1) 
Unsatisfactory (2) Neither satisfactory nor 
unsatisfactory (3) 
Satisfactory (4) Very Satisfactory (5) 
     
 
9. If the satisfaction level varies then please mention the reasons: 
4. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
5. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
6. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
10. How do you rank the ‘magnitude of corruption’ before the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing in Railway? 
(Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
11. How do you rank the ‘magnitude of corruption’ after the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing in Railway? 
(Low=1 and 6= High) 
Reducing Corruption through E-governance: Rhetoric or Reality 
148 | P a g e  
 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
12. If the magnitude of corruption varies then please mention the reasons: 
1. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
2. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
13. If there is corruption before the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing, then which types of corruption were 
dominant? (Like bribe, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, favoritism, political/ bureaucratic influence etc.) 
Code Types of Corruption 
Lowest                          Highest 
1  1 2 3 4 5 6 
2  1 2 3 4 5 6 
3  1 2 3 4 5 6 
4  1 2 3 4 5 6 
5  1 2 3 4 5 6 
6  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
14. If there is corruption after the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing, then which types of corruption were 
dominant? (Like bribe, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, favoritism, political/ bureaucratic influence etc.) 
Code Types of Corruption 
Lowest                          Highest 
1  1 2 3 4 5 6 
2  1 2 3 4 5 6 
3  1 2 3 4 5 6 
4  1 2 3 4 5 6 
5  1 2 3 4 5 6 
6  1 2 3 4 5 6   
Part C: Changing Patterns and Explanations  
 
15. How do you rank the level of ‘Accountability’ for the officials related with selling tickets for Railway 
before the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
16. How do you rank the level of ‘Accountability’ for the officials related with selling tickets for Railway 
after the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17. If the level of ‘Accountability’ varies then please mention the changing processes: 
1. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
2. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
18. How do you rank the level of ‘Discretionary Power’ of the officials who are related with selling of the 
tickets for Railway before the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
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Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
19. How do you rank the level of ‘Discretionary Power’ of the officials who are related with selling of the 
tickets for Railway after the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
20. If the level of ‘Discretionary Power’ of the officials varies after the introduction of E/M/C-ticketing  
for selling tickets for Railway then please mention the changing processes: 
1. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
2. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
21. How do you rank the level of ‘Monopoly’ of the traditional counter based ticketing system before the 
introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
22. How do you rank the level of ‘Monopoly’ of the traditional counter based ticketing system after the 
introduction of E/M/C-ticketing? (Low=1 and 6= High) 
Low                                                                                                                                                                  High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
23. If the level of ‘Monopoly’ of the officials varies, then please mention the changing processes: 
1. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
2. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
24. Do you have any comments or observations on the provable effects of E/M/C-ticketing on the level of 
corruption related with ticketing in Bangladesh Railway? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Thank you for your kind cooperation. 
